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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 




CITY OF McCALL, 
Defendant. 
CITY OF McCALL, 
Counterclaimant, 
V. 
RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE 
VILLAGE, LLC, 
Counter-defendant. 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Ada ) 
I, MARTIN C. HENDRICKSON, being first duly sworn, depose and say: 
1. I am one of the attorneys for the Defendant/Counterclaimant City of McCall in 
this matter. I make this affidavit based upon my personal knowledge. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A IS a true and correct copy of 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefedants' Response to City's First Set of Discovery Requests. 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 
tL /A, 
DATED this _J_ day of April, 2011. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this _Lj-f---- day of April, 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
uf1 I hereby certify that on the -(--- day of April, 20 I I, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served by the following means: 
Jed Manwaring 
Victor Villegas 
Evans Keane LLP 
1405 West Main 
P.O. Box 959 
Boise, ID 83701-0959 
jmanwaring@evanskeane.com 
vvillegas@evanskeane.com 
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Jed Manwaring ISB #3040 
Victor Villegas ISB# 5860 
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Boise, Idaho 83701-0959 
Telephone: (208) 384-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 345-3514 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 




CITY OF McCALL, 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. 
Case No. CV 2010-276C 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERDEFENDANTS' 
RESPONSE TO CITY'S FIRST SET OF 
DISCOVERY REQUESTS TO 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS 
COMES NOW Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants Richard Hehr and Greystone Village, LLC 
(hereinafter "Plaintiffs"), by and through their attorney of record, EVANS KEANE LLP, and 
answers and responds to Defendant/Counterclaimant VaiJey County's (hereinafter "Defendant") 
First Set of Discovery Requests, as follows: 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION. INTERROGATORIES, 
AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1. Please identify each owner of the Project (or interests 
therein) and state when each ownership interest was acquired, from whom it was acquired, and 
the nature of the interest. 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' RESPO i 
TO PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS· I J 
EXHIBIT 
A F DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
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ANSWER NO. l: 
I. Plaintiff Greystone Village, LLC is an Idaho limited liability company formed on 
November 5, 2004. Greystone Village was the applicant for the Project at issue and holds the 
title to the real property and is the owner of the Project. 
2. Plaintiff Richard Hehr is the sole remaining member of Plaintiff Greystone 
Village, LLC and the assignee of all claims or causes of action that Greystone Village, LLC may 
have, including the claims and causes of action in this matter. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1. Please produce all current Documents (articles, 
bylaws, Secretary of State registration, etc.) showing the current corporate or other 
organizational status of each of the Plaintiffs. 
RESPONSE TO RFP NO. 1: See the documents produced as GREYSTONE I - 6. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. I [SIC] 2. Please produce Documents identifying 
the name and position of each current officer of Greystone. 
RESPONSE TO RFP NO.2: See the documents produced as GREYSTONE I- 6. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. I: Please admit that, other than the refund request 
submitted on November 25, 2009, and the filing this lawsuit, none of the Developers or anyone 
acting on their behalf has raised any objection to the City either before or after the Application 
was approved with respect to the provisions in the Agreement concerning Community Housing. 
RESPONSE TO RFA NO.1: Deny. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2. If Your response to the previous Request for Admission 
was anything other than an unqualified admission, please describe and explain in detail the 
circumstances and substance of each Developer's objection to the provisions in the Agreement 
concerning Community Housing. 
ANSWER NO. 2: Admit only that Plaintiffs made no objection on record, but deny all 
inferences from the lack of an objection. It was made clear to Plaintiffs by the City of McCall 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO CITY'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
TO PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS - 2 
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that community housing mitigation was a condition of approval of Plaintiffs application and/or 
issuance of future approvals. Plaintiffs rightly assumed that the City of McCall could legally 
require and charge a community housing fee. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. I [SIC] 3. If Your response to the previous 
Request for Admission was anything other than an unqualified admission, please produce each 
and every Document of any kind that either constitutes an objection to the provisions in the 
Agreement concerning Community Housing or provides evidence that such an objection was 
made either before or after the Application was approved. 
RESPONSE TO RFP NO. 3: As discovery is ongoing, Plaintiffs reserve the right to 
supplement this Request For Production No. 3 pursuant the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
and/or the Court's Scheduling Order. 
INTERROGATORY NO.3. Please describe in detail the history of the development of 
the Agreement including a description of who drafted the Agreement, how many drafts were 
prepared, and what discussions and communications occurred between representatives of the 
City and the Developers or their representatives respecting the Agreement. 
ANSWER NO. 3: Plaintiffs did not draft the Development Agreement. As discovery is 
ongoing, Plaintiffs reserve the right to supplement their response to Interrogatory No. 3 pursuant 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and/or the Court's Scheduling Order. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1 [SIC] 4. Please produce each draft, written 
communication, or other Document referenced or described in the above Interrogatory. 
RESPONSE TO RFP NO. 4: See the documents produced as GREYSTONE 7- 21. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2: Please admit that Condition No. 19 of the P&Z's 
Pre! iminary Plat approval for S U 8-05-4 does not mandate any particular content of the required 
development agreement. 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO CITY'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
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RESPONSE TO RF A NO. 2: Condition 19 and the document speaks for itself, but deny 
all inferences suggested by the City of McCall. City of McCall Resolution 05-19 and the 
ordinances derived therefrom require community housing in new developments. City of McCall 
officials knew that community housing mitigation was a condition of approval. 
INTERROGATORY NO.4. If Your response to the previous Request for Admission 
was anything other than an unqualified admission, please describe and explain in detail the basis 
for your response. 
ANSWER NO. 4: See response to Request for Admission No. 2. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. l [SIC] 5. If Your response to the previous 
Request for Admission was anything other than an unqualified admission, please produce each 
and every Document of any kind that supports or relates to your response. 
RESPONSE TO RFP NO.5: As discovery is ongoing, Plaintiffs reserve the right to 
supplement this Request for Production No.5 pursuant the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and/or 
the Court's Scheduling Order. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3: Please admit that Condition No. 19 of the P&Z's 
Preliminary Plat approval for SUB-05-4 does not mandate payment of a community housing fee 
nor does it mandate any other cash or in-kind contribution by the Developers to the City. 
RESPONSE TO RFA NO.3: Condition 19 and the document speaks for itself, but deny 
all inferences suggested by the City of McCall. City of McCall Resolution 05-19 and the 
ordinances derived therefrom require community housing in new developments. City of McCall 
officials knew that community housing mitigation was a condition of approval. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5. If Your response to the previous Request for Admission 
was anything other than an unqualified admission, please describe and explain in detail the basis 
for your response. 
ANSWER NO.5: See response to Request for Admission No.3. 
flLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO CITY'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. I [SIC] 6. If Your response to the previous 
Request for Admission was anything other than an unqualified admission, please produce each 
and every Document of any kind that supports or relates to your response. 
RESPONSE TO RFP NO. 6: As discovery is ongoing, Plaintiffs reserve the right to 
supplement this Request For Production No. 6 pursuant the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
and/or the Court's Scheduling Order. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4: Please admit that none of the Developers or 
anyone acting on their behalf filed an appeal of the P&Z's Preliminary Plat approval for SUB-
05-4. 
RESPONSE TO RF A NO. 4: Admit only that no appeal was made because the 
Developers were led to believe by the City of McCall that it could legally require the Developers 
to provide for community housing or community housing mitigation. Developers have now 
discovered that the City of McCall's requirement for community housing mitigation was illegal. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6. If Your response to the previous Request for Admission 
was anything other than an unqualified admission, please describe and explain in detail the basis 
for your response. 
ANSWER NO. 6: See response to Request for Admission No. 4. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. I [SICJ 7. If Your response to the previous 
Request for Admission was anything other than an unqualified admission, please produce each 
and every Document of any kind that supports or relates to your response. 
RESPONSE TO RFP NO. 7: As discovery is ongoing, Plaintiffs reserve the right to 
supplement this Request For Production No. 7 pursuant the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
and/or the Court's Scheduling Order. 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.5: Please admit that Condition No. 19 ofthe P&Z's 
General Development Plan approval for PUD-05-2 does not mandate any particular content of 
the required development agreement. 
RESPONSE TO RFA NO.5: Condition 19 and the document speaks for itself, but deny 
all inferences suggested by the City of McCall. City of McCall Resolution 05-19 and the 
ordinances derived therefrom require community housing in new developments. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7. If Your response to the previous Request for Admission 
was anything other than an unqualified admission, please describe and explain in detail the basis 
for your response. 
ANSWER NO.7: See response to Request for Admission No.5. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. I [SIC] 8. If Your response to the previous 
Request for Admission was anything other than an unqualified admission, please produce each 
and every Document of any kind that supports or relates to your response. 
RESPONSE TO RFP NO. 8: As discovery is ongoing, Plaintiffs reserve the right to 
supplement this Request For Production No. 6 pursuant the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
and/or the Court's Scheduling Order. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6: Please admit that Condition No. 19 of the P&Z's 
General Development Plan approval for PUD-05-2 does not mandate payment of a community 
housing fee nor does it mandate any other cash or in-kind contribution by the Developers to the 
City. 
RESPONSE TO RF A NO. 6: Condition 19 and the document speaks for itself, but deny 
all inferences suggested by the City of McCall. City of McCall Resolution 05-19 and the 
ordinances derived therefrom require community housing in new developments. City of McCall 
officials knew that community housing mitigation was a condition of approval. 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO CITY'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
TO PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS- 6 
/98 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8. If Your response to the previous Request for Admission 
was anything other than an unqualified admission, please describe and explain in detail the basis 
for your response. 
ANSWER NO.8: See response to Request for Admission No.6. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. I [SIC] 9. If Your response to the previous 
Request for Admission was anything other than an unqualified admission, please produce each 
and every Document of any kind that supports or relates to your response. 
RESPONSE TO RFP NO. 9: As discovery is ongoing, Plaintiffs reserve the right to 
supplement this Request For Production No. 9 pursuant the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
and/or the Court's Scheduling Order. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7: Please admit that none of the Developers or 
anyone acting on their behalf filed an appeal of the P&Z's General Development Plan approval 
for PUD-05-2 or objected to any of the conditions therein when it was considered by the 
Council. 
RESPONSE TO RFA NO.7: Admit only that no appeal was made because the 
Developers were led to believe by the City of McCall that it could legally require the Developers 
to provide for community housing mitigation. Developers have now discovered that the City of 
McCall's requirement for community housing mitigation was illegal. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9. If Your response to the previous Request for Admission 
was anything other than an unqualified admission, please describe and explain in detail the basis 
for your response. 
ANSWER NO.9: See response to Request for Admission No.7. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. I [SIC] 10. If Your response to the previous 
Request for Admission was anything other than an unqualified admission, please produce each 
and every Document of any kind that supports or relates to your response. 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO CITY'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
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RESPONSE TO RFP NO. 10: As discovery is ongoing, Plaintiffs reserve the right to 
supplement this Request For Production No. 10 pursuant the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
and/or the Court's Scheduling Order. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8: Please admit that Greystone executed the 
Agreement on May 3, 2006, a true and correct copy of which is Exhibit E to the City's Answer 
to First Amended Complaint and Counterclaim. 
RESPONSE TO RFA NO.8: Admit only that Greystone's authorized representative 
executed a Development Agreement with the City of McCall and that Greystone was led to 
believe by the City of McCall that it could legally require the payment of community housing 
fees or community housing mitigation as addressed in the agreement. City of McCall officials 
knew that the illegal community housing fees were a condition of approval and included in the 
mandated content of the required development agreement. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10. If Your response to the previous Request for Admission 
was anything other than an unqualified admission, please describe and explain in detail the basis 
for your response. 
ANSWER NO. 10: See response to Request for Admission No. 10. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1 [SIC] 11. If Your response to the previous 
Request for Admission was anything other than an unqualified admission, please produce each 
and every Document of any kind that supports or relates to your response. 
RESPONSE TO RFP NO. 11: As discovery is ongoing, Plaintiffs reserve the right to 
supplement this Request For Production No. 11 pursuant the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
and/or the Court's Scheduling Order. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 9: Please admit that the Findings and Conclusions 
Regarding Final Plan Approval for PUD-05-2 and SUB 05-4 include, as Finding No. 16, "While 
the applicant is not required to provide a Community Housing Plan, the applicant has agreed to 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO CITY'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
TO PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS- 8 
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deed the nine single family residential lots that constitute Phase 3 of the project to the City of 
McCall to provide Community Housing." 
RESPONSE TO RF A NO. 9: Admit only that Greystone was led to believe by the City 
of McCall that it could legally require the payment of community housing mitigation. City of 
McCall officials knew that the i lie gal community housing fees were a condition of approval and 
included in the mandated content of the required development agreement. 
INTERROGATORY NO. II. If Your response to the previous Request for Admission 
was anything other than an unqualified admission, please describe and explain in detail the basis 
for your response. 
ANSWER NO. I I: See response to Request for Admission No. 9. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1 [SIC] 12. If Your response to the previous 
Request for Admission was anything other than an unqualified admission, please produce each 
and every Document of any kind that supports or relates to your response. 
RESPONSE TO RFP NO. 12: As discovery is ongoing, Plaintiffs reserve the right to 
supplement this Request For Production No. 11 pursuant the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
and/or the Court's Scheduling Order. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 10: Please admit that none of the Developers, or 
anyone acting on their behalf, objected to Finding No. 16 of the Findings and Conclusions 
Regarding Final Plan Approval for PUD-05-2 and SUB 05-4. 
RESPONSE TO RF A NO. 10: Admit only that Greystone was led to believe by the City 
of McCall that it could legally require the payment of community housing mitigation. City of 
McCall officials knew that the illegal community housing fees were a condition of approval. 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO CITY'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 12. If Your response to the previous Request for Admission 
was anything other than an unqualified admission, please describe and explain in detail the basis 
for your response. 
ANSWER NO. 12: See response to Request for Admission No. 10. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. I [SIC] 13. If Your response to the previous 
Request for Admission was anything other than an unqualified admission, please produce each 
and every Document of any kind that supports or relates to your response. 
RESPONSE TO RFP NO. 13: As discovery is ongoing, Plaintiffs reserve the right to 
supplement this Request For Production No. 13 pursuant the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
and/or the Court's Scheduling Order. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. II: Please admit that the Minutes of the McCall 
City Council meeting on April 27, 2006, state that "Steve Benad introduced himself as the 
developer for Greystone Village, and explained to Council that he wanted to get some 
community housing built and available as soon as possible." 
RESPONSE TO RF A NO. 11: The referenced meeting minutes speak for themselves, 
but deny any inference suggested by the City of McCall or that the meeting minutes accurately or 
fully explain or identify what was said, the nature of what was said or the context in which it was 
said. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13. If Your response to the previous Request for Admission 
was anything other than an unqualified admission, please describe and explain in detail the basis 
for your response. 
ANSWER NO. 13: See response to Request for Admission No. II. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. l [SIC] 14. If Your response to the previous 
Request for Admission was anything other than an unqualified admission, please produce each 
and every Document of any kind that supports or relates to your response. 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO CITY'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
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RESPONSE TO RFP NO. 14: As discovery is ongoing, Plaintiffs reserve the right to 
supplement this Request For Production No. 14 pursuant the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
and/or the Court's Scheduling Order. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12: Please admit that Mr. Benad made the statement 
that is attributed to him in the Minutes of the McCall City Council meeting on April 27, 2006, 
wherein those minutes it reports that Mr. Benad introduced himself as the developer for 
Greystone Village and said "that he wanted to get some community housing built and available 
as soon as possible," 
RESPONSE TO RF A NO. 12: The referenced meeting minutes speak for themselves, 
but deny any inference suggested by the City of McCall or that the meeting minutes accurately or 
fully explain or identify what was said, the nature of what was said or the context in which it was 
said. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14. If Your response to the previous Request for Admission 
was anything other than an unqualified admission, please describe and explain in detail the basis 
for your response. 
ANSWER NO. 14: See response to Request for Admission No. 12. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. I [SIC] 15. If Your response to the previous 
Request for Admission was anything other than an unqualified admission, please produce each 
and every Document of any kind that supports or relates to your response. 
RESPONSE TO RFP NO. 15: As discovery is ongoing, Plaintiffs reserve the right to 
supplement this Request For Production No. 15 pursuant the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
and/or the Court's Scheduling Order. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 13: Please admit the City has met its material 
obligations under the Development Agreement to date. 
RESPONSE TO RFA NO. 13: Deny. 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO CITY'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 15. If Your response to the previous Request for Admission 
was anything other than an unqualified admission, please describe and explain in detail each 
manner and instance in which the City has not met its material obligations under the 
Development Agreement to date. 
ANSWER NO. 15: The City of McCall has breached its duty of good faith and fair 
dealing that is part of all contracts under Idaho law because it conditioned approval of Plaintiffs 
application on the payment of community housing mitigation fees as part of the development 
agreement. Discovery is ongoing in this matter. Plaintiff's reserve the right to supplement their 
response to Interrogatory No. 15 pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and/or the 
Court's scheduling order. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. I [SIC] 16. If Your response to the previous 
Request for Admission was anything other than an unqualified admission, please produce each 
and every Document of any kind that you contend shows that the City has not met its material 
obligations under the Development Agreement to date. 
RESPONSE TO RFP NO. 16: As discovery is ongoing, Plaintiffs reserve the right to 
supplement this Request For Production No. 16 pursuant the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
and/or the Court's Scheduling Order. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16. Please identify, explain, and describe each instance in 
which Developers or any of them cautioned the City that it should not rely on the Development 
Agreement. 
ANSWER NO. 16: Plaintiffs are without knowledge that they or any of them made any 
statements cautioning the City of McCall not to rely on the Development Agreement. The 
Development Agreement was entered because Developers were lead to believe by the City of 
McCall that it could legally require the community housing mitigation requirements set forth in 
the agreement. All developers in the City of McCall and City oflicials knew that community 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO CITY'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
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housing mitigation was a condition of approval and part of the mandated content of the required 
development agreement. The City of McCall cannot require developers pay illegal fees to 
mitigate community housing and then defend its illegal actions on grounds that it was not 
cautioned by the Developers that the City was acting outside the scope of its authority or was 
imposing an illegal fee. The duty to know the legal limits of its authority and not to impose 
illegal fees rests squarely on the City, not Developers. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1 [SIC] 17. Please produce all Documents or 
other evidence showing that Developers or any of them cautioned the City that it should not rely 
on the Development Agreement. 
RESPONSE TO RFP NO. 17: As discovery is ongoing, Plaintiffs reserve the right to 
supplement this Request For Production No. 17 pursuant the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
and/or the Court's Scheduling Order. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 17. Please identify and describe each step Developers or those 
acting on their behalf have taken to exhaust administrative and judicial remedies available to 
them with regard to the issues described in the Complaint, prior to filing this lawsuit. 
ANSWER NO. 17: Developers were unaware that Valley County was operating outside 
the scope of its authority in imposing illegal fees to mitigate community housing. Developers 
had no opportunity to exhaust administrative remedies, if any, because the City of McCall 
misrepresented that it had authority to impose community housing mitigation. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 18. Please identify and describe each fact that supports Your 
contention, contained in paragraph 9 of the First Amended Complaint, that, "As a condition of 
approval of its land use application for a planned unit development, the City required Greystone 
to pay a fee that was being collected by the City for workforce housing (community housing)." 
ANSWER NO. 18: City of McCall policies, Resolutions and ordinances require 
developers to mitigate for community housing. Plaintifrs application was approved with the 
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condition that Plaintiffs enter into a development agreement with the City of McCall. Contents 
of the development agreement were not presented to Plaintiffs at the time of approval. On 
information and belief, Article VII of the Development Agreement drafted by the City of McCall 
requiring Plaintiffs to mitigate for community housing was based on the City of McCall's 
existing policies, Resolutions and ordinances. Discovery is ongoing in this matter. Plaintiffs 
reserve the right to supplement their response to Interrogatory No. I8 pursuant to the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure and the Court's scheduling order. 
INTERROGATORY NO. I9. Please identify and describe each fact that supports Your 
contention, contained in paragraph I 0 of the First Amended Complaint, that, "Greystone was 
given the option of deeding lots from its development project to the City in lieu of paying the 
community housing fee." 
ANSWER NO. 19: During discussions between City of McCall Development Services 
staff and Developers including, but not limited to, Richard Hehr and Steven Benad, and their 
engineer, Dean Briggs, City of McCall staff informed Developers that they had the option of 
deeding lots from its Project to the city in lieu of paying a community housing fee. Discovery is 
ongoing in this matter. Plaintiffs reserve the right to supplement their response to Interrogatory 
No. 18 pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court's scheduling order. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 20. Please identify and describe each fact that supports Your 
contention, contained in paragraph I 0 of the First Amended Complaint, that, "Greystone was 
given the option of deeding lots from its development project to the City in lieu of paying the 
community housing fee." 
ANSWER NO. 20: See response to Interrogatory No. I9. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. I [SIC] I8. Please produce copies of all 
Documents or evidence that support, relate or refer to any of the facts identified in Your answers 
to Interrogatories Nos. 19 and 20. 
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RESPONSE TO RFP NO. 18: See documents produced as GREYSTONE 22 - 126 and 
BRIGGS I - 1039. Discovery is ongoing in this matter. Plaintiffs reserve the right to 
supplement their response to Request for Production No. 18 pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the Court's scheduling order. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1 [SIC] 19. Please produce copies of all 
Documents or evidence referenced or described in Your responses to any of the above 
Interrogatories. 
RESPONSE TO RFP NO. 19: See documents produced as GREYSTONE 22- 126 and 
BRIGGS I - 1039. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. I [SIC] 20. Please provide copies of any 
Documents that You relied on to respond to these Discovery Requests. 
RESPONSE TO RFP NO. 20: Plaintiffs object to Request for Production No. 20 to the 
extent it seeks the discovery of documents or items protected by the attorney/client privilege 
and/or the work product doctrine. Without waiving this objection, see documents produced as 
GREYSTONE 22 - 126 and BRIGGS I - I 039. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 21. Identify each and every person who has knowledge of 
facts concerning the subject matter of this action, and for each person state: 
(a) Residence address and telephone number. 
(b) Business address and telephone number. 
(c) Whether You, Your agents, representatives, and/or attorneys have spoken 
with said person, and if so, whether any oral or written statement has been 
obtained from said person. 
(d) State the general nature of the facts of which such person has knowledge. 
(e) Identify each and every Document obtained by You, Your agents, 
representatives, and/or attorneys from said person or known to You, Your 
agents, representatives, and/or attorneys to be in the possession of said 
person that relates to the subject matter of this action. 
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ANSWER NO. 21: Plaintiffs object to Interrogatory No. 21 on grounds that it is 
impermissibly compound, overbroad, and seeks the discovery of information protected by the 
attorney client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Without waiving these objections, the 
following persons may have knowledge of the facts and circumstances ofthis action: 
I. Plaintiff Richard Hehr. Mr. Hehr may be contacted through counsel of record. 
Mr. Hehr has knowledge of Plaintiff's application for the Project and the subject matter of this 
litigation. 
2. Steven Benad. Mr. Benad's contact information is unknown to Plaintiffs at this 
time. Mr. Benad has knowledge of Plaintiff's application for the Project and the subject matter 
of this litigation. 
3. City of McCall Planning and Zoning personnel and Commissioners, City Council 
Members, Mayor, Engineers and other City of McCall officials, representatives, agents or 
employees at the time of Plaintiff's application may have knowledge of Plaintiff's application, 
the Project, and City of McCall policies, resolutions and ordinances related to community 
housing mitigation. This may include, but is not limited to, Michelle Groenevelt, Community 
Planner; Steve Hasson, Planning Manager; Lindley S. Kirkpatrick, City Manager; and Roger 
Millar, Development Services. 
4. Dean Briggs, Briggs Engineering. Mr. Briggs served as Plaintiff's engineer for 
the project and may have knowledge regarding the Project and Plaintiff's application. Mr. 
Briggs may be contacted through counsel for Plaintiffs. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 22. State the name, address, and telephone number of each 
and every person whom You expect to call as a factual witness at the trial of this action. 
ANSWER NO. 22: Plaintiffs have not yet identified each and every factual witness they 
expect to call at the trial of this action. Plaintiffs reserve the right to call any factual witness 
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identified in discovery. As discovery is ongoing in this matter, Plaintiffs will supplement their 
response pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and/or the Court's scheduling order. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 23. Have You, Your attorneys, or any person, firm, or 
corporation acting on Your behalf consulted with or engaged any expert that may be called at the 
trial of this action? If so, please state the name and address of each such expert and provide all 
of the information provided for under I.R.C.P. Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i). 
ANSWER NO. 23: Plaintiffs have not yet engaged any expert witness that may be 
called at the trial of this action. As discovery is ongoing in this matter, Plaintiffs will supplement 
their response pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and/or the Court's scheduling 
order. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 24. Please identify and describe each and every Document or 
tangible item of evidence You expect to introduce or use or may use at trial of the above-titled 
matter. Please provide sufficient detail (e.g. date, author, subject matter) to identify and 
distinguish each item from each other Document or tangible item of evidence produced or used 
in this action. 
ANSWER NO. 24: Plaintiffs have not yet identified every document or tangible item 
they expect to introduce at the trial of this matter. Plaintiffs reserve the right to identify as an 
exhibit any item produced or identified during discovery in this matter. As discovery is ongoing 
in this matter, Plaintiffs reserve the right to supplement their response pursuant to the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure and/or the Court's scheduling order. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 25. Please identify and describe all material statements, 
representations, communications, and/or admissions, whether written, spoken, or otherwise, 
which You attribute to Defendant or its agent(s) or representative(s) in full, complete, and 
material detail, and state for each the substance thereof, the identity of the person making the 
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statement or admission, the date and/or place where the statement or admission was made, and 
the identity of each and every person who heard or observed each statement or admission. 
ANSWER NO. 25: Plaintiffs object to Interrogatory No. 25 on grounds it is vague. As 
discovery is ongoing in this matter, Plaintiffs reserve the right to supplement their response 
pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and/or the Court's scheduling order. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. I [SIC] 21. Please produce all Documents that 
relate in any way to any material statements, representations, communications, and/or admissions 
which You attribute to the Defendant or its agent(s) or representative(s) on which You relied in 
Your answer to Interrogatory No. 22. 
RESPONSE TO RFP NO. 21: See response to Interrogatory No. 22. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 26.: Please set forth a full and complete itemization of all 
damages claimed by You whether in or related to Your Complaint, identifying the source for all 
such damages and stating in dollars and cents the amount of money You are seeking for each. 
Your response should also include a full and complete description of the method{s) used in 
calculating all such damages, the identification of all Documents, items, or things which support 
or relate to the existence or computation of all such damages, and the identification of each 
person who has or who You believe may have knowledge of the facts which relate to the 
existence or computation of all such damages. 
ANSWER NO. 26: Plaintiffs object to Interrogatory No. 26 on grounds that it is 
compound and overbroad, and to the extent it seeks discovery of information protected by the 
attorney/client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Without waiving these objections 
Plaintiffs damages include the fair market value of the lots deeded to the City of McCall, the 
costs to build out McCall A venue, and all other related costs for utility construction and hook 
ups required by the City of McCall for the deeded lots. As discovery is ongoing in this matter, 
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Plaintiffs reserve the right to supplement their response to Interrogatory No. 26 pursuant to the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and/or the Court's scheduling order. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. I [SIC] 22. Please produce all Documents relating 
to any damages claimed by You in this action. 
RESPONSE TO RFP NO. 22: See response to Interrogatory No. 26 and the objections 
stated therein. Without waiving these objections, see the documents produced as GREYSTONE 
115 - 126. Discovery is ongoing in this matter. Plaintiffs reserve the right to supplement their 
response to Request for Production No. 22 pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and 
the Court's scheduling order. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. l [SIC] 23. Please produce any and all 
Documents and items of tangible evidence that You expect to introduce or use or may use at trial 
of this action. 
RESPONSE TO RFP NO. 23: See response to Interrogatory No. 24. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. I [SIC] 24. Please produce any and all 
Documents and items of tangible evidence seen, reviewed, maintained, or generated by any 
expert witness who will testify on behalf of Plaintiffs, or any of them, at the trial of this action, 
including but not limited to all Documents that reflect, document, or otherwise describe facts 
known and/or opinions held by any such expert witness. 
RESPONSE TO RFP NO. 24: See response to Interrogatory No. 23. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. I [SIC] 25. Please provide copies of any and all 
documents that constitute communications between any of the Developers and any other person 
at any time regarding the subject matter of the Complaint filed in this action. 
RESPONSE TO RFP NO. 25: Plaintiffs object to Request for Production No. 25 to the 
extent it seeks discovery of communications protected by the attorney client privilege. Without 
waiving this objection, see the documents produced in response to these discovery requests. 
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Discovery is ongoing in this matter. Plaintiffs reserve the right to supplement their response to 
Request for Production No. 25 pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court's 
scheduling order. 
DATED this l31h day of January, 2011. 
EVANS KEANE LLP 
By Y#1r:~ 
Victor Villeg , fThe Fmn 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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VERDICATION 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
) ss. 
County of k04J AM:!el&':> . > 
Richard Hehr. being duly sworn. deposes and says: 
I am a Member of Greystone Village. LLC and a Plaintift7Counterdefendant in the above-
entitled proceeding. and I am authorized to make this verification on its behalf. 
I have read the foregoing PJaintiffsiCounterdefendants• Response to City's First Set of 
Discovery Requests to Plainti:ffsiCounterdefendants'. know the contents thereof: and the same 
are 1rue to the best of my knowledge, information and belief 
Richard Hehr 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this q ,2011. 
Notary Public for California 
Residing at l-/gJ4ltj All1t'N ~tt,tl I c.A 
My Commission Expires: Rc.:r. 1k, ~t>ll 
PLAI:NTlFFSICOUNTER-DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO ClTY'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
TO PLA.INTIFFSICOUNTB!t-DEFENDANTS - 21 213 
dci77n 1 t en no • 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 131h day of January, 20 II, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax 
transmission to; by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person 
in charge of the office as indicated below: 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Martin C. Hendrickson 
Givens Pursley LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ J Overnight Delivery 
[X] Hand Delivery 
Victor Villega 
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i~. gf::\IVOUH l. """'~' 
~ 
Christopher H. Meyer, ISB # 4461 
Martin C. Hendrickson, ISB #5876 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP CaseNo·---~n t N 
s. o. __ _ 
601 West Bannock Street Filed A.M £~~{? P.M 
P.O. Box 2720 





Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant City ofA1cCall 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 




CITY OF McCALL, 
Defendant. 
CITY OF McCALL, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE 
VILLAGE, LLC, 
Counter-defendant. 
:\<lOTION TO ENLARGE PAGE LIMITATION 
Case No: CV 2010-276C 
MOTION TO ENLARGE PAGE 
LIMITATION 
Page 1 of 3 
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COMES NOW the Defendanu'Counterplaintiff, the City of McCall ("City) by and 
through its attorneys of record, and respectfully moves this Court for leave to exceed the page 
limitation for its Opening Brief set by Fourth District Local Rule 8.1. which states that "each 
motion and response to such motion, other than a routine or uncontested matter, must be 
accompanied by a separate memorandum, not to exceed twenty-five (25) pages containing all of 
the reasons, points and authorities relied upon by the moving party." Defendant seeks up to forty 
( 40) pages total Opening Brief 
The grounds for Defendant's request for enlargement of page limits are as follows: 
The City's Motion for Summary Judgment raises numerous issues of both state and 
federal law which the City chose to address in a single motion rather than successive applications 
to the Court. Allowing the City up to forty pages will permit a thorough discussion of the issues 
that will be helpful to the Court. 
I ) 11'--
DATED this_____:]__ day of April, 2011. 




MOTION TO ENLARGE PAGE LIMITATION Page 2 of3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 41h day of April, 20 ll, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
was served by the following means: 
Jed Manwaring 
Victor Villegas 
Evans Keane LLP 
I 405 West Main 
P.O. Box 959 
Boise, ID 83701-0959 
jmanwaring@evanskeane.com 
vvillegas@evanskeane.com 
:\lOTION TO ENLARGE PAGE LIMITATION 





Page 3 of3 
217 
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Jed W. Manwaring, ISB # 3040 
Victor S. Villegas, ISB # 5864> 
EVANS KEANE LLP 
1405 W. Main Street 
CaseNo. ___ _.n,st.No~~-
Fied A.M _ _5_:_!!C?__p~r 
P.O. Box 959 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0959 
Telephone: (208) 384-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 345-3514 
E-Mail: JManwatring@evanskeane.com 
VVllleeas@evanskeane.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DJ.STRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN At"'fD FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 








County of Valley ) 
Case No. CV 2010-276C 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
BONNIE BERTRAM 
BONNJE BERTRAM, being duly sworn upon oath deposes and says as follows: 
1. That Tam an adult over the age of eighteen (18) years, that I am a resident of McCall, 
Valley County, Idaho, and that I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this Affidavit. 
2. I served as a member of the McCall City Council from Novenlber 20,2003 to January 
10, 2008. During that time, McCall experienced rapid growth, including the development and 
construction of residential housing throughout the City. Roger Millar \vas employed by the City as 
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the Director of Community Development and Deputy City Manager during this time. Millar 
implemented ideas regarding affordable housing for the local workforce based on Commrmity 
Housing policies. These policies included the idea that developers were obligated to help provide 
the City with so1utions to workforce housing issues. I agreed with this philosophy and based on my 
conversations and interactions with the other members of the City Council, I believe that they also 
agreed with this philosophy. 
3. In my capacity as a member of the City Council, I was involved in discussions and 
hearings regarding the issue of Community Housing. I was a member of the City Council when 
McCall approved Resolution No. 05-J 9 on September 22, 2005 providing for a Community Housing 
Policy. Resolution No. 05-19 included a mandate to staffto develop ordinances to implement the 
Community Housing Policy. Millar assured us that this was a program that he had seen work in 
other areas. 1 was also a member ofthe City Council when McCall enacted Ordinance Nos. 819 and 
820 on February 23, 2006, to require the payment of Community Housing fees. 
4. Prior to enactment of Ordinance Nos. 819 and 820, developers paid Community 
Housing fees to the City as part of their application. Prior to the ordinances, I did not understand the 
Community Housing Policy to be voluntary. I am not aware of any developer who willingly or 
voluntarily paid a Community Housing fee, or who donated a Commwlity Housing fee to the City. 
Based on my observations and interactions with Millar and staff, it was my belief and understanding 
that Millar instructed staff to exact Community Housing fees from developers. It was my 
understanding that developers were expected to pay Community Housing fees as part of their 
application for land use approvals. If a developer did not pay CommW1ity Housing fees, the 
developer most likely would not have enough points under the City's land use approval matrix to 
obtain an approval. 
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BONNIE BERTRAM 
SUBSCRIBED u.d SWORN to befote me this d~..:.::filaay of April, 20~ 1. 
tal 004 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27m day of April, 201 1, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax 
transmission to; by overnight de1ivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in 
charge of the office as indicated below: 
Christopher H. Meyer 
\1artin C. Hendrickson 
Givens Pursley LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise,ID 83701-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
Attorneys for Defendant 
AI<RlTlAVTT llf.' RO'\ll\;'lE RERTRAM. 4 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ 1 Overnight Delivery 
( ] Hand Delivery 
Victor Villegas 
221 
0412712011 15:56 FAX 208345351 EVANS KEA~'E LLP l4n 006 
Jed W. Manwaring, ISB # 3040 
Vidor S. Villegas, ISB # 5860 
.EVANSKEANELLP 
140S W. Main Street 
CaseNo. __ -'nst.No __ _ 
P.O. Box 959 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0959 
Telephone: (208) 384-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 345-3514 
E-Mail: JManwaring@evanskeane.com 
VVlllegas@evanskeane.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Filed A.M 6 : CO P.M 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COU~ OF VALLEY 




CITY OF McCALL, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Valley ) 
Case No. CV 2010-276C 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
JEFFREY BEEBE 
JEFFREY BEEBE, being duly sworn upon oath deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am an adult over the age of eighteen (18) years, that I am a resident of Boise, Ada 
County, Idaho, and that I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this Affidavit. 
2. I am a licensed certified public accountant in the State of Idaho and have served as 
Greystone Village, LLC's ("Greystone") accountant from approximately 2005 to present. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY BEEBE- 1 
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3. As the accountant for Greystone,l interacted with owners Steve Benad and Richard 
Hehrduring the entire project life ofthe Greystone Village Project in McCall Idaho. 
4. As part of my job duties, I am in charge of accounting for the overall budgeting and 
financial record keeping of the project relative to construction costs and lad use development fees. 
5. If the lots that are the subject matter of this lawsuit were donated by Greystone, I, as 
Greystone's accountant, would have filed the appropriate papetw'ork to seek a tax deduction for an 
approximately $1.3 million dollar charitable contribution to the City of McCall. 
6. I have never filed for a charitable tax deduction for Greys tone with respect to the lots 
because I understood that the lots were deeded to pay for fees imposed by the City of McCall. 
~--------------
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this d1~ay of April, 2011. 
AFFIDA V!T OF JEFFREY BEEBE- 2 
Residing in-~=-=-::..;..;::=-----.-~+-­
My Commission Expires: 0:5/o Bj.iO/J-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
J HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of April, 2011, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing docwnent was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to~ by fax 
transmi~sion to; by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in 
charge of the office as indicated below: 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Martin C. Hendrickson 
Givens Pursley LLP 
P .0. Box. 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
Victor Villegas 
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Jed W. Manwaring, ISB # 3040 
Victor S. Villegas, ISB # 5860 
EVANS KEA. ~E LLP 
1405 W. Main Street 
P.O. Box 959 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0959 
Telephone: (208) 384-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 345-3514 
E-Mail: JManwaring@evanskeane.com 
VViJJegas@evanskeane.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
~CH~BUAY,~ 
APR 2 7 2011 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH Jl.JDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 




CITY OF McCALL, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV 2010-276C 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
RICHARD HEHR 
RICHARD HEHR, being duly sworn upon oath deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am one of the named Plaintiffs in this matter and have personal knowledge of the 
facts set forth herein. 
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD HEHR - I 
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2. I am the owner ofPiaintiffGreystone Village, LLC and was an owner ofGreystone in 
January 2005 when Greystone filed its application with the City of McCall to build a planned unit 
development and subdivision called Greystone Village. 
3. I signed the Warranty Deed conveying nine lots to the City of McCall, a copy of 
which is attached as "ExhibitS" to the Affidavit ofMichele Groenevelt filed with the Court on April 
7,2011. 
4. When I conveyed the lots to the City on behalf of Greystone Village, LLC, I never 
understood the conveyance to be a gift or donation to the City of McCall, but rather I was doing so 
as payment for fees that were required by the City. 
5. I understood the deeded lots would pay the required fees for community housing, 
building permits and sewer connections. 
6. Greystone Village, LLC submitted Building Permit Applications to the City of 
McCall on May 12, 2006. The City issued building permits on June l, 2006. Copies of the Building 
Permit Applications, Building Permits and receipts for fees paid for the Building Pem1its are 
attached as Exhibit A. These are records maintained by Greys tone Village, LLC in its regular course 
of business. 
7. Neither my business partner at the time, Steven Benad, nor I approached the City and 
offered or volunteered to donate lots to provide for community housing. Nonetheless, it becan1e 
quite clear to me during the initial stages of the Greystone application process that in order to get all 
approvals, including building permits and sewer connections, Greystone would be required to deal 
with the City's claimed need for community housing in one way or another, or risk being denied 
somewhere down the line. 
AFFIDAVIT OF RJCHARD HEHR • 2 
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EVANS KEANE LLP laJOOl 
p.i 
8. I have reviewed the dOCUUJents and affidavits filed by the City of McCall in this 
matter in support of the City's MotiOll fot Summar:y Judgment. The Affidavit of Michelle 
Groeaevelt iuchldes an article nom the Star News rega:rdiJlg the lots conveyed by Greystone for 
Community Ho-uslng and photographs of Steven Benad and me participating iD a groundbJea.lc:mg 
ceremony. The City sugaests that this is evidence that Oreystone voluntarily donated the nine lots to 
the City. This simply is. not true. While Vtte made the best of the situation by participating in the 
gmundbtt:aking cerem.ooy. we did not 110luntarily donate the lots at issue in this case to the Ci1;Y and 
oll!:' partioipation in the groundbreak:ing cC£Cmony does not imply othcnvisc. 
RICHARD HBHR 
SUBSClUBED and SWORN to before me this c:J. 7 day of April, 2011. 
Notary Public forlsialte- ~'-tfDU)t~ 
Residios in f.o;; &we:tes. 
My Commission Expires: De: ~2(w 
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04127/2011 15:45 FAX 20834535 EVANS KEANE LLP Ill 002 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this r:J 1..;! day of April, 2011, a true and colTect copy of 
the foregoing document was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax 
transmission to; by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in 
charge oftbe office as indicated below: 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Martin C. Hendrickson 
Givens Pursley LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, JD 83701-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
FacsimHe: (208) 388-1300 
Attorneys for Defendam 
[X) U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
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• Rece 1pt No: 1.053315 
GREVSTONE VILLAGE, LLC. 




P & Z Fees/Connection Fees 
Fffi BP#3274 
6Q-30-020-200.0 
WATER CONNECTION FEES 
P & l Fees/Connection Fees 
FOR 8Pii3274 
70-30-020-200.0 
SEWER CONNECTION FEES 




P & Z Fees/Cor.nectioh Fees 
FOR BPii3277 
60-30-020-200.0 
~ATER CONNECTION FEES 
P·& Z Fees/Connection Fees 
FOR BP!t3277 
70-3Q-()20-200.0 
SEWER CONNECTION FEES 




' P & l Fees/Connection Fees 
FOR BPli3275 
60--30-020-200.0 
/lATER CONNECTION FEES 
P & Z.Fee~/Connection Fees 
FOR BP#3275 
7D-30-020--200 . 0 
SEWER CONNECTION FEES 




P & Z Fees/Connection Fees 
FOR BP:t3'27£ 
60-30-020-200.0 
WATER CONNECTION FEES 
P & Z Fees/Connection Fees 
FOR BP!t3276 
70-30-020-200 . 0 
SEwER CONNECTION FEES 




...... ..,. I"' • ~ 'r<.- ... __ ....... ~ ........ r ............ 
EXHIBIT A 















1 orlhlLto J:ns 
! 10-30-G15-500.0 
BUILDIHG PERMITS 
P & Z Fees/Connection Fees 
FOR BP~t327S 
60-30-020-200.0 
WATER CONNECTION FE:S 
P & Z Fees/Connoction Fees 
--r- FOR BP#3275 
t 70-3D-o20--200 .0 
I SEWER CONNECTION FEES 
P & Z Fees/ConrJect i 011 Fees 
~ ~P#32ZB . 
(,1 o-30--o 15-500. a -
j BUILDING PERMITS 
1 P & Z Fees/Connection Fees 
I FOR BP#3276 
I 80-30-020-200.0 · WATER ~OHNECTION FEES 
I P & l Fees/Connec:ion Fees 
FOR BP#3276 
70-30-020-200.0 
SEWER CONNECTION FEES 
1
' P-& Z.Fees/C:lnnection Fees 
· ~Pt3273 .. 
10~30-015-500.0 . 
BUIU)!NG PERMITS 
~ & Z Fees/Connection Fees 
FOR BP#3273 
60-30-020-200.0 
WATER CONNECTION FEES 
, P & Z Fees/Comection Fees 
; fOR BPit3273 
70-30-020-200.0 
SEWER CONNECTION FEES 
I
• P & Z Fees/Connection Fees 
--- 8~3272 
! 1 30-01~ 1i1 1(! :, 
BUILDlNG III~HI i . 
P & Z Ft:.c>y, .. ul ""~' I l ,;.: Fees 
r· FOR BPJ3272 , 
~ 60-30-02D-200 0 
: ~ATER CONNECTION FEES 
P & Z Fees/Connec:ion Fees 
FOR BPit3272 
70-30-020-200.0 
SEWER CONNECTICN FEES 
Check 
Check Nc: 530A 
Payor~ 
GREYSTONE VILLAGE, LLC. 
Total A;JP1 ied: 
, Change iendereo: 




















OTICE TO THE PUBUC 
AND BUILDER 
It is unlawful for any perso11 
to enter upon or interfere with 
tbe bul.lding operations carried 
on under this permit, or in any 
way o mr:erfere with the build-
ing material. 
TEMPORARY OCCUPAl CY 
The permittee is granted the 
use of the ~tree~ or public prop-
erty as provided by the ~cCall 
Building Code. 
TinS CARD MUST BE 
TACKED ON THE FRONT 
OR STREET IDE OF ALL 
BUILDING OPERATIC SO 
THAT IT MAY BE 
FROM THE STREET. 
Date'/, lo C. ~o . .2t2 7 3 ' ., 




Date _____ __ Footing Trenches---------
Fooo~on ____________________ _ 
F~ng ____________________ ___ 
Ftn~------------------------
----- ··-- - --- -- - -. 
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BUILDING PERMIT 
~OTICE TO THE PUBLIC 
A.loffi B ilLDER 
It is unlawful for any person 
to enter upon or interfere with 
tbe building operations carried 
on under this permit., or in any 
way to interfere with the build-
ing material. 
TEMPORARY OCCUPANCY 
The permittee is granted rhe 
use of the Si.reets or public prop-
erty as provided by rhe McCall 
Building Code. 
TB1S CA.RD MUSfBE 
TACKED 0 • THE FRONT 
OR STREET SIDE OF ALL 
Bun.DING OPERATIONS SO 
THAT IT MAY BE SEEN 






Date ___ _ Footing Trench:s ---------
Foundation __________ _ 
Framing-----------
Fmal _______________ __ 
.,....---- - -- - - - ·- - · -- --
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BUILDING PERMIT · 
OTICE TO THE PUBUC 
ANDBUlLDER 
It is UD.lawful for any person 
to enter upon or !ntex:fere with 
the building operations carried 
on nder !his permit, or in any 
way to interfere with the build-
ing matmal. 
TEMPORARY OCCUPANCY 
The permittoe i.s granted the 
use of the streets or public prop-
erty as provided by the McCall 
Building Code. 
THIS CARD MUSr BE 
TACKED ON mE FRONT 
OR STREET SID OF ALL 
BUILDING OPERATIONS SO 
THAT IT MAY BE SEE 
FROM THE STREET. 
----.....------ at 
No./Su{4'll1 loo.~. 




















Building PetooJt Applicati-On · Fcinn 
216 East Park Street 
McCaH1 Idaho 83638 
Permit Number: ~-=-=-.!.!::::l.--­
Date of 
lh!s appioalicn and mow the same Ill be 111!aend 
gOI'ellling thit type olwOtt 'loti be COifl)Ked 1'1111 
, of a ii'""'J! dcea not prssume to giva atlhoily to Violate 
-- · - ·~ .~ ~ -·- or local law regulating <Xll'lltrucllon or the ;>erfolmance al 
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Building Pet~it Applicatron Form 
216 East P.ark Street 
. McCall, Idaho 83638 
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Building Permit Application Form 
216 East Park Street 
. McCall, Idaho 83638 
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Building Permit Appli.cation Form 
216 East Park Street 
McCall, Idaho 83638 
Permit Number: 
Date of 
This permit becomes null and 'Void H wor1! or constl\lctkm illllho:ized is not comme!\COO v.«rin 1 80 
:....::..:=~:.::::.;=:;__-------+-=.=..::...::.!..:::.::::..:::;:.:::::::_-1 daya, or K construction or work is susptiOOed orabandooed for a period of 180 days a1 any lime after 
~~=s~~~~~~::;;.:m======:l W<ll1<.iacommenced. 
I hereby certi fy that I have read and tmJminsd tllls applcal!on at!d kllow 1/19 same lo be ttue and 
correct. All pr011isions ci laws and Oldlnancea lllis type ol woli: will be ca~~plled Will 
wnelher apeolhd herem or no~ tile does 'lilt prei\Jm& to give auill011ly to viola til 




OTICE TO THE PUBUC 
AND BUILDER 
It is lll)lawtul for any person 
to enter upon or iDtede.re with 
the builcting operations carried 
on under this permit, or in any 
way to interfere with the build-
ing material. 
TEMPORARY OCCL"PANCY 
The permittee is granted the 
use of the streets or public prop-
erty as provided by the McCaU 
Building Code. 
THIS CARD MUST BE 
TACKED 0 THE FRONT 
ORSTREET IDEOFALL 
BUILD G OPERATION 0 
TIIAT IT MAYBE SEEN 
FROM THE STREET. 
D& No. ~--'--L-




Date ___ _ Footing Trenches---------
Poundat:ion __________ _ 
~g __________________ _ 





Building_ Permjt AppBcafion Form 
216 East Park Street 
McCall, Idaho 83638 
- --- - - ---
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Building Permit Application Form 
216 East Park Street 
McCall, Idaho 83638 
This penrit becomes ~n and void f WCil< or con&1ruotlon authanzad is not ~ oM\hin 1 00 
~=;..::=::::::;._=::.:::_-------f-=.=..:..=::::....:==---1 days, or I co:muclion or worlc is suspended or ltlandoned for a pe!ixt of 180 days at any lime afler 
::;:---~-:i-----------+--------1 WOit Ia oomrnenced. 
1 ;,ereby certify 1~11 have read and exanlned this applcallon ard l\.'lOW lhe same to ba true ..,d 
corred. AI prt"'l9ions d laws and governing tiS type of wort v.ill be compllad wlh 
wllether sp~led herel, or no~ of a pennll doN not prasume to give authott)o lo violaiB 




·oTICE TO THE PUBLIC 
AND BUILDER 
It is unlawful for any person 
to enter upop or interfere with 
the buildmg operatlons carried 
on under this permit. or in any 
way to interfere with the build-
ing ~nal. 
TEMPORARY CUP~ CY 
The permittee is granted the 
use of the streets or public prop-
e.rty as provided by the McCall 
Building Code. 
THIS CARD MUST BE 
TACKED 0 THE FRONT 
R ITREETSIDE FAU. 
BUILDING OPERATIONS 0 
THAT IT MAY BE SEEN 
FROM THE TREET. 
p OR 
Date~/, /o G. ':{o . .i o17 ~ 





Date ___ _ Footing enches ________ _ 
Foundation _________ _ 
F~g ___________________ _ 
Fin 
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B:uildlng Pe:f~it Applicatioh Form 
216 l;ast Park Street 
McCall, Idaho 83638 
242 
Building Permit Application Forni 
216 ~ast Park Street 
McCall, Idaho 83638 
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BUILDING PERMIT 
NOTICE TO THE PUBUC 
AND BUILDER 
It is unlawful for any person 
to enter upon or interfere with 
the building operations carried 
on under this permit, or in any 
way to interfere with the build-
ing material. 
TEMPORARY OCCUP CY 
The permittee is granted the 
use of the streets or public prop-
erty as provided by the McCall 
Building Code. 
CARDMUSI'BE 
TA 0 THE FRONT 
OR STREET SIDE OF ALL 
BUILDING OPERATION 0 
THAT IT MAY BE SEEN 
FROM THE STREET. 
PECTO 
Date C No.3;? 7 t, 




Date ___ _ Footing Trenches---------
Poundation -----------
F~ng ________________ ___ 
Fwd _________________ __ 
244 
. BuUdi.n:g:Permit AppllcatiO:n Form ~ 
216 East Park Street 
McCall, Idaho 83638 
have read an~ examined tills appijcalon ana know lb9 same lobe true and 
oflav.s and otdnances gove~ni'lg this lype ofwo~ will be CXJCllllt..d wilh 
or not the QrilnUng permn does nol presume lil give authori ty lo violate 
of any clher law ~laling conslrucllon or tile pertarmance of 
245 
. Building Permit Application Form , 
216 East Park Street 
McCall, Idaho 83638 
Permit Number: 
Date of 
'lis penn~ becomes nul and ..ud ii won or ca~slrudl:Jn autllollled is rot oommeruo~ ~ 180 
~=::..:==-==--------+..=:::~:::.z::.:::::..:::z::;:::_-J days, or" conWuaion crworl< is SIJSpended or abaoocned for a period ut 180 days at atff time af1Br 
=-~~----------------+----------~w~~oom~*· 
~~~~--;:~~:4!~~~~--:-----~ I herobycer11ty llat I have read an~ eumtled 1ills a!'l*ation and knowllle S5T1II to be troe and 
ccmd. All pf<l'risions ollllws and o~!nar.ces governing 1hls typo ol woO< w.i be ocxnplioO v.ilh 
whether ~flad ~arail or no\ lhollfllllilg pemil does nol Pfl'SUilll to gil'll au11100tr to vtolale 
rr canc!!l the !JDII\slcns ol any oflor law r&g~~iating ta'.si/Uclloo or tile perionnance cA 
oonsiuaion. 
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BUILDING PERMIT . 
·onCE TO THE PUBUC 
ANDBUIT..DER 
It is unlawful for wy person 
to enter upon or iotecfere with 
the building operations carried 
on under this pennit, or in any 
way to interfere with the build-
ing material 
TEMPORARY OCCUP. CY 
The permittee is granted the 
use of the streets or pcbtic prop-
erty as provided by the McCall 
Building Code. 
TBlS CARD MUSI' BE 
TACKED Ori THE FRONT 
OR srREET SIDE OF ALL 
B JLDING OPERATION 0 
'l'HATITMAYBE N 
FROM TRE STREET. 
TO 
Date t,j,j O(p No.3o271 
• 
To:tftw 7iu&x1hc I?J..L 




Date. ___ _ Footing Trenches---------







Building Permit Applic-ation F 
-216 East Park Street 
McCall1 Idaho 83638 
Addiffon Repair Damolsh Garage.'Ca!J)Orl Other 




Building Permit Application Form 
· 216 East Park Street 
McCallr Idaho 83638· 
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Jed W. Manwaring, ISB # 3040 
Victor S. Villegas, ISB # 5860 
EVANS KEANE LLP 
1405 W. Main Street 
P.O. Box 959 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0959 
Telephone: (208) 384-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 345-3514 
E-Mail: JManwaring@evanskeane.com 
VVillegas@evanskeane.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 




CITY OF McCALL, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV 2010-276C 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs Richard Hehr ("Hehr") and Greystone Village, LLC ("Greystone") (Plaintiffs may 
sometimes be collectively referred to as "Greystone" or "Plaintiffs"), by and through their counsel of 
record, submit their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant City of McCall's (the "City" or 
"McCall") Motion for summary judgment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This case arises from an application Plaintiffs made to the City far a planned unit 
development ("PUD") and subdivision in McCall called Greystone Village. Plaintiffs conveyed nine 
lots in Greystone Village to the City for community housing. (See Affidavit of Michelle Groenevelt, 
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Ex. S.) The lots had a total value of one million one hundred seventy thousand dollars 
($1,117,000.00) at the time of conveyance. (Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. M.) The City claims that 
Greystone itself proposed "donating" the lots and did, in fact, donate the lots to McCall because the 
City had no community housing requirement at the time Greystone submitted its application. (See 
City's Opening Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("City's Brief''), p. 8.) While 
there may be reasons for a developer to convey title to over a $1.1 million in real property from their 
development to the land use authority, a donation is usually not one of them. 
At the time of Greystone 's application to the City for Greystone Village, the City had been 
extensively studying the issue of affordable workforce housing. The City adopted Resolution 05-19 
on September 22, 2005. (See Affidavit of Dean W. Briggs, Ex. B.) The Resolution identifies the 
City's responsibility to assure the existence of affordable housing for the local workforce and that it 
was the City's responsibility under the Resolution to develop and implement a community housing 
policy to meet the affordable workforce housing need in McCall. (See I d.) The Resolution likewise 
directs staff to develop ordinances to implement Community Housing Policy under the Resolution. 
(See /d.) 
On February 23, 2006, the City adopted two ordinances, Ordinance No. 819 to require all 
new subdivisions to include community housing units to be affordable to the local workforce and 
Ordinance No. 820, to require payment of a community housing fee for each new residential 
dwelling unit. (Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. F, G.) Greystone's application was subject to Ordinance 
No. 820 requiring the payment of a community housing fee for each new residential unit. Ordinance 
Nos. 819 and 820 were later found illegal and invalid. (Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. U.) 
The City has set forth its arguments in favor of summary judgment divided by state law based 
claims and federal law based claims. Greystone will respond in kind. 
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II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when ali of the pleadings, affidavits and other 
relevant documents before the court indicate that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment under the applicable law. I.R.C.P. 56( c). The City ofMcCall, 
as the moving party, bears the burden of establishing a lack of genuine issues of material fact. !d. 
As the nonmoving party, Plaintiffs are entitled to have all reasonable inferences and conclusions 
drawn in their favor. !d. The non-moving party may overcome swnmary judgment by setting forth 
genuine issues of material fact by affidavit or otherwise. I.R.C.P. 56( e). 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiffs' State Law Claims are not Barred. 
1. Plaintiffs Timely Complied with the Idaho Tort Claims Act Based on the City of 
McCall's Revival of a Claim for Community Housing by its Enactment of 
Resolutions to Make Refunds under its Illegal Community Housing Policies and 
Ordinances. 
Plaintiffs' state-based claims against the City are not barred under the Idaho Tort Claims Act 
(the "ITCA") due to the City's own actions. While tort claims against a political subdivision must be 
presented within 180 days from the date the claim arose (I.C. § 6-906) and presenting the claim 
within that time frame is a condition precedent to an action against a public subdivision (I. C. § 6-
908), and the ITCA applies to all claims against a city under Idaho Code section 50-219, McCall 
created an entirely new limitations period by passing resolutions regarding its illegal community 
housing policies and ordinances. The City should be estopped from arguing that Greystone's claim 
did not comply with the ITCA notice requirements. 
The doctrine of quasi estoppel applies when it would be unconscionable to allow a party to 
assert a right which is inconsistent with a prior position. Mitchell v. Zilog, Inc., 125 Idaho 709, 715, 
874 P.2d 520,526 (1994). Willigv. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259,261,899 P.2d 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSIT10N TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -3 
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969, 971 (1995). The doctrine is designed to prevent a party from reaping an unconscionable 
advantage, or from imposing an unconscionable d}sadvantage upon another, by changing positions. 
See Tommerup v. Albertson's Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 6-7, 607 P.2d 1055, 1060-61 (1980); Keesee v. 
Fetzek, 111 Idaho 360, 723 P.2d 904 (Ct.App.l986). Treasure Valley Bankv. Butcher, 121 Idaho 
531, 533, 826 P .2d 492, 494 (Ct. App. 1992). 
In this case, Greys tone did not submit a notice oftort claim to the City within 180 days from 
the date it conveyed the nine lots at issue to the City. The City, however, revived Greystone's claims 
after its Ordinance No. 820 was found illegal by enacting Resolution 08-11 on April 24, 2008. 
Resolution 08-11 provided for a refund of Community Housing fees collected under Ordinance No. 
820 and Resolution 09-10, enacted on November 4, 2009, extended the period to obtain a refund of 
Community Housing fees collected under Ordinance No. 820 until December 31, 2009. 
Greystone and Hehr filed a Refund Request Form provided by the City for refunds on 
November 12, 2009. (See Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. Y.) The form provided by the City and the 
information provided by Greystone and Hehr, in all material respects, complied with the contents 
required in a notice of claim under the ITCA. See I. C. § 6-907. Even assuming the effective date of 
Resolution 09-10, November 4, 2009, was the last date upon which a claim for refund could be 
made, Greystone filed its claim a few days later on November 12, 2010 and well within 180 days. 
The City will assert that voluntary contributions or donations to Community Housing were 
exempted from refund under Resolution 08-11 just as it has already asserted that Greystone 
voluntarily donated or contributed approximately $1.3 million in real property to the City for 
Community Housing. The Court should reject those assertions. As set forth elsewhere and in the 
affidavits accompanying Greystone's opposition to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
question ofvoluntariness cannot be resolved at this point in the litigation. (See Hehr Affidavit,, 4-
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -4 253 
5, 7; Briggs Affidavit,~ 6; Affidavit of Bonnie Bertram,~ 4.) The discussion at the May 3, 2005, 
Planning and Zoning Commission hearing for Greystone Village's preliminary plat regarding 
Community Housing also demonstrate that there are genuine issues of material fact on whether 
Greystone donated or contributed anything to the City. During that meeting Greystone's 
representative was asked by Planning & Zoning Commissioner Bailey about prior conversations 
regarding Community Housing, which Greystone's representative did not recall. (See Groenevelt 
Affidavit, Ex. B (p. 7 of 26). Yet, the City claims Grey stone came to the City offering to donate 
land. This simply is not true. 
The City will also assert that Resolution 08-11 is irrelevant because Greystone conveyed the 
lots pursuant to a Development Agreement and not under Ordinance No. 820. This exalts form over 
substance, which the Court should ignore. By the City's own admission, Ordinance No. 820 applied 
to Greystone's application. Additionally, Greystone pulled building permits during the effective 
period of Ordinance No. 820 and no Community Housing fee was paid on those permits, consistent 
\vith the Development Agreement calling for an offset of those fees. (Hehr Affidavit, Ex. A.) Thus, 
Greystone was obligated to pay for Community Housing under Ordinance No. 820 as a condition to 
receiving building permits even without a Development Agreement. 
The City cannot excuse its illegal policies and ordinances by calling Plaintiffs' conveyance of 
property to the City voluntary or a donation, or that Plaintiffs' proceeded under a Development 
Agreement and did not convey the lots under Ordinance No. 820. The City would have gotten its 
illegal fees either way. Likewise, the City cannot dump Plaintiffs' state law claims for failing to 
follow the JTCA when the City's own Resolution, enacted after its Community Housing Policy was 
found invalid and illegal, created the claim for a refund and extended the deadline to make a claim 
for a refund to, at the very earliest, November 4, 2009. Plaintiffs' timely filed a claim for a refund of 
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its taken property for Community Housing under the City's Resolution creating the claim. The Court 
should not allow the City to take an inconsistent position to Greystone's disadvantage and deny 
Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue. 
2. Statute of Limitations for inverse condemnation claim. 
Greystone timely asserted its state-law based claims under the four (4) year statute of 
limitations in Idaho Code section 5-224. The City asserts that, under McCuskey v. Canyon County, 
128 Idaho 213,912 P.2d 100 (1996), and related cases, Greystone' s causes of action accrued sooner 
than July 31, 2006, the day Greystone conveyed its real property to McCall. Based on the facts of 
this case, Greystone' s Complaint was time! y filed under McCuskey. Furthennore, under the case of 
C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 75 P.3d 194 (2003) and the prohibition 
against pre-takings litigation, Greystone' s claims, at the very earliest, could not have accrued prior to 
conveying the lots to the City. 
The statute oflimitations in Idaho for inverse condemnation is four (4) years. I.C. § 5-224. 
As discussed in McCuskey, damages for inverse condemnation are assessed as of the time of the 
taking. McCuskey v. Canyon County, 128 Idaho at 217, 912 P .2d at 104. The taking occurs and the 
cause of action accrues "as of the time that the full extent of plaintiff's loss of use and enjoyment of 
property becomes apparent." I d. In cases like McCuskey, and this one, when the government does 
not engage in formal condemnation proceedings, there is always the question of when the cause of 
action accrued. While the McCuskey standard for designating accrual of the claim is somewhat 
arbitrary, the standard sets forth at least two distinct, but necessary events, for accrual. First, the 
party seeking damages for inverse condemnation must experience a loss of use and enjoyment of 
property. Second, that loss of use and enjoyment must be apparent. In McCuskey the loss of use and 
enjoyment of the claimant's property, and the apparentness ofthat loss both occurred at the same 
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time, when a stop work order was issued on construction of the claimant's convenience store. 
McCuskey, 128 Idaho at 216, 912 P.2d at 103. 
There was no such dual occurrence in this case. The City argues at length that at the very 
latest Greystone's claim for inverse condemnation accrued by May 3, 2006, the date Greystone 
signed a Development Agreement with the City. The City also points out a number of events during 
April 2006, including Greystone's application for final plat approval and various other actions 
referencing or related to community housing, which the City asserts triggered a claim for inverse 
condemnation. Based on this information, the City argues that the "indisputable documentary 
evidence shows that no later than April of2006, four years and three months before the lawsuit was 
filed, 'the full extent of plaintiffs loss of use and enjoyment of the property [had become] 
apparent"'. (See City's Brief, p. 17.) 
The City's application of the standard in McCuskey to the facts of this case and accrual of 
Greystone's claims is simply Mong. While it may be arguable that is was apparent by April 2006 
that the City intended to exact nine lots worth over a million dollars from Greystone, being apparent 
of a future loss of use and enjoyment of property is not sufficient under McCuskey. Greystone did 
not, and could not have, lost the use and enjoyment of those lots at any time before July 31,2006, 
when it conveyed title of those lots to the City. As of Apri12006, or even May 3, 2006, when the 
Development Agreement was signed, Greystone retained all ownership rights and interests in the 
lots. The City, on the other hand, had no rights or interests in the nine lots, and could have none until 
title to them was conveyed by Greystone. 
Greystone also had no obligation to go forth with its development ofGreystone Village at the 
time it signed the Development Agreement. Greystone could have lost its financing, lost interest in 
pursuing the development or otherwise decided not to go forth with the development for a number of 
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other reasons. The City could not have compelled Greys tone to move forward with the development 
had Greystone decided not to proceed. The City also could not have compelled Greystone to convey 
the nine lots. The only thing the City could have done was terminate the Development Agreement. 
See I. C.§ 67-6511A ( ... A commitment may be terminated, and the zoning designation upon which 
the use is based reversed, upon the failure of the requirements in the commitment after a reasonable 
time as determined by the governing board or upon the failure of the owner; .... ) Greystone simply 
did not lose the use and enjoyment of its property any time before July 31, 2006, when it conveyed 
the nine lots to the City. A property owner cannot maintain an inverse condemnation action unless 
there has actually been a taking of his or her property. KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 
581, 67 P.3d 56, 60 (2003) (citing Covington v. Jefferson County. 137 Idaho 777, 53 P.3d 828 
(2002)) See also Williamson County Reg '1 Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 
473 U.S. 172 (1985) (prohibiting pre-takings claims). A pending or future loss of the property, even 
if apparent, is not sufficient under McCuskey; actual loss is required. 
Other inverse condemnation cases relied on by the City are inapposite. In Rueth v. State, 644 
P.2d 1333 (Idaho 1982) (accrual occurred when the claimant met with a government official about 
flooding caused by a diversion dam because the meeting was a recognition of the severity of the 
problem), Wadsworth v.ldaho Department a/Transportation, 128 Idaho 439, 915 P.2d 1 (1996) (the 
single event of a government construction project triggered the inverse condemnation claim), and 
Harris v. State, 147 Idaho 401,210 P.3d 86 (2009) (the claimant's cause of action accrued when it 
signed a lease to pay rents on sand and gravel), none of the claimants retained control over what 
happened to their property after their loss of property became apparent. The loss of use and 
enjoyment in this case simply did not occur until conveyance of the lots to the City, even if it was 
apparent that a loss would occur in the future. This, again, is illustrated by the fact that Greystone 
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could not have pursued a claim for inverse condemnation prior to conveying the lots to the City. 
Alternatively, the reasoning set forth in C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No. 4, 139 
Idaho 140, 75 P .3d 194 (2003), for a departure from the McCuskey standard also establishes that no 
taking occurred in this case, and thus the claim did not accrue, until title to the lots were conveyed to 
the City. In C&G the Canyon Highway District rebuilt the Old Middleton Road over C&G's 
property. ld. at 141,75 P.3d at 195. The Highway District discussed with C&G the possibility of 
rebuilding the existing winding road over the straight section line that dissected C&G' s property for 
a number of years. !d. The Highway District believed it owned an easement over the section line 
and could rebuild the road without compensating C&G for taking the property on which the road 
would be built. !d. The Highway District eventually rebuilt the road over the section line and 
advised C&G that due to its alleged easement, C&G was not entitled to compensation for a taking of 
its property. Id. C&G believed the Highway District's representations without further inquiry. Id. 
By November 1992 the Highway District completed construction ofthe road's subbase and 
construction was totally finished by November 1993. !d. at 142, 75 P.3d at 196. In January 1997, 
when C&G hired a surveyor for development purposes, it learned for the first time there was no 
easement over the section line. Id. C&G initiated an inverse condemnation action against the 
Highway District on January 31, 1997. Jd. C&G prevailed before the district court and the Highway 
District appealed on grounds that the statute of limitations ran before C&G initiated its lawsuit. !d. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court declined to apply the McCuskey standard on the issue of accrual 
and instead applied the "project completion rule", largely on policy considerations. Jd. at 144, 75 
P.3d at 198. The policy considerations identified by the Court included the need for certainty and 
efficiency in resolving claims by identifYing a clearly ascertainable date for accrual purposes, to 
avoid requiring a claimant to sue prematurely, and because the government's mistaken belief that it 
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owned an easement over the section line, which caused the confusion in the first place. I d. 
Thus, the Court reasoned, the facts in C&G provided a compelling reason to deviate from the 
accrual standard set forth in Tibbs v. Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667,603 P.2d 1001 (1979), and carried on 
in McCuskey. While Greystone's claim is timely under the Tibbs-McCuskey standard, the facts of 
this case also provide the same policy reasons for the application of a date certain standard as 
identified in C&G. When the government takes or obtains the rights and title in real property 
through conveyance of a deed, the date of conveyance is the appropriate standard for when the taking 
occurs and a claim accrues. Like the "project completion rule" adopted in C&G, the date of 
conveyance of the deed provides certainty and efficiency in resolving claims by providing a clearly 
ascertainable date that triggers the claim. It also prevents premature legal action. The need for a 
clearly ascertainable date in this case is illustrated by City's attempt to identify several different 
events before conveyance of the deeds that allegedly triggered Greystone' s claim for inverse 
condemnation. Greystone gave title to the lots, and McCall obtained title to the lots, on one clearly 
ascertainable date - the date the deed to the lots was conveyed. Further, the City asserts it had a 
good faith belief that it could legally require the payment of Community Housing fees. The City was 
incorrect on that issue and caused the confusion in this case. For all of these reasons, the accrual 
date for Greystone's inverse condemnation claim was the July 31, 2006, the date the deeds were 
conveyed. 
3. Contracts Statute of Limitations. 
The City asserts that the five year statute oflimitations for contract actions does not apply in 
this case. Greystone has not asserted a contract claim in this matter and offers no argument with 
regard to this issue raised by the City. 
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4. The Exhaustion of Remedies Doctrine and Voluntary Actions do not Prohibit 
Greystone from Asserting a Claim in this Case. 
The City claims that Greystone 's state claims fail under KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 
Idaho 577, 67 P.3d 56 (2003) because Greystone failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and 
because Greystone voluntarily donated the nine lots at issue. KMST does not compel the result urged 
by the City. Greystone was not required to exhaust under the facts of this case and there are 
questions of fact regarding donative intent that cannot be resolved on summary judgment. 
a. Greystone was not Required to Exhaust any Administrative Remedy 
Prior to bringing this Action. 
Greystone had no obligation to exhaust any administrative remedies. As a general 
rule, a party must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the courts to challenge the 
validity of administrative acts. Arnzen v. State, 123 Idaho 899,906, 854 P.2d 242, 249 (1993). The 
Idaho Supreme Court hac; recognized exceptions to that rule: (a) when the interests of justice so 
require, and (b) when the agency acted outside its authority. Regan v. Kootenai County, 140 Idaho 
721, 725, 100 P.3d 615, 619 (2004). 
Greystone's claims meet both exceptions to the general rule of exhaustion. First, the City 
acted outside its authority by requiring the payment of Community Housing fees. The fact that 
Greystone entered into a Development Agreement with the City makes no difference. Under the 
plain terms of the Development Agreement, the value of the lots conveyed was to offset community 
housing fees and building permit fees. (See Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. R.) Ordinance No. 820, which 
the City agrees applied to Greystone, would have also required the payment of the fees. It is an 
adjudicated fact that the City acted outside its authority in requiring the payment of community 
housing fees. (See Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. U.) Second, the interests of justice also compel 
application of the exhaustion exception- the public has an interest in local governments not enacting 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-
II 
26() 
illegal tax schemes. Thus, the exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement 
applies in this case. 
The City argues that under KMST, the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement only apply to 
facial challenges of ordinances and statutes, and that this case is an "as applied" challenge. This 
position is incorrect. Foremost, no Idaho case stands for the proposition asserted by the City. The 
City attempts to manipulate the holding in the White v. Bannock County Commissioners, 139 Idaho 
396, 80 P.3d 332 (2003), to stand for the proposition that the exhaustion exceptions only apply to 
"facial" challenges, but admits in footnote 14 of its brief that: " ... although the Court did not say so 
in so many words, it is inescapable from White that the exhaustion exception does not apply to 'as 
applied' constitutional challenges." (City' Brief, p. 21) (underlining added). 
White does not lead to any such inescapable conclusion. The decision does not even use the 
tenns "as applied" or "facial", or analyze the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement other than to 
summarily state at the conclusion of the decision that the exceptions did not apply to the case. 
Neither White nor any other Idaho case holds that the exhaustion exceptions apply only to "facial" 
challenges. See Also, American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 143 
Idaho 862, 870-73, 154 P.3d 433, 441-43 (2007) (stating that in an "as applied'' challenge, 
administrative remedies must first be exhausted for purposes of establishing a factual record when 
the traditional exceptions to the exhaustion requirement do not apply). Additionally, the City's 
Community Housing Policy and Ordinances are, as a matter oflaw, invalid. It does not get any more 
"facial" than that. 
Furthennore, the administrative appeal process would not provide Greystone the proper 
remedy as the City suggests. The Idaho Supreme Court has distinguished the difference between an 
administrative appeal and a civil action. The court in Euclid Avenue Trust v. City of Boise, 146 
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Idaho 306, 193 P.3d 853 (2008) held that an administrative appeal and a civil action may not be 
combined in one proceeding. The Euclid court reasoned: 
The separation of civil actions and administrative appeals is supported by good policy 
underpinnings. After all, one proceeding is appellate in nature and the other is an 
original action. They are processed differently by our courts. Discovery is rarely 
available in a judicial review proceeding. The review is to be conducted on the 
record, absent specific authorization. I. C. § 67-5276. The standards for determining 
an outcome are specified by statute (I. C.§ 67-5279), whereas this is not the case with 
actions seeking declaratory or monetary relief. 
!d. at 308. Here, Greystone has pleaded inverse condemnation for its lots that were taken, among 
other claims. All of Plaintiffs' requests are civil actions that cannot be properly addressed by a court 
sitting in an appellate capacity onjudic]al review. 
The City argues that Greystone should have noted its concerns so the City could have been 
put on notice and reconsidered its policies on Community Housing. The City basically asks this 
Court to find that Greystone should be precluded from maintaining this action because it did not 
object to conveying the lots at issue for community housing. The City's arguments should be 
disregarded by this Court for two reasons. 
First, there is no Idaho law requiring a party to object or otherwise pay under protest an 
illegal fee before it can be recovered. This was the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in BHA 
Investments v. City Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 108 P.3d 315 (2004). If the government has no authority 
to impose any fee at all, it is illegal. BHA Investments, at 176. The City had no authority to impose a 
community housing fee. Greystone was not required to raise any objections prior to paying the 
community housing fees via the lots conveyed to the City. 
Second, Greystone had no reason to question the City's policies and ordinances. An 
ordinance is presumed valid until the contrary is shown. State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365, 377, 399 P.2d 
955, 962 (1965). Just as the courts presume ordinances are valid, the general public must have some 
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confidence in local government and likewise presume that ordinances enacted by local governments 
are legal. Greystone read Resolution 05-19 and Ordinance No. 820, both of which applied to 
Greystone, to require community housing fees. Greystone had no reason to doubt the City's actions. 
It would be unconscionable to place a heightened burden on Greystone to question the City's 
ordinances to ensure that they are properly enacted and valid before paying a fee required under the 
ordinance. 
b. Greystone did not Voluntarily Donate or Contribute the Nine Lots at 
Issue to the City. 
KMST, prior to submitting its land use application, met twice v.ith the supervisor of ACHD's 
representative in order to determine what recommendations regarding KMST's development the 
ACHD staff would make. KMST, at 579-580, 67 P.3d at 58-59. The ACHD representative informed 
K.MST that "he would recommend that KMST be required to construct a street ... and dedicate that 
street to the public." KMST, at 580, 67 P.3d at 59. Based on that conversation, KMST submitted, 
along with its application, a statement that it would construct a public street and that such street 
would be the primary access for the development. /d. 
The KMST court held that no taking had occurred because ACHD had no final authority to 
approve or reject the property owners' proposed development. KMST, at 582, 67 P.3d at 61. 
Moreover, the court held that even if ACHD did have final authority to approve some aspect of the 
development, there was no taking because the KMST voluntarily included the dedication of the street 
based on the conversation it had with the ACHD supervisor. !d. 
The City has failed to create an inference in the first place that Grey stone voluntarily donated 
or willingly gave the lots at issue to the City. Nowhere in any part of the record provided by the City 
is there any indication or information, other than unfounded and unsubstantiated claims made by 
unidentified City representatives, that Greystone approached the city about donating the lots. The 
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City cannot even establish to whom any authorized agent of Greystone indicated this alleged intent 
or desire to pay Community Housing fees or donate the lots. Nowhere in Greystone's application is 
an affirmative representation that it wished to pay a Community Housing fee. The fact that 
Greystone "agreed" to convey the lots in lieu of paying a Community Housing fee (and received an 
offset against building permit fees, sewer hookup fees and Community Housing Fees as a result) 
does not make their action "voluntary" as contemplated by KMST. 
Grey stone did not voluntarily donate the nine lots at issue with a combined value of over one 
million dollars. (See Hehr Affidavit, ,, 4-5, 7; Briggs Affidavit, , 6; Beebe Affidavit, , 5-6.) 
Greystone had to do so in order to get the necessary approvals to proceed with its development of 
Greystone Village. (See Hehr Affidavit,, 7; Briggs Affidavit,, 6.) The City intended to require 
developers to provide for Community Housing, regardless of the means (See Affidavit of Bonnie 
Bertram, 14fi 4-5). 
There are unresolved questions offact regarding whether Greystone's actions in conveying 
the lots at issue was voluntarily. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Greystone, the 
non-moving party, genuine issues of fact exist that contradict the City's voluntary/donative act 
argument. Greystone's claims cannot be thrown out under the voluntary theory in KMST. 
Furthermore, C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway District, is the more applicable case to address this 
question ofvoluntariness. In C&G the evidence showed that one of the owners of C&G favored the 
action that resulted in the taking of C&G' s property. G&G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 
140, 145, 75 P.3d 194, 199. The court recognized, however, that "such an attitude does not reflect 
donative intent or intent not to seek compensation for C&G's taken property." !d. Like in C&G, 
Greystone simply believed that the City could require the payment of Community Housing fees 
under its existing policies and ordinances. The fact that Greystone acted in its own best interests to 
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ensure those fees were paid by conveying lots to the City "does not reflect a donative intent or intent 
not to seek compensation" for the City's taking of Greystone's property. 
B. Plaintiffs' Federal Law Claims are not Barred. 
1. Greystone was not Required to bring its Inverse Condemnation Claim Under 
Section 1983 and is not Barred by tbe Statute of Limitations for Section 1983 
Claims. 
Greystone has not sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nor was it required to do so to 
maintain an inverse condemnation action for a violation of the Fifth Amendment. The City argues 
that Plaintiffs' claims arising under a violation of the United States Constitution can only be brought 
as a § 1983 claim and is subject to its two year statute of limitation. A section 1983 claim is not the 
only remedy available to Greystone for vindicating its federal rights. The two-year statute of 
limitations for§ 1983 claims simply does not apply to Grey stone's claim for inverse condemnation 
under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a party is entitled to bring an 
inverse condemnation action directly under the Fifth Amendment: 
We have recognized that a landowner is entitled to bring an action in inverse 
condemnation as a result of "the self-executing character of the constitutional 
provision with respect to compensation .... " ... [I]t has been established at least 
since Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933), that claims for just compensation 
are grounded in the Constitution itself: "The suits were based on the right to recover 
just compensation for property taken by the United States for public use in the 
exercise of its power of eminent domain. That right was guaranteed by the 
Constitution. The fact that condemnation proceedings were not instituted and that 
the right was asserted in suites by the owners did not change the essential nature of 
the claim. The form of the remedy did not qualify the right. It rested upon the Fifth 
Amendment. Statutory recognition was not necessary. A promise to pay was not 
necessary. Such a promise was implied because the duty to pay imposed by the 
Amendment. The suits were thus founded upon the Constitution of the United States. 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church a/Glendale v. Los Angeles County, Cal. 482 U.S. 304, 
314-315, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 2385-2386 (1987) (internal citations omitted, emphasis in original). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court's pronouncement of a direct right under the Fifth Amendment for an 
inverse condemnation claim speaks for itself The right of an inverse condemnation claim directly 
under the Fifth Amendment could not be stated more clearly. Other courts have recognized this 
direct claim as well. See Lawyer v. Hilton Head Pub. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 220 FJd 298, 303 n. 4 (41h 
Cir. 2000); Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 864 F.2d 463,468 (7th Cir. 1988); 287 Corp. Ctr. Assocs. v. 
Township of Bridgewater, 101 F.3d 320,324 n. 3 (3rd Cri. 1996). The Ninth Circuit, on the other 
hand, has held that an inverse condemnation claim must be brought as a section 1983 claim. See 
Azul Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704 (91h Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, this Court is 
not bound by the holdings of the Ninth Circuit or other lower federal courts, even on issues of federal 
law. See Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer Consulting Holding, Inc., 142 Idaho 235, 
240, 127 P.3d 138, 143 (2005). 
Most relevant to this issue is the Idaho Supreme Court's own view on the question of whether 
there is a direct claim under the Fifth Amendment for inverse condemnation. The Idaho Supreme 
Court recognized a direct claim in BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 175, 108 
P. 3d 315, 3 22 (2004). In discussing the fact that the ITCA and its notice requirements are preempted 
when a federal civil rights action is brought in state court, the Court recognized that "in this case 
Bravo and Splitting Kings have asserted their federal claim directly under the Takings Clause in the 
United States Constitution." !d. at l76 n.2, 108 P.3d at 323 n.2. The Court also recognized that: 
"The Takings Clause is self-executing, and a takings claim may be based solely upon it, First 
Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, or it may be brought as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd." /d. (emphasis added) (internal citations 
omitted). Thus, our own Idaho Supreme Court expressly acknowledges the United States Supreme 
Court's holding in First Lutheran the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is self executing and 
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that inverse condemnation claimants may proceed in Idaho courts directly under the Fifth 
Amendment or under section 19 83. Greystone has chosen to submit its claim directly under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
2. This Case is Distinguishable from Williamson County and the Ripeness Test is 
Inapplicable. 
The City argues that Greystone's Fifth Amendment taking claim is not ripe for review under 
the special two-part test established in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. 
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 4 73 U.S. 172 ( 1985) for federal takings claims. The two-part test 
requires that: (1) the governmental entity reach a final decision; and (2) in federal court litigation 
involving regulatory takings, the property owner must "seek compensation through the procedures 
the State has provided for doing so." Williamson County, at 186, 194. Neither ofthese ripeness 
tests, however, prohibit Greystone's federal takings claims under the facts and circumstances of this 
case. 
a. Williamson County's First Ripeness Test is Inapplicable in this Case. 
In Williamson County, a land owner sued alleging that the county's zoning ordinance 
amounted to a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Williamson County, 105 U.S. at 175. 
The plaintiff's takings claim centered on a regulatory taking. Citing to cases such as Penn Central 
Transportation Company v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, (1978), the Williamson County Court 
recognized that a regulation that goes "1oo far" can be a "taking," but for the claim to be ripe, the 
governmental entity charged with implementing the regulation must first reach a final decision. !d., 
at 186. The court held that the plaintiff's claim was not ripe because the plaintiff could have sought 
a variance from the county. Id., at 191. 
Greystone's claim is distinguishable because the City has already physically taken 
Greystone's property. The "first Williamson County requirement is automatically satisfied at the 
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time of the physical taking." Daniel v. County of Santa Barbara, 288 F.3d 375, 382 (9th Cir. 2002); 
see also Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1281 n. 28 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that 
"[w ]here there has been a physical invasion, the taking occurs at once, and nothing the city can do or 
say after that point will change that fact.") (overruled on other grounds by Yee v. City of Escondido, 
503 u.s. 519 (1992)). 
b. Williamson County's Second Ripeness Test is Inapplicable in this Case. 
The City argues that Greystone's inverse condemnation claim fails to meet this second 
ripeness test because Greystone should have first sought judicial review of the City's actions. The 
City misinterprets Willimason County's second ripeness test. The second prong of the Williamson 
County ripeness test requires that a property owner first seek just compensation through a state 
inverse condemnation, and be denied, before litigating in federal court. Williamson County, at 194. 
The second ripeness test is not an exhaustion doctrine or principle. The Plaintiffs have filed this 
action before this state court seeking among other things, inverse condemnation. Thus, the second 
Williamson County ripeness test is inapplicable in this case. 
c. Williamson County does not Preclude a Due Process Claim Under the 
Facts of this Case. 
In Williamson County the court dismissed the landowner's procedural due process claims as 
unripe by holding "respondent's claim is premature, whether it is analyzed as a deprivation of 
property without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, or as a taking under the Just 
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Williamson County, at 200. The City relies on this 
to argue that a due process claims is just a reframing of the taking issue and does not change the 
outcome. The important factual distinctions between Williamson County and this case render 
Williamson County inapplicable to a due process claim in this case. 
The second ripeness test requiring inverse condemnation proceedings to be first brought in 
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state court is inapplicable to procedural due process causes of action. Nowhere in the Williamson 
County holding is there a requirement that, as a prerequisite, an aggrieved party must first seek relief 
in state court before seeking relief in federal court to vindicate due process protections. Unlike an 
inverse condemnation action that seeks just compensation, "[t]he remedy for a regulation that goes 
too far, under the due process theory is not 'just compensation' but invalidation of the regulation, and 
if authorized and appropriate, actual damages." Williamson County, at 197. Since due process 
violations are not concerned with determining whether a state court will deny just compensation, 
Williamson County's second ripeness test is inapplicable to Greystone' s due process claim. 
Additionally, the ripeness issues related to the due process claims discussed by the 
Williamson County Court dealt with the first ripeness test of 'finality' in the context of a regulatory 
taking. This case involves a direct physical taking of Greystone's nine lots and are therefore 
inapplicable in this case. In addressing the land owner's due process arguments, the Court held that 
the due process claim was not ripe for review because it could not determine whether the regulation 
went "too far": 
Viewing a regulation that 'goes too far' as an invalid exercise of the police power, rather 
than as a 'taking' for which just compensation must be paid, does not resolve the difficult 
problem of how to define 'too far,' that is, how to distinguish the point at which 
regulation becomes so onerous that it has the same effect as an appropriation of the 
property through eminent domain or physical possession. As we have noted, resolution 
of that question depends, in significant part, upon an analysis of the effect the 
Commission's application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations had on the 
value of respondent's property and investment-backed profit expectations. That effect 
cannot be measured until a final decision is made as to how the regulations will be 
applied to respondent's property. 
Williamson County, at 199-200. 
The law and facts in this case do not present the same ripeness concerns faced by the 
Williamson County Court. It is an adjudicated fact that the City's Community Housing Policy and 
resulting ordinances were illegal (See Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. U.) Therefore, this Court can readily 
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conclude that the City's Community Housing Policy and ordinances went "too far". 
3. Greystone's Claim for Inverse Condemnation is not Barred under the Federal 
Statute of Limitations. 
Generally, in the absence of a federal statute of limitations, the analogous state statute is 
applied to the federal cause of action. E.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 
462, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1721,44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975); O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 322, 34 S.Ct. 
596, 597, 58 L.Ed. 980 (1914). In this case, the most analogous state statute for Greystone's Fifth 
Amendment federal inverse claim is the four ( 4) year statute of limitations found in Idaho Code 
section 5-224 applicable to its state inverse condemnation claim. 
The City argues that Idaho's two year statute oflimitations for personal injury suits, which 
applies to all section 1983 claims (See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985)), is applicable to 
Greystone's federal Fifth Amendment inverse condemnation claim and, therefore, this lawsuit is 
untimely. In support of this argument the City cites and discusses Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 864 
F.2d at 463 (7th Cit. 1988) and Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1991). In both the 
Bieneman and Van Strum cases, the respective plaintiffs specifically proceeded under section 1983 as 
their vehicle for maintaining their inverse condemnation claim. When challenged on statute of 
limitations, both claimants in those cases argued that since an inverse condemnation action can be 
brought directly under the United States Constitution, the state limitations period to be applied 
should be the statute most analogous to inverse condemnation, not personal injury. Both circuit 
courts rejected the claimants' argument and instead adhered to the Unites States Supreme Court's 
mandate in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), that al1 claims brought under §1983 are subject to 
the limitations period established by the state personal injury statute. 
In this case, Bieneman and Van Strum are inapplicable because Greystone has not pled or 
sought inverse condemnation under section 1983. The City's federal statute of limitations argument 
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on this point is simply a re-hash of its argument that all inverse condemnation claims must be 
brought under section 1983. Greystone has already demonstrated that it was not limited to bringing 
its inverse condemnation claim under section 1983. As discussed above, our Idaho Supreme Court 
recognizes that inverse condemnation claims can be brought in two ways, either directly under the 
United States Constitution or under section 1983. See BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 141 
Idaho 168, 175, 108 P.3d 315, 322 (2004). The claim can be brought in two ways because the two 
are entirely different animals and each carries different remedies. 
An inverse condemnation claim directly under the United State Constitution limits the 
claimant's remedy for simply the payment of just compensation. Proceeding under section 1983 for 
an inverse condemnation claim, on the other hand, may provide advantages not available in a direct 
claim under the Fifth Amendment. Section 1983 created a "species" of tort liability where the level 
of damages is ordinarily derived from common law torts. Memphis Community School Dist. v. 
Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (I 986). This includes compensatory damages, nomina] damages, 
punitive damages, non-economic damages and prejudgment interest, and the right to a jury trial. 
Webb v. CountyofTrinity, 734 F.Supp.2d I 018 (E.D. Ca12010);Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth, 743 
F.Supp.2d 619 (E.D. Mich 2010); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterrey, LTD., 526 
U.S. 687 (1999). Claimants may also seek equitable relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Prevailing claimants 
are entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees. 42 U.S. C. § 1988. 
While a section 1983 claim might very well be a better vehicle to bring an inverse 
condemnation claim rather than a clirect suit under the U.S. Constitution, the rewards also come with 
a price. As Bieneman and Van Strum suggest, the rule set forth in Garcia v. Wilson may limit an 
jnverse condenmation claim brought under section 1983 to the applicable state statute oflimitations 
for personal injury, which may be a shorter period. Here, Greystone does not have that problem 
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because it chose to proceed on its federal takings claim directly under the U.S. Constitution. 
C. Plaintiffs are not Prohibited from the Remedies Sought under Principles of Equity. 
Plaintiffs claims cannot be barred on equitable principles and equitable defenses do not 
shield the City from its actions in this case. The City argues that, under principles of equity namely, 
promissory estoppel, Jaches, waiver and unjust enrichment, Greystone's claims should be barred 
and/or the City has an equitable defense. The City predicts that Greystone will argue that the City 
cannot rely on its own illegal acts as a defense. That is the law in Idaho. The doctrine of unclean 
hands allows "a court to deny equitable relief to a litigant on the ground that his conduct has been 
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent and decejtful as to the controversy at issue." Sword 
v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 251, 92 PJd 492, 501 (2004). Greystone's belief that the City's 
Community Housing Policies and Ordinances complied with the law was reasonable. The City 
comes to this Court with unclean hands and cannot defend based on equitable grounds. 
The City argues that the doctrine of promissory estoppels bars Greystone's claims because 
the City relied on Greystone' s promises in the Development Agreement and it would be unfair to the 
City and its taxpayers to allow Greystone to recover its property. If the City took Greystone's 
property without paying just compensation as required by the Federal and State Constitutions, 
Greystone is entitled to be compensated. Promissory estoppel is inapplicable under the facts of thjs 
case. 
The City argues that laches bar Greystone's claim because Greystone did not raise an 
objection to the City's illegal Community Housing policies and ordinances and because the City 
would be burdened by paying back Grey stone if it prevails in this action. The City also makes the 
assertion, without citation to law, that Greystone cannot survive a laches defense because Greystone 
assumed the Community Housing policies and ordinances were lawful. The City fails to establish 
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the equities oflaches favors its position in the first place, but violation ofGreystone's constitutional 
right to just compensation for the taking of its property far outweigh any equities that may lie in the 
City's favor on the question of laches. 
The City argues that the principle of waiver bars Greystone's claims because again Greystone 
never objected to the Community Housing policies or ordinances, and that had Greystone objected, 
the City could have then evaluated its position. This argument misses the point. Greystone' s claim is 
for inverse condemnation. Nowhere is there any evidence that Greystone ever waived any right to 
assert a claim for the taking of its property without just compensation. See G&G, Inc. v. Canyon 
Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 140, 145, 75 P.3d 194, 199 (holding that not objecting to a taking of 
property does not reflect an intent not to seek compensation for the taken property). 
Finally, the City argues that Greystone was unjustly enriched because its owners participated 
in a groundbreaking ceremony. The City makes a general and sweeping claim, without citation to 
any evidence in the record, that Greystone was enriched by the publicity received from the 
groundbreaking ceremony. In addition to a complete lack of any evidence of unjust enrichment, as 
stated above, the City comes to this Court with unclean hands - it acted illegally in exacting 
Community Housing fees from Greystone. For all of these reasons, the City cannot defend against 
Greystone's claims based on these equitable theories. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above Plaintiffs request that this Court deny the City of McCall's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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CITY OF McCALL, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV 2010-276C 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDA.NT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs Richard Hehr ("Hehr") and Grey stone Village, LLC ("Greystone") (Plaintiffs may 
sometimes be collectively referred to as "Greystone" or "Plaintiffs"), by and through their counsel of 
record, submit their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant City of McCall's (the "City" or 
"McCall") Motion for summary judgrnent. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This case arises from an application Plaintiffs made to the City for a planned unit 
development ("PlTD") and subdivision in McCall called Greystone Village. Plaintiffs conveyed nine 
lots in Greystone Village to the City for community housing. (See Affidavit of Michelle Groenevelt, 
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Ex. S.) The lots had a total value of one million one hundred seventy thousand dollars 
($1,117,000.00) at the time of conveyance. (Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. M.) The City claims that 
Greystone itself proposed "donating" the lots and did, in fact, donate the lots to McCall because the 
City had no community housing requirement at the time Greystone submitted its application. (See 
City's Opening Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("City's Brief''), p. 8.) While 
there may be reasons for a developer to convey title to over a $1.1 million in real property from their 
development to the land use authority, a donation is usually not one of them. 
At the time of Greystone's application to the City for Greystone Village, the City had been 
extensively studying the issue of affordable workforce housing. The City adopted Resolution 05-19 
on September 22, 2005. (See Affidavit of Dean W. Briggs, Ex. B.) The Resolution identifies the 
City's responsibility to assure the existence of affordable housing for the local workforce and that it 
was the City's responsibility under the Resolution to develop and implement a community housing 
policy to meet the affordable workforce housing need in McCall. (See !d.) The Resolution likewise 
directs staff to develop ordinances to implement Community Housing Policy under the Resolution. 
(See !d.) 
On February 23, 2006, the City adopted two ordinances, Ordinance No. 819 to require all 
new subdivisions to include community housing units to be affordable to the local workforce and 
Ordinance No. 820, to require payment of a community housing fee for each new residential 
dwelling unit. (Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. F, G.) Greystone's application was subject to Ordinance 
No. 820 requiring the payment of a community housing fee for each new residential unit Ordinance 
Nos. 819 and 820 were later found illegal and invalid. ( Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. U.) 
The City has set forth its arguments in favor of summary judgment divided by state law based 
claims and federal law based claims. Greystone will respond in kind. 
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D. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when all of the pleadings, affidavits and other 
relevant documents before the court indicate that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment under the applicable law. I.R.C.P. 56( c). The City of McCall, 
as the moving party, bears the burden of establishing a lack of genuine issues of material fact. /d. 
As the nonmoving party, Plaintiffs are entitled to have all reasonable inferences and conclusions 
drawn in their favor. Jd. The non-moving party may overcome sununary judgment by setting forth 
genuine issues of material fact by affidavit or otherwise. I.R.C.P. 56( e). 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiffs' State Law Claims are not Barred. 
1. Plaintiffs Timely Complied with the Idaho Tort Claims Act Based on the City of 
McCall's Revival of a Claim for Community Housing by its Enactment of 
Resolutions to Make Refunds under its Illegal Community Housing Policies and 
Ordinances. 
Plaintiffs' state-based claims against the City are not barred under the Idaho Tort Claims Act 
(the "ITCA") due to the City's own actions. While tort claims against a political subdivision must be 
presented within 180 days from the date the claim arose (l.C. § 6-906) and presenting the claim 
within that time frame is a condition precedent to an action against a public subdivision (I. C. § 6-
908), and the ITCA applies to all claims against a city under Idaho Code section 50-219, McCall 
created an entirely new limitations period by passing resolutions regarding its illegal community 
housing policies and ordinances. The City should be estopped from arguing that Greystone's claim 
did not comply with the ITCA notice requirements. 
The doctrine of quasi estoppel applies when it would be unconscionable to allow a party to 
assert a right which is inconsistent with a prior position. Mitchell v. Zilog, Inc., 125 Idaho 709, 715, 
874 P.2d 520,526 (1994). Willigv. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259,261,899 P.2d 
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969, 971 (1995). The doctrine is designed to prevent a party from reaping an unconscionable 
advantage, or from imposing an unconscionable disadvantage upon another, by changing positions. 
See Tommerup v. Albertson's Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 6-7, 607 P.2d 1055, 1060-61 (1980); Keesee v. 
Fetzek, 111 Idaho 360, 723 P.2d 904 (Ct.App.l986). Treasure Valley Bank v. Butcher, 121 Idaho 
531,533,826 P.2d 492,494 (Ct. App. 1992). 
In this case, Greystone did not submit a notice of tort claim to the City within 180 days from 
the date it conveyed the nine lots at issue to the City. The City, however, revived Greystone's claims 
after its Ordinance No. 820 was found illegal by enacting Resolution 08-11 on April 24, 2008. 
Resolution 08-11 provided for a refund of Community Housing fees collected under Ordinance No. 
820 and Resolution 09-10, enacted on November 4, 2009, extended the period to obtain a refund of 
Community Housing fees collected under Ordinance No. 820 until December 31, 2009. 
Greystone and Hehr filed a Refund Request Form provided by the City for refunds on 
November 12, 2009. (See Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. Y.) The form provided by the City and the 
information provided by Greystone and Hehr, in all material respects, complied with the contents 
required in a notice of claim under the ITCA. See I. C. § 6-907. Even assuming the effective date of 
Resolution 09-10, November 4, 2009, was the last date upon which a claim for refund could be 
made, Greystone filed its claim a few days later on November 12, 20 l 0 and well within 180 days. 
The City will assert that voluntary contributions or donations to Community Housing were 
exempted from refund under Resolution 08-11 just as it has already asserted that Greystone 
voluntarily donated or contributed approximately $1.3 million in real property to the City for 
Community Housing. The Court should reject those assertions. As set forth elsewhere and in the 
affidavits accompanying Greystone's opposition to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
question ofvoluntariness cannot be resolved at this point in the litigation. (See Hebr Affidavit,~~ 4-
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5, 7; Briggs Affidavit,~ 6; Affidavit ofBormie Bertram,~ 4.) The discussion at the May 3, 2005, 
Planning and Zoning Commission hearing for Greystone Village's preliminary plat regarding 
Community Housing also demonstrate that there are genuine issues of material fact on whether 
Greystone donated or contributed anything to the City. During that meeting Greystone's 
representative was asked by Plarming & Zoning Commissioner Bailey about prior conversations 
regarding Community Housing, which Greystone's representative did not recall. (See Groenevelt 
Affidavit, Ex. B (p. 7 of26). Yet, the City claims Greystone came to the City offering to donate 
land. This simply is not true. 
The City will also assert that Resolution 08-11 is irrelevant because Greystone conveyed the 
lots pursuant to a Development Agreement and not under Ordinance No. 820. This exalts form over 
substance, which the Court should ignore. By the City's own admission, Ordinance No. 820 applied 
to Greystone's application. Additionally, Greystone pulled building permits during the effective 
period of Ordinance No. 820 and no Community Housing fee was paid on those permits, consistent 
with the Development Agreement calling for an offset ofthose fees. (Hehr Affidavit, Ex. A.) Thus, 
Greystone was obligated to pay for Community Housing under Ordinance No. 820 as a condition to 
receiving building permits even without a Development Agreement. 
The City cannot excuse its illegal policies and ordinances by calling Plaintiffs' conveyance of 
property to the City voluntary or a donation, or that Plaintiffs' proceeded under a Development 
Agreement and did not convey the lots under Ordinance ~o. 820. The City would have gotten its 
illegal fees either way. Likewise, the City carmot dump Plaintiffs' state law claims for failing to 
follow the ITCA when the City's own Resolution, enacted after its Community Housing Policy was 
found invalid and illegal, created the claim for a refund and extended the deadline to make a claim 
for a refund to, at the very earliest, November 4, 2009. Plaintiffs' timely filed a claim for a refund of 
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its taken property for Community Housing under the City's Resolution creating the claim. The Court 
should not allow the City to take an inconsistent position to Greystone's disadvantage and deny 
Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue. 
2. Statute of Limitations for inverse condemnation claim. 
Greystone timely asserted its state-law based claims under the four (4) year statute of 
limitations in Idaho Code section 5-224. The City asserts that, under McCuskey v. Canyon County, 
128 Idaho 213,912 P.2d I 00 (1996), and related cases, Greystone's causes of action accrued sooner 
than July 31, 2006, the day Greystone conveyed its real property to McCall. Based on the facts of 
this case, Greystone's Complaint was timely filed under McCuskey. Furthermore, under the case of 
C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No.4, 139Idaho 140,75 P.3d 194 (2003) and the prohibition 
against pre-takings litigation, Greystone' s claims, at the very earliest, could not have accrued prior to 
conveying the lots to the City. 
The statute of limitations in Idaho for inverse condemnation is four (4) years. I.C. § 5-224. 
As discussed in McCuskey, damages for inverse condemnation are assessed as of the time of the 
taking. McCuskey v. Canyon County, 128 Idaho at217, 912 P.2d at 104. The taking occurs and the 
cause of action accrues "as of the time that the full extent of plaintiffs loss of use and enjoyment of 
property becomes apparent." !d. In cases like McCuskey, and this one, when the government does 
not engage in formal condemnation proceedings, there is always the question of when the cause of 
action accrued. While the McCuskey standard for designating accrual of the claim is somewhat 
arbitrary, the standard sets forth at least two distinct, but necessary events, for accrual First, the 
party seeking damages for inverse condemnation must experience a loss of use and enjoyment of 
property. Second, that loss of use and enjoyment must be apparent. In McCuskey the loss of use and 
enjoyment of the claimant's property, and the apparentness of that loss both 0ccurred at the same 
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time, when a stop work order was issued on construction of the claimant's convenience store. 
McCuskey, 128 Idaho at 216, 912 P.2d at 103. 
There was no such dual occurrence in this case. The City argues at length that at the very 
latest Greystone's claim for inverse condemnation accrued by May 3, 2006, the date Greystone 
signed a Development Agreement with the City. The City also points out a number of events during 
April 2006, including Greystone's application for final plat approval and various other actions 
referencing or related to community housing, which the City asserts triggered a claim for inverse 
condemnation. Based on this information, the City argues that the "indisputable documentary 
evidence shows that no later than April of2006, four years and three months before the lawsuit was 
filed, 'the full extent of plaintiff's loss of use and enjoyment of the property [had become] 
apparent"'. (See City's Brief, p. 17.) 
The City's application of the standard in McCuskey to the facts of this case and accrual of 
Greystone's claims is simply wrong. While it may be arguable that is was apparent by April 2006 
that the City intended to exact nine lots worth over a million dollars from Grey stone, being apparent 
of a future loss of use and enjoyment of property is not sufficient under McCuskey. Greystone did 
not, and could not have, lost the use and enjoyment of those lots at any time before July 31,2006, 
when it conveyed title of those lots to the City. As of April 2006, or even May 3, 2006, when the 
Development Agreement was signed, Greystone retained all ownership rights and interests in the 
Jots. The City, on the other hand, had no rights or interests in the nine lots, and could have none until 
title to them was conveyed by Greystone. 
Greystone also had no obligation to go forth with its development ofGreystone Village at the 
time it signed the Development Agreement. Grey stone could have lost its financing, lost interest in 
pursuing the development or otherwise decided not to go forth with the development for a number of 
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other reasons. The City could not have compelled Greys tone to move forward with the development 
had Greystone decided not to proceed. The City also could not have compelled Greystone to convey 
the nine lots. The only thing the City could have done was terminate the Development Agreement. 
See I. C.§ 67-6511A ( ... A commitment may be terminated, and the zoning designation upon which 
the use is based reversed, upon the failure of the requirements in the commitment after a reasonable 
time as determined by the governing board or upon the failure of the owner; .... ) Greys tone simply 
did not lose the use and enj oyrnent of its property any time before July 31, 2006, when it conveyed 
the nine lots to the City. A property owner cannot maintain an inverse condemnation action unless 
there has actually been a taking of his or her property. KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 
581, 67 P.3d 56, 60 (2003) (citing Covington v. Jefferson County. 137 Idaho 777, 53 P.3d 828 
(2002)) See also Williamson County Reg 'I Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 
473 U.S. 172 (1985) (prohibiting pre-takings claims). A pending or future loss of the property, even 
if apparent, is not sufficient under McCuskey; actual loss is required. 
Other inverse condemnation cases relied on by the City are inapposite. In Rueth v. State, 644 
P.2d 1333 (Idaho 1982) (accrual occurred when the claimant met with a government official about 
flooding caused by a diversion dam because the meeting was a recognition of the severity of the 
problem), Wadsworth v. Idaho Department of Transportation, 128 Idaho 439, 915 P .2d 1 (1996) (the 
single event of a government construction project triggered the inverse condemnation claim), and 
Harris v. State, 147 Idaho 401,210 P.3d 86 (2009) (the claimant's cause of action accrued when it 
signed a lease to pay rents on sand and gravel), none of the claimants retained control over what 
happened to their property after their loss of property became apparent. The loss of use and 
enjoyment in this case simply did not occur until conveyance of the lots to the City, even if it was 
apparent that a loss would occur in the future. This, again, is illustrated by the fact that Greystone 
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could not have pursued a claim for inverse condemnation prior to conveying the lots to the City. 
Alternatively, the reasoning set forth in C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No. 4, 139 
Idaho 140, 75 P.3d 194 (2003), for a departure from the McCuskey standard also establishes that no 
taking occurred in this case, and thus the claim did not accrue, until title to the lots were conveyed to 
the City. In C&G the Canyon Highway District rebuilt the Old Middleton Road over C&G's 
property. ld. at 141, 75 P.3d at 195. The Highway District discussed with C&G the possibility of 
rebuilding the existing winding road over the straight section line that dissected C&G' s property for 
a number of years. !d. The Highway District believed it owned an easement over the section line 
and could rebuild the road without compensating C&G for taking the property on which the road 
would be built. ld. The Highway District eventually rebuilt the road over the section line and 
advised C&G that due to its alleged easement, C&G was not entitled to compensation for a taking of 
its property. !d. C&G believed the Highway District's representations without further inquiry. I d. 
By November 1992 the Highway District completed construction ofthe road's subbase and 
construction was totally finished by November 1993. !d. at 142, 75 P.3d at 196. In January 1997, 
when C&G hired a surveyor for development purposes, it learned for the first time there was no 
easement over the section line. Id. C&G initiated an inverse condemnation action against the 
Highway District on January 31, 1997. !d. C&Gprevailed before the district court and the Highway 
District appealed on grounds that the statute of limitations ran before C&G initiated its lawsuit. Id. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court declined to apply the McCuskey standard on the issue of accrual 
and instead applied the "project completion rule", largely on policy considerations. !d. at 144, 75 
P.3d at 198. The policy considerations identified by the Court included the need for certainty and 
efficiency in resolving claims by identifying a clearly ascertainable date for accrual purposes, to 
avoid requiring a claimant to sue prematurely, and because the government's mistaken belief that it 
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owned an easement over the section line, which caused the confusion in the first place. /d. 
Thus, the Court reasoned, the facts in C&G provided a compelling reason to deviate from the 
accrual standard set forth in Tibbs v. Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667,603 P.2d 1001 (1979), and carried on 
in McCuskey. While Greystone's claim is timely under the Tibbs-McCuskey standard, the facts of 
this case also provide the same policy reasons for the application of a date certain standard as 
identified in C&G. When the government takes or obtains the rights and title in real property 
through conveyance of a deed, the date of conveyance is the appropriate standard for when the taking 
occurs and a claim accrues. Like the "project completion rule" adopted in C&G, the date of 
conveyance of the deed provides certainty and efficiency in resolving claims by providing a clearly 
ascertainable date that triggers the claim. It also prevents premature legal action. The need for a 
clearly ascertainable date in this case is illustrated by City's attempt to identify several different 
events before conveyance of the deeds that allegedly triggered Greystone's claim for inverse 
condemnation. Greystone gave title to the lots, and McCall obtained title to the lots, on one clearly 
ascertainable date - the date the deed to the lots was conveyed. Further, the City asserts it had a 
good faith belief that it could legally require the payment of Community Housing fees. The City was 
incorrect on that issue and caused the confusion in this case. For all of these reasons, the accrual 
date for Greystone's inverse condemnation claim was the July 31, 2006, the date the deeds were 
conveyed. 
3. Contracts Statute of Limitations. 
The City asserts that the five year statute of limitations for contract actions does not apply in 
this case. Greystone has not asserted a contract claim in this matter and offers no argument with 
regard to this issue raised by the City. 
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4. The Exhaustion of Remedies Doctrine and Voluntary Actions do not Prohibit 
Greystone from Asserting a Claim in this Case. 
The City claims that Greystone' s state claims fail under KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 
Idaho 577, 67 P.3d 56 (2003) because Greystone failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and 
because Greystone voluntarily donated the nine lots at issue. KMST does not compel the result urged 
by the City. Greystone was not required to exhaust under the facts of this case and there are 
questions of fact regarding donative intent that cannot be resolved on summary judgment. 
a. Greystone was not Required to Exhaust any Administrative Remedy 
Prior to bringing this Action. 
Greystone had no obligation to exhaust any administrative remedies. As a general 
rule, a party must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the courts to challenge the 
validity of administrative acts. Arnzen v. State, 123 Idaho 899, 906, 854 P.2d 242, 249 (1993). The 
Idaho Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to that rule: (a) when the interests of justice so 
require, and (b) when the agency acted outside its authority. Regan v. Kootenai County, 140 Idaho 
721, 725, 100 P.3d 615,619 (2004). 
Greystone's claims meet both exceptions to the general rule of exhaustion. First, the City 
acted outside its authority by requiring the payment of Community Housing fees. The fact that 
Greystone entered into a Development Agreement v.ith the City makes no difference. Under the 
plain terms of the Development Agreement, the value of the lots conveyed was to offset community 
housing fees and building permit fees. (See Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. R.) Ordinance No. 820, which 
the City agrees applied to Greystone, would have also required the payment of the fees. It is an 
adjudicated fact that the City acted outside its authority in requiring the payment of community 
housing fees. (See Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. U.) Second, the interests of justice also compel 
application of the exhaustion exception- the public has an interest in local governments not enacting 
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illegal tax schemes. Thus, the exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement 
applies in this case. 
The City argues that under KMST, the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement only apply to 
facial challenges of ordinances and statutes, and that this case is an "as applied" challenge. This 
position is incorrect. Foremost, no Idaho case stands for the proposition asserted by the City. The 
City attempts to manipulate the holding in the White v. Bannock County Commissioners, 139 Idaho 
396, 80 P.3d 332 (2003), to stand for the proposition that the exhaustion exceptions only apply to 
"facial" challenges, but admits in footnote 14 of its brief that:" ... although the Court did not say so 
in so many words, it is inescapable from White that the exhaustion exception does not apply to 'as 
applied' constitutional challenges." (City' Brief, p. 21) (underlining added). 
White does not lead to any such inescapable conclusion. The decision does not even use the 
terms "as applied" or "facial", or analyze the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement other than to 
summarily state at the conclusion of the decision that the exceptions did not apply to the case. 
Neither White nor any other Idaho case holds that the exhaustion exceptions apply only to "facial" 
challenges. See Also, American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dept. ofWater Resources, 14 3 
Idaho 862, 870-73, 154 P.3d 433, 441-43 (2007) (stating that in an "as applied" challenge, 
administrative remedies must first be exhausted for purposes of establishing a factual record when 
the traditional exceptions to the exhaustion requirement do not apply). Additionally, the City's 
Community Housing Policy and Ordinances are, as a matter oflaw, invalid. It does not get any more 
"facial" than that. 
Furthermore, the administrative appeal process would not provide Greystone the proper 
remedy as the City suggests. The Idaho Supreme Court has distinguished the difference between an 
administrative appeal and a civil action. The court in Euclid Avenue Trust v. City of Boise, 146 
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Idaho 306, 193 P .3d 853 (2008) held that an administrative appeal and a civil action may not be 
combined in one proceeding. The Euclid court reasoned: 
The separation of civil actions and administrative appeals is supported by good policy 
underpinnings. After all, one proceeding is appellate in nature and the other is an 
original action. They are processed differently by our courts. Discovery is rarely 
available in a judicial review proceeding. The review is to be conducted on the 
record, absent specific authorization. I. C. § 67-5276. The standards for determining 
an outcome are specified by statute (I. C. § 67-5279), whereas this is not the case with 
actions seeking declaratory or monetary relief. 
!d. at 308. Here, Greystone has pleaded inverse condemnation for its lots that were taken, among 
other claims. All of Plaintiffs' requests are civil actions that cannot be properly addressed by a court 
sitting in an appellate capacity on judicial review. 
The City argues that Greystone should have noted its concerns so the City could have been 
put on notice and reconsidered its policies on Community Housing. The City basically asks this 
Court to find that Greystone should be precluded from maintaining this action because it did not 
object to conveying the lots at issue for community housing. The City's arguments should be 
disregarded by this Court for two reasons. 
First, there is no Idaho law requiring a party to object or otherwise pay under protest an 
illegal fee before it can be recovered. This was the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in BHA 
Investments v. City Boise, 1411daho 168, I 08 P.3d 315 (2004). If the govenunent has no authority 
to impose any fee at all, it is illegal. BHA Investments, at 176. The City had no authority to impose a 
community housing fee. Greystone was not required to raise any objections prior to paying the 
community housing fees via the lots conveyed to the City. 
Second, Greystone had no reason to question the City's policies and ordinances. An 
ordinance is presumed valid until the contrary is shown. State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365, 377, 399 P.2d 
955, 962 (1965). Just as the courts presume ordinances are valid, the general public must have some 
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confidence in local government and likewise presume that ordinances enacted by local governments 
are legal. Greystone read Resolution 05-19 and Ordinance No. 820, both of which applied to 
Greystone, to require community housing fees. Greystone had no reason to doubt the City's actions. 
It would be unconscionable to place a heightened burden on Greystone to question the City's 
ordinances to ensure that they are properly enacted and valid before paying a fee required under the 
ordinance. 
b. Greystone did not Voluntarily Donate or Contribute the Nine Lots at 
Issue to the City. 
KMST, prior to submitting its land use application, met twice with the supervisor of ACHD's 
representative in order to determine what recommendations regarding KMST's development the 
ACHD staff would make. KMST, at 579-580, 67 PJd at 58-59. The ACHD representative informed 
KMST that "he would recommend that KMST be required to construct a street ... and dedicate that 
street to the public." KMST, at 580, 67 P.3d at 59. Based on that conversation, KMST submitted, 
along with its application, a statement that it would construct a public street and that such street 
would be the primary access for the development. !d. 
The KAfST court held that no taking had occurred because ACHD had no fmal authority to 
approve or reject the property owners' proposed development. KMST, at 582, 67 P.3d at 61. 
Moreover, the court held that even if ACHD did have fmal authority to approve some aspect of the 
development, there was no taking because the KMST voluntarily included the dedication of the street 
based on the conversation it had with the ACHD supervisor. Id. 
The City has failed to create an inference in the first place that Greystone voluntarily donated 
or willingly gave the lots at issue to the City. Nowhere in any part of the record provided by the City 
is there any indication or information, other than unfounded and unsubstantiated claims made by 
unidentified City representatives, that Greystone approached the city about donating the lots. The 
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City cannot even establish to whom any authorized agent of Greystone indicated this alleged intent 
or desire to pay Community Housing rees or donate the lots. Nowhere in Greystone 's application is 
an affirmative representation that it wished to pay a Community Housing fee. The fact that 
Greystone "agreed" to convey the lots in lieu of paying a Community Housing fee (and received an 
offset against building permit fees, sewer hookup fees and Community Housing Fees as a result) 
does not make their action "voluntary" as contemplated by KMST. 
Grey stone did not voluntarily donate the nine lots at issue with a combined value of over one 
million dollars. (See Hehr Affidavit, 'J'J 4-5, 7; Briggs Affidavit, ~ 6; Beebe Affidavit, ~ 5-6.) 
Greystone had to do so in order to get the necessary approvals to proceed with its development of 
Greystone Village. (See Hehr Affidavit, 'If 7; Briggs Affidavit, 'J 6.) The City intended to require 
developers to provide for Community Housing, regardless of the means (See Affidavit of Bonnie 
Bertram, 'J'J 4-5). 
There are unresolved questions of fact regarding whether Greystone's actions in conveying 
the lots at issue was voluntarily. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Greystone, the 
non-moving party, genuine issues of fact exist that contradict the City's voluntary/donative act 
argument. Greystone's claims cannot be thrown out under the voluntary theory in KMST. 
Furthermore, C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway District, is the more applicable case to address this 
question ofvoluntariness. In C&G the evidence showed that one of the owners ofC&G favored the 
action that resulted in the taking ofC&G' s property. G&G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 
140, 145, 75 P.3d 194, 199. The court recognized, however, that "such an attitude does not reflect 
donative intent or intent not to seek compensation for C&G's taken property." !d. Like in C&G, 
Greystone simply believed that the City could require the payment of Community Housing fees 
under its existing policies and ordinances. The fact that Greystone acted in its own best interests to 
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ensure those fees were paid by conveying lots to the City "does not reflect a donative intent or intent 
not to seek compensation" for the City's taking of Greystone's property. 
B. Plaintiffs' Federal Law Claims are not Barred. 
1. Greystone was not Required to bring its Inverse Condemnation Claim Under 
Section 1983 and is not Barred by tbe Statute of Limitations for Section 1983 
Claims. 
Greystone has not sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nor was it required to do so to 
maintain an inverse condemnation action for a violation of the Fifth Amendment. The City argues 
that Plaintiffs' claims arising under a violation of the United States Constitution can only be brought 
as a § 1983 claim and is subject to its two year statute oflimitation. A section 1983 claim is not the 
only remedy available to Greystone for vindicating its federal rights. The two-year statute of 
limitations for§ 1983 claims simply does not apply to Grey stone's claim for inverse condemnation 
under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a party is entitled to bring an 
inverse condemnation action directly under the Fifth Amendment: 
We have recognized that a landowner is entitled to bring an action in inverse 
condemnation as a result of "the self-executing character of the constitutional 
provision with respect to compensation .... " ... [I]t has been established at least 
since Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933), that c1aims for just compensation 
are grounded in the Constitution itself: "The suits were based on the right to recover 
just compensation for property taken by the United States for public use in the 
exercise of its power of eminent domain. That right was guaranteed by the 
Constitution. The fact that condemnation proceedings were not instituted and that 
the right was asserted in suites by the owners did not change the essential nature of 
the claim. The form of the remedy did not qualify the right. It rested upon the Fifth 
Amendment. Statutory recognition was not necessary. A promise to pay was not 
necessary. Such a promise was implied because the duty to pay imposed by the 
Amendment. The suits were thus founded upon the Constitution oft he United States. 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church a/Glendale v. Los Angeles County, Cal. 482 U.S. 304, 
314-3 J 5, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 2385- 2386 (1987) (internal citations omitted, emphasis in original). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court's pronouncement of a direct right under the Fifth Amendment for an 
inverse condemnation claim speaks for itself. The right of an inverse condemnation claim directly 
under the Fifth Amendment could not be stated more clearly. Other courts have recognized this 
direct claim as well. See Lawyer v. Hilton Head Pub. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 220 FJd 298, 303 n. 4 (4th 
Cir. 2000); Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 864 F.2d 463, 468 (7th Cir. 1988); 287 Corp. Ctr. Assocs. v. 
Township of Bridgewater, 101 F.3d 320, 324 n. 3 (3rd Cri. 1996). The Ninth Circuit, on the other 
hand, has held that an inverse condemnation claim must be brought as a section 19&3 claim. See 
Azul Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, this Court is 
not bound by the holdings of the Ninth Circuit or other lower federal courts, even on issues of federal 
law. See Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer Consulting Holding, Inc., 142 Idaho 235, 
240, 127 P.3d 138, 143 (2005). 
Most relevant to this issue is the Idaho Supreme Court's own view on the question of whether 
there is a direct claim under the Fifth Amendment for inverse condemnation. The Idaho Supreme 
Court recognized a direct claim in BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 175, 108 
P.3d 315, 322 (2004). In discussing the fact that the ITCA and its notice requirements are preempted 
when a federal civil rights action is brought in state court, the Court recognized that "in this case 
Bravo and Splitting Kings have asserted their federal claim directly under the Takings Clause in the 
United States Constitution." Id. at 176 n.2, 108 P.3d at 323 n.2. The Court also recognized that: 
"The Takings Clause is self-executing, and a takings claim may be based solely upon it, First 
Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, or it may be brought as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd." !d. (emphasis added) (internal citations 
omitted). Thus, our own Idaho Supreme Court expressly acknowledges the United States Supreme 
Court's holding in First Lutheran the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is self executing and 
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that inverse condemnation claimants may proceed in Idaho courts directly under the Fifth 
Amendment or under section 1983. Greystone has chosen to submit its claim directly under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
2. This Case is Distinguishable from Williamson County and the Ripeness Test is 
Inapplicable. 
The City argues that Greystone's Fifth Amendment taking claim is not ripe for review under 
the special two-part test established in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. 
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 4 73 U.S. I 72 (1985) for federal takings claims. The two-part test 
requires that: (1) the governmental entity reach a final decision; and (2) in federal court litigation 
involving regulatory takings, the property o-wner must "seek compensation through the procedures 
the State has provided for doing so." Williamson County, at 186, 194. Neither ofthese ripeness 
tests, however, prohibit Greystone's federal takings claims under the facts and circumstances of this 
case. 
a. Williamson County's First Ripeness Test is Inapplicable in this Case. 
In Williamson County, a land owner sued alleging that the county's zoning ordinance 
amounted to a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Williamson County, 105 U.S. at 175. 
The plaintiff's takings claim centered on a regulatory taking. Citing to cases such as Penn Central 
Transportation Company v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, (1978), the Williamson County Court 
recognized that a regulation that goes "too far" can be a "taking," but for the claim to be ripe, the 
governmental entity charged with implementing the regulation must first reach a final decision. Id., 
at 186. The court held that the plaintiff's claim was not ripe because the plaintiff could have sought 
a variance from the county. Id., at 191. 
Greystone's claim is distinguishable because the City has already physically taken 
Greystone's property. The "first Williamson County requirement is automatically satisfied at the 
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time of the physical taking." Daniel v. County of Santa Barbara, 288 F.3d 3 75, 382 (9th Cir. 2002); 
see also Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1281 n. 28 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that 
"[w ]here there has been a physical invasion, the taking occurs at once, and nothing the city can do or 
say after that point will change that fact.") (overruled on other grounds by Yee v. City of Escondido, 
503 u.s. 519 (1992)). 
b. Williamson County's Second Ripeness Test is Inapplicable in this Case. 
The City argues that Greystone's inverse condemnation claim fails to meet this second 
ripeness test because Greystone should have first sought judicial review of the City's actions. The 
City misinterprets Willimason County's second ripeness test. The second prong of the Williamson 
County ripeness test requires that a property owner first seek just compensation through a state 
inverse condemnation, and be denied, before litigating in federal court. Williamson County, at 194. 
The second ripeness test is not an exhaustion doctrine or principle. The Plaintiffs have filed this 
action before this state court seeking among other things, inverse condemnation. Thus, the second 
Williamson County ripeness test is inapplicable in this case. 
c. Williamson County does not Preclude a Due Process Claim Under the 
Facts of this Case. 
In Williamson County the court dismissed the landowner's procedural due process claims as 
unripe by holding "respondent's claim is premature, whether it is analyzed as a deprivation of 
property without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, or as a taking under the Just 
Compensation Clause ofthe Fifth Amendment." Williamson County, at 200. The City relies on this 
to argue that a due process claims is just a reframing of the taking issue and does not change the 
outcome. The important factual distinctions between Williamson County and this case render 
Williamson County inapplicable to a due process claim in this case. 
The second ripeness test requiring inverse condemnation proceedings to be first brought in 
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state court is inapplicable to procedural due process causes of action. Nowhere in the Williamson 
County holding is there a requirement that, as a prerequisite, an aggrieved party must first seek relief 
in state court before seeking relief in federal court to vindicate due process protections. UnUke an 
inverse condemnation action that seeks just compensation, "[ t]he remedy for a regulation that goes 
too far, under the due process theory is not 'just compensation' but invalidation of the regulation, and 
if authorized and appropriate, actual damages." Williamson County, at 197. Since due process 
violations are not concerned with determining whether a state court will deny just compensation, 
Williamson County's second ripeness test is inapplicable to Greystone's due process claim. 
Additionally, the ripeness issues related to the due process daims discussed by the 
Williamson County Court dealt with the first ripeness test of'finality' in the context of a regulatory 
taking. This case involves a direct physical taking of Greystone's nine lots and are therefore 
inapplicable in this case. In addressing the land owner's due process arguments, the Court held that 
the due process claim was not ripe for review because it could not determine whether the regulation 
went "too far": 
Viewing a regulation that 'goes too far' as an invalid exercise of the police power, rather 
than as a 'taking' for which just compensation must be paid, does not resolve the difficult 
problem of how to define 'too far,' that is, how to distinguish the point at which 
regulation becomes so onerous that it has the same effect as an appropriation of the 
property through eminent domain or physical possession. As we have noted, resolution 
of that question depends, in significant part, upon an analysis of the effect the 
Commission's application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations had on the 
value of respondent's property and investment-backed profit expectatjons. That effect 
cannot be measured until a final decision is made as to how the regulations will be 
applied to respondent's property. 
Williamson County, at 199-200. 
The law and facts in this case do not present the same ripeness concerns faced by the 
Williamson County Court. It is an adjudicated fact that the City's Community Housing Policy and 
resulting ordinances were i1legal (See Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. U.) Therefore, this Court can readily 
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conclude that the City's Community Housing Policy and ordinances went "too far". 
3. Greystone's Claim for Inverse Condemnation is not Barred under the Federal 
Statute of Limitations. 
Generally, in the absence of a federal statute of limitations, the analogous state statute is 
applied to the federal cause of action. E.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 
462, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1721,44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975); O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 322, 34 S.Ct. 
596, 597, 58 L.Ed. 980 (1914). In this case, the most analogous state statute for Greystone's Fifth 
Amendment federal inverse claim is the four (4) year statute of limitations found in Idaho Code 
section 5-224 applicable to its state inverse condemnation claim. 
The City argues that Idaho's two year statute of limitations for personal injury suits, which 
applies to all section 1983 claims (See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985)), is applicable to 
Greystone's federal Fifth Amendment inverse condemnation claim and, therefore, this lawsuit is 
untimely. In support of this argument the City cites and discusses Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 864 
F.2d at 463 (7th Cit. 1988) and Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1991). In both the 
Bieneman and Van Strum cases, the respective plaintiffs specifically proceeded under section 1983 as 
their vehicle for maintaining their inverse condernnatlon claim. When challenged on statute of 
limitations, both claimants in those cases argued that since an inverse condemnation action can be 
brought directly under the United States Constitution, the state limitations period to be applied 
should be the statute most analogous to inverse condemnation, not personal injury. Both circuit 
courts rejected the claimants' argument and instead adhered to the Unites States Supreme Court's 
mandate in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), that alJ claims brought under §1983 are subject to 
the limitations period established by the state personal injury statute. 
In this case, Bieneman and Van Strum are inapplicable because Greystone has not pled or 
sought inverse condemnation under section 1983. The City's federal statute oflimitations argument 
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on this point is simply a re-hash of its argument that all inverse condemnation claims must be 
brought under section 1983. Greys tone has already demonstrated that it was not limited to bringing 
its inverse condemnation claim under section 1983. As discussed above, our Idaho Supreme Court 
recognizes that inverse condemnation claims can be brought in two ways, either directly under the 
United States Constitution or under section 1983. See BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 141 
Idaho 168, 175, 108 P .3d 315, 322 (2004). The daim can be brought in two ways because the two 
are entirely different animals and each carries different remedies. 
An inverse condemnation claim directly under the United State Constitution limits the 
claimant's remedy for simply the payment of just compensation. Proceeding under section 1983 for 
an inverse condemnation claim, on the other hand, may provide advantages not available in a direct 
claim under the Fifth Amendment. Section 1983 created a "species" of tort liability where the level 
of damages is ordinarily derived from common law torts. Memphis Community School Dist. v. 
Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986). This includes compensatory damages, nominal damages, 
punitive damages, non-economic damages and prejudgment interest, and the right to a jury trial. 
Webb v. CountyofTrinity, 734 F.Supp.2d 1018 (E.D. Cal201 O);Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth, 743 
F.Supp.2d 619 (E.D. Mich 2010); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterrey, LTD., 526 
U.S. 687 (1999). Claimants may also seek equitable relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Prevailing claimants 
are entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
While a section 1983 claim might very well be a better vehicle to bring an inverse 
condemnation claim rather than a direct suit under the U.S. Constitution, the rewards also come with 
a price. As Bieneman and Van Strum suggest, the rule set forth in Garcia v. Wilson may limit an 
inverse condemnation claim brought under section 1983 to the applicable state statute oflimitations 
for personal injury, which may be a shorter period. Here, Greystone does not have that problem 
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because it chose to proceed on its federal takings claim directly under the U.S. Constitution. 
C. Plaintiffs are not Prohibited from the Remedies Sought under Principles of Equity. 
Plaintiffs claims cannot be barred on equitable principles and equitable defenses do not 
shield the City from its actions in this case. The City argues that, under principles of equity namely, 
promissory estoppel, laches, waiver and unjust enrichment, Greystone's claims should be barred 
and/or the City has an equitable defense. The City predicts that Greystone will argue that the City 
cannot rely on its own illegal acts as a defense. That is the law in Idaho. The doctrine of unclean 
hands allows "a court to deny equitable relief to a litigant on the ground that his conduct has been 
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent and deceltful as to the controversy at issue." Sword 
v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 251, 92 PJd 492, 501 (2004). Greystone's belief that the City's 
Community Housing Policies and Ordinances complied with the law was reasonable. The City 
comes to this Court with unclean hands and cannot defend based on equitable grounds. 
The City argues that the doctrine of promissory estoppels bars Greystone's claims because 
the City relied on Greystone' s promises in the Development Agreement and it would be unfair to the 
City and its taxpayers to allow Greystone to recover its property. If the City took Greystone's 
property without paying just compensation as required by the Federal and State Constitutions, 
Greystone is entitled to be compensated. Promissory estoppel is inapplicable under the facts of this 
case. 
The City argues that laches bar Greystone's claim because Greystone did not raise an 
objection to the City's illegal Community Housing policies and ordinances and because the City 
would be burdened by paying back Grey stone if it prevai1s in this action. The City also makes the 
assertion, without citation to law, that Greystone cannot survive a laches defense because Greystone 
assumed the Community Housing policies and ordinances were lawful. The City fails to establish 
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the equities oflaches favors its position in the first place, but violation ofGreystone's constitutional 
right to just compensation for the taking of its property far outweigh any equities that may lie in the 
City's favor on the question of laches. 
The City argues that the principle of waiver bars Greystone's claims because again Greystone 
never objected to the Community Housing policies or ordinances, and that had Greystone objected, 
the City could have then evaluated its position. This argument misses the point Greystone' s claim is 
for inverse condemnation. Nowhere is there any evidence that Greystone ever waived any right to 
assert a claim for the taking of its property without just compensation. See G&G, Inc. v. Canyon 
Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 140, 145, 75 P.3d 194, 199 (holding that not objecting to a taking of 
property does not reflect an intent not to seek compensation for the taken property). 
Finally, the City argues that Greystone was unjustly enriched because its owners participated 
in a groundbreaking ceremony. The City makes a general and sweeping claim, without citation to 
any evidence in the record, that Greystone was enrkhed by the publicity received from the 
groundbreaking ceremony. In addition to a complete lack of any evidence of unjust enrichment, as 
stated above, the City comes to this Court with unclean hands - it acted illegally in exacting 
Community Housing fees from Greystone. For all of these reasons, the City cannot defend against 
Greystone's claims based on these equitable theories. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above Plaintiffs request that this Court deny the City of McCall's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-
24 298 
0412112011 15:46 FAX 208345351 
DATED this 27m day of April, 20J 0. 
EVANS KEANE LLP 
EVANS KEANE LLP 
By y t..!r;;.. ~ 
Victor Ville s, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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141003 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27Ih day of April, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was served by first-class mail. postage prepaicl and addressed to; by fax 
transmission to; by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in 
charge of the office as indicated below: 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Martin C. Hendrickson 
Givens Pursley LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
Attorneys for Defendant 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
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Jed W. Manwaring, ISB # 3040 
Vietor S. Villegas, ISH # 5860 
EVANS KEANE In" 
1405 W. Main Street 
Case No. ___ ,lnst.Nq. 
Filed A.M fj . 00 P.M 
P.O. Box 959 
Boise, Idaho 83701..0959 
Telephoue: (208) 384-1800 
Faaimile: (208) 345-3514 
E-M•D: JManwariag@ev8.111keaae.eom 
VVUlegas@evanakeane.com 
AttorneyJ for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR 1"Bl!: COUNI.'Y OF VALLEY 




CITY OF McCALL, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS-
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV l010-l76C 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
DEAN W. BRIGGS 
DEAN W. BRIGGS, being duly sworn upon oath deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am an adult over the age of eighteen (1 &) years, I am a resident of Boise, Ada 
County, Idaho, and I have peTsonal knowledge of the facts set forth in this Affidavit. 
2. I am a licensed Professional Civil Engineer, Structural Engineer and Surveyor. 1 am 
employed by and am a principal ofBriggs Engineering, Inc. located in Boise.ldaho. I have worked 
as an engineer in Idaho since 1978. I have extensive experience in representing residential 
AF'FTOA VIT OF DEAN W. BRJGGS - 1 
300 
04/27/2011 15:59 FAX 208345351 EVANS KEANE LLP la!003/0ll 
developers in all phases of the Land use process and construction management on all phases of land 
development projects. My experience includes representing developers on residential land use 
projects in the City of McCall, Idah.o. Based on my experience, I am familiar with the City of 
McCall's ordinances and land use application process. 
3. Greystone, LLC hired Briggs Engineering, Inc. in 2005 to represent Greystone in 
filing an application with the City to develop a planned unit development ("PUD") and subdivision 
called Greystone Village. Twas the engineer from Briggs Engineering that managed the application 
process and project on behalf ofGreystone. A true and correct copy of an Affidavit ofLegal Interest 
to the City of McCall regarding my authority to work on behalf of Greystone is attached to this 
affidavit as Exhibit A. I worked with Steven Benad, an owner and representative ofGreystone, LLC 
on the subdivision application. J also worked with Richard Hehr, the other owner and representative 
ofGreystone, LLC, from time to time on the subdivision application. As Greystone's engineer, it 
was my responsibility to provide the land planning, engineering and surveying services needed to 
obtain land use approvals and permits from McCall, to represent Greystone in obtaining land use 
approvals, and to assist Greystone's efforts to carry out its development of Greystone Village. 
4. Based on my experience) I am famil ia.r with McCall's land use ordinances. I was also 
aware that preceding Greystone 's application that the City was concerned about what the City saw as 
a need for affordable housing for the loca1 workforce. During 2005 the City adopted Resolution 05-
19 providing a Community Housing Policy. A true and correct copy ofResolution 05-19; which I 
maintained in my files for Greystone Village, is attached to this affidavit as Exhibit B. I famillarized 
myself with Resolution 05-19 regarding the City's Community Housing Policy and I was aware that 
the City planned to adopt ordinances requiring developers to pay fees for workforce housing as set 
forth in Resolution 05-19. 
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S. I filed Greystone's Subdivision Application- Preliminary Application to Plat on 
January 12, 2005. lt was my job to ensure that Greystone's application to McCall was complete. An 
incomplete application creates delays in the land use application process. which in tum increases the 
developer's costs. Community Housing was not proposed or addressed in the application. I attended 
a. meeting of the McCall Planning and Zoning Conunission on May 3, 2005, when Greystone's 
application for a PUD and subdivision were under consideration. During that meeting the issue of 
affordable housing was addressed by the Commission. Tt was suggested that Community Housing 
was a necessary component of the deveJopment and that it needed to be a "voluntary" part of the 
overall development The owners of Greystone at no point had conveyed to me that they were 
willing to donate money or property to the City as part of Oreystone' s application. 
6. Prior to the May3, 2005 meeting and after, IworkedcloselywithMr.Benad and City 
representatives on Greystone's application. Throughout this process it was clearly implied that 
Greystone had to do something to satisfy the City on the issue of affordable housing, and that 
Greystone had to address affordable housing. It was never my understanding that it was within 
Greystone' s discretion to not address affordable housing in the application process. Mr. Benad made 
it clear to me that for Greystone's application for fmal plat to be approved and in order to move 
through the application process in an expeditious manner, Greystone would have to address the 
affordable housing issue. Based on my understanding ofMcCall's approval matrix and based on Mr. 
Benad's instructions to me, Greystone's application would not satisfy the City's approval 
requirements unless Greystone agreed to pay fees or donate lots for Community Housing. Mr. 'Bena.d 
made it clear to me that Greystone would not voluntarily pay a fee or donate lots for Community 
Housing, but that it was something that had to be done to get final approvals and proceed with the 
project, 
AFFIDA VlT Of' DEAN W. BRIGGS ~ 3 
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7. I was var~ that McCall enacted Ordinance No. 819to require all new subdivisions to 
include community hrsing units to be affordable to the local workforce and Ordinance No. 820 to 
require payment ofa orru:nunity housing fee fe>r each new res1dentinl dwelling unit. Based on my 
understanding ofO('d' ance No. 820, Greystone would have been required to pay a fee or make other 
contributions to the!$ ordablc housing effort in order to obtain development approvals and building 
pem1its for Greyston~ Village. 
8. I atten~ed a meeting of the McCall Planning and Zoning Commission on April 4, 
2006. to consider Gre~sronc!'' s request for f:mal plat approval of a PUD and sub<livision tor Greystone 
Village. During that leeting I addressed the issue of the affordable housing lot.c; af'ld that the plan 
had been altered to cfvey nine (9) deed Jestricted lots for affordable housing instead of the six ( 6) 
addtes$ed in Grey stone Village's preliminary plat. While that is the infonnal.ion lhat I gave during 
that me•tini, I did + stat< that the lots being oonveyod were a donation by Gceys<On• or <hat 
Grcystone would voluntarily convey those lors.· J,simpl~ stated the fucts with regard to the number ~)f 
lots to be conveyed J the City to satisfy its Community Housing Policy. 
SUBSCRIBE~ and SWORN to before me this 'Jt0~ day of April, 201 L 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing in ·3:x..~u .., sA.d.-. h. ..) 
My Comrniss·ion Expires:--QJ, ..... * 't..u\ L 
~005/011 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27m day of April, 2011, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document *'as served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax 
transmission to; by ov~rnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in 
I 
charge of the office as~ indicated below: 
I 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Martin C. Hertdrickson 
Givens Pursldy LLP 
P.O. Box27lP 
Boise, ID 83~01-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
Facsimile: (:l08) 388-1300 
Attomeys for Vefendant 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEAN~· BRIGGS· 5 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
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AFFIDA V1T OF LEGAL INTEREST 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
COUNTY OF VAJiEY ) 
I 
r, 9.f;.....,_, I r3.e.... 11d , tc;uq P.~z·"-' c.,.._ cP.J 
(nan,\e) (address) 
l ..._._ ,1 being first duly sworn upon 
frh C(_ ~ \ ( I ~ P5 ~ 3 Y oath, depose and say: 
(city) \ (state) 
1. That 1 am the record ovvner of the property described on the attached, and I grant 
I • • to my pe:ronsston : 
Briggs En¢nL lo!:... 1800 W. OverlaJlllRo!!!l Bolse ld. 837o:; 
I (name) (address) 
to submit the BCCOmpanying application pertaining to that property. 
2. I awel to indenmify, defend and hold the City of McCall and it's employees 
harmlbss from any claim or liability resulting from any dispute as to the 
statenients contained herein or as to the ownership of the property which is the 
I 
subj,t ofthe application. 
"'\I 
.v t I 
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RESOLUTION 05-19 
I 
A RESOLUTION OF !fHE CITY OF McCALL, IDAHO. PROVIDING FOR A CO:MMUNITY 
HOUSING POLICY, \PROVIDING FOR RELATED MATI'ERS, AND PROVIDING AN 
EFFECTIVE DATE. : 
WHEREAS, the Housi~ Component of the McCall Area Comprehensive Plan (adopted on June 
22, :woo) includes the following objectives: 
• Encou:rage geographic diversity ofhousing types; 
• Prepare fur the housing impact of majOl' development proposals and expaos.ions on the 
City ofMcCa.tllim.pact area, and surrounding vicinity; 
• Encourage o:r provide for affordable housing; 
• Analyze the poiential demand for second homes in the city and impact area; 
• Preserve oldet homes and established neighborhoods; 
• Ensure that all ~ew residential developments comply with the Americans with 
Disabilities A~ 
• Eneourage ~ing and neighborhood design standard development which preserves and 
protects the bi~wquality natural environment; and 
I 
WHEREAS. to advand; these objectives the City, 1n partnership with Valley County, Adams 
County, and the cornrnuPities of Cascade, Council, Donnelly, and New Meadows. commissioned 
a Housing Market and ~eeds Assessment (Housing Needs Assessment) for Valley and Ada:ms 
Co\lllty that was completed in July 2005; and 
WHEREAS, the Housink Needs Assessment determined that 210 community housing units are 
cutT~m.tly needed in Vall~ and Adams Counties, including 14 5 low to moderate income homes 
for families earning 50 tb 100% of annual median income and 65 moderate to middle income 
homes fur families eamir 100 to 16QOA of amxua1 median income; and 
WHEREAS. the Housing Needs Assessment determined that 200 additional homes are needed 
Valley and Adams Cm.mties in the next two years, including 138 low to moderate income homes 
and 62 moderate to mid~e incoltle homes; and 
WHBRBAS, the HO'LISlng Needs As:sessment de~ed that housing is needed for the families 
\, of a significant number ~f the 700 to 1,000 construction woikeJ.'S estimated to be worl::ing in 
Valley and Adams Cotmties and commuting to their homes elsewhere, reducing the vitality of 
the local economy ; and I 
WHEREAS, the City of ~cCall encompasses approximately twenty percent of the region • s 
population and employmtt; and 
WHEREAS, twenty percent of the housing need identified in the Housing Needs Assessment is 
110 to 122 homes, includtng 16 to 84low to moderate inCOllle homes and 34 to 3 8 1-noderate to 
middle income homes; arid 
WHEREAS, the City of McCall is presently comprised of approximately forty percent year 
round ptimary residences)and approximately 60 percent seasonally~occupied homes; a.."ld 
EXHIBITB 
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WHEREAS, tbe best a. ailable data indicates that the average price of a horne for sale in McCall 
currently exceeds $3ooiooo, and 
WHEREAS, the best afailable data indicates that approximately fifteen percent of the families 
murently residing in McCall have sufficient income 1o afford the lllOrtgage payments on a 
$300,000 home; and I 
WHEREAS, maintairuxk a housing inventory for a year round resident population that comprises 
forty percont of the tot~ housing inventory as the community grows will likely require some 
form of community housing assistance ; and 
WHEREAS, the City olMcCa.U has assets at its disposal to address this community housing 
need. :ineluding: I 
• The ability to ,tlopt regulations, 
• Public land, 
• Staff resources I 
• The Utban R~wal Agency of the City of McCall) 
• Access to fedequ and state resources, and 
• A regional partpersbip with the other local governments of Valley and Adams Counties 
(The Valley Aqams Planning Partnership) 
I 
NOW, THEREFORE, ~ is resolved by the Mayor and City Council of the City of McCall, 
Valley County, Idaho, 1 follows: 
Section 1: To ~ the existence of a supply of desirable and affordable housing for 
persons currently employed in the McCall area, persons wbo were employed in the McCall area 
prior to retirement, the ;disabled, and other qualified persons of the McCall area, the City of 
McCall adopts the follo~ng Community Housing Policy: 
I. Responsibility · 
1.1. The City of ~cCall is responsible for developing and implementing a community 
housing pro~ to meet the.needs of its citizens. 
1.2. The City of M~all will develop and implement this program in partnership with other 
local~ state, Sl'ld federal agencies. 
1.3. The City of M~all will regularly refine its community housing policy to reflect new 
info:rma.tion and phBllging market conditions. 
l, Seasona1/Y ear Rounq Housing Mix 
2.1. McCall's Comniu:nity Housing Program wil! be designed and implemented to maintain 
the ratio (60/40)[ of seasonally-occupied homes to year round primary residences as the 
community groW:s. 
3. Intended Beneficiari~s 
3 .1. McCall~s CommUnity Housing Program will be designed to benefit: 
3.1.1. Low, modbrate. and middle income families 
3.1.2. Local workers 
3. 1.3. Senior ci'ens 
3.1.4. Special nepds populations 
4. Income Targets I 
4.1. The policy will develop housing targeted to meet the needs of the following household 
types: I 
4.1.1. Low Incorlle - 50% of median income 
141009/011 
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4.1.2. Moderatle IDcome- 80% of median income 
4.1.3. Middle !!ncome-160% ofmedian income 
5. Job/Housing Relati9nslrip 
5.1. Community hopsing will be developed primarily fur people with jobs in the community, 
5.2. McCall will house at least 50 percent of its workforce within city limits. 
6. Production Goals j 
6.1. To keep up wj.th demand and eliminate our community housing backlog within ten 
years. McCall iS committed to providing: 
6.1.1. 43 addit:I,onallow to moderate income homes annually 
6.1.2. 22 addi~nal moderate to middle income homes IUill.Ually 
. 6.1.3. Senior :ujtd special needs housing in quantities to be determined 
7. Ownership/Rental~ 
7.1. McCall will deVelop community housing to maintain at least 65 percent owner occupied 
housing within the year round resident community. 
8. Location/Unit Type) 
8.1. Comm:u:nity housing requirements for new development will be met within the 
geographic bouridaries of new development to the extent possible. 
8.2. Mixed use projects will be encouraged to incorporate commllllicy housing into 
commercial tmd industrial areas. 
I 
8.3. Public community housing resources will focus on infill and redevelopment to: 
8.3 .1. Maintain! and enhance existing neighborhoods~ 
8.3.2. Promote ajobs-hou.sing balance; 
8.3 .3. Reduce r~liance on the automobile; and 
8.3.4. Promote knart growth principals and reduce sprawl. 
9. Design and Quality I 
9.1. Community hoJsing is civic architecture and reflects the values of the community. 
9.2. Community hoJsing should be designed to fit its context. 
I 
9.3. Design within bpdget is a characteristic of good design. 
Section 2: McCall bity Council directs staff to develop ordinances to implement the 
Cotmmmity Housing Pdlicy for consideration by the Pla:nning & ,Z()ning Commission and the 
City Council, including~ an Inclusionary Housing Ordinance. a Residential Linkage Ordinance, 
and a Commercial Link~~e Ordinance. 
Segi.Qn 3; McCall cpity Council directs staff to aggressively pursue state and federal 
resources to help i_mplerqent the Community Housing Policy. 
I 
Section 4: McCall qity Council requests that the Planning & Zoning Commission develop 
incentives for the constlfction of community housing as a part of the Commission's update of 
the City's Zoning and SUbdivision Ordinances. 
! 
Section 5: McCall City Cmmcil requests that the Urban Renewal Agency consider 
community housing as a ~gnificant element of the update of the City's Urban Renewal Plan. 
Section 6: McCall Jty Council commits to working in partnership with the private sector, 
the communities of the falley Adams Planning Partnership, the State of Idaho, and the federal 
goverrunent to develop and manage community housing in the region. 
141010/011 
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Section 7; This Rekolution shall take effect end be in force from and after its passage and 
approval. · 
P~d and approved t1lis :l~rJ.nay of st:.¢ .. !Q'o.t.r , 2005. 
1 . 
Kirk L. Eimers. Mayor 
ATTEST: 
Dan Irwin, City Clerk ' 
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Jed W. Manwaring, ISB # 3040 
Victor S. Villegas, ISB # 5860 
EVANS KEANE l.LP 
1405 W. Main Street 
P.O. Bo:s: 959 
Bolle, Idaho 83701-0959 
Telephooe: (208) 384-1800 
FacsimDe: (208) 345-3514 
E-Mail: JM.anwari:ag@eva.llskearae.eom 
VVillegas@evatl8keaae.com 
Attorneys for Plaiutifl's 
EV A.~S KEA!'I'E LLP 141002 
Case No. __ -'nst.No. __ _ 
Filed A.M. 5; c;:x::.> P.M 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 




CITY OF McCALL, 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. 
Case No. CV 2010-276C 
MOTION TO VACATE HEARING 
AND/OR ALLOW SUPPLEMENTAL 
RESPONSES 
COMES NOW Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, Richard Hehr and Greystone Village, LLC 
(hereinafter "Heh:r and Greystone"), by and through their counsel of record, Evans Keane, LLP, and 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56( f) moves the court to vacate Defendant/Counterclaimant's swnmaryjud.gment 
hearing scheduled for May 11, 2011 at 3:30 p.m. and/or allow Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants to file 
supplemental responses. The basis for Greystone's Motion is because discovery is ongoing in this 
matter and Oreystone has issued discovery written discovery requests, which remain outstanding. 
MOTION TO VACATE HEARING AND/OR ALLOW SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES - 1 
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Written discovery was issued to Defendant/Cowrterclaimant City of McCall on April 5, 2011. City of 
McCall's responses are due on or before May 5, 2011. The response deadline for Greystone' s written 
discovery requests is before the hearing for the City's pending Motion for Summary Judgment, but after 
the deadline for Grey stone to respond to the City's pending Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, 
Greystone respectfully requests that this Court to vacate the hearing scheduled for May 11, 2011 at 3:3 0 
p.m. and/or allow Greystone to supplement its response to the City's Summary Judgment Motion. 
DATED this 2 7t11 day of April, 2011. 
EVANS KEANE LLP 
By Y~':~ 
Victor Villega, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTm.CATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27111 day of April, 2011, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was served by frrst·class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax 
transmission to; by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in 
charge of the office as indicated below: 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Martin C. Hendrickson 
Givens Pursley LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
Facsimile; (203) 388-1300 
Attorneys/or Defendant 
[.:.t) U.S. Mail 
I ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
Victor Villegas 
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Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant City of McCall 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE 
VILLAGE, LLC, 
Case No: CV 2010-276C 
Plaintiffs, 
CJTV'S REPLY BRIEF JN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
v. 
CITY OF McCALL, 
Defendant. 
CITY OF McCALL, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE 
VILLAGE, LLC> 
Counter-defendant. 
CITY'S REPLY BRIEJIIN SUPPORT OF MOTION J;'QR SUMMARY JUDGMI<:Nr 
l 156fS1_1~.00C, 44l2-4 
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INTRODUCTION 
This is Defendant City of McCall's ("City") Reply Brief. 1 It follows the City's Opening 
Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("Opening Brief') dated April 4, 2011. It 
responds to the brief by Plaintiffs Richard Hehr and Greystone Village, LLC ("Plaintiffs") 
entitled Plaint(ffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Plaintiffs• Response Brief') dated April27, 201 I. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS' STATE LAW CLAIMS ARE BARRED. 
A. Plaintiffs' state-law damage claims are late under the 180-day notice 
requirement. 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Idaho Code§ 50-219 requires all claims for damages against 
a city to be flied as prescribed by the Idaho Tort Claims Act, and that, pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 6-906, any such claim must be "presented to and filed with the clerk or secretary of the [city] 
within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have 
been discovered, whichever is later." Plaintiffs do not dispute that this requirement applies to 
their claims against the City. Plaintiffs do not dispute that they failed to submit a notice of claim 
within 180 days of when their claims arose? The Plaintiffs present a single argument to 
overcome the City's defense based upon their failure to comply with the notice of claim 
requirement-that the City "revived'' Plaintiffs' claims by enacting Resolution 08-11 that 
provided for a refund of Community Housing fees that were collected by the City under 
1 While the pending motion covers a broad range of issues, we wish to underscore that the motion is not 
comprehensive. Other defenses requiring further factual development are reserved for trial in the event this motion 
is denied. 
2 Plaintiffs state in their Response Brief at 4 that "Greystone did not submit a notice of tort claim to the 
City within 180 days from the date it conveyed the nine Jots at issue to the City." As discussed below, Plaintiffs' 
claims arose, at the very latest, when the Development Agreement was executed. For purposes of the application of 
the notice of claim requirement, it does not matter which date is used. 
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Ordinance 820. Plaintiffs' Response Brief at 3~5. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that quasi 
estoppel should operate to preclude the City from asse1ting a defense based upon Idaho Code 
§ 50-219. Unfortunately for the Plaintiffs, neither quasi estoppel nor any other theory applies to 
"revive" their claims. 
While Plaintiffs cite to several Idaho cases that describe the elements of quasi estoppel, 
none of those cases invo1ves facts that are remotely similar to the case at bar. Specifically, 
Plaintiffs fail to direct this Court to any case that applies estoppel to override or modify 
requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, nor do they cite to any case that involves the 
application of quasi estoppel to a city. This is significant because estoppel does not apply where 
the issue goes to subject matter jurisdiction (which the notice of claim requirement does), and the 
Idaho Supreme Court repeatedly has held that estoppel can only be applied against a city where 
there are "exigent circumstances." In any event, the facts do not meet the basic elements of 
quasi estoppel because the City has not changed its position vis-a~vis these Plaintiffs and the 
Plaintiffs have not been induced by the City's action to change their position. These points will 
be discussed in tum below. 
(1) Quasi estoppel cannot create subject matter jurisdiction. 
Plaintiffs' efforts to excuse themselves from timely filing a notice of claim with the City 
falter out of the gate because estoppel cannot operate to grant subject matter jurisdiction. The 
Idaho Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in City of Eagle v. Idaho Dept. of Water 
Resources, 150 Idaho 449,247 P.3d 1037 (2011). In that case, the plaintiff argued that the 
defendant was precluded from denying the timeliness of plaintiff's petition for judicial review 
based upon explicit representations as to when the appeal period began. 
According to Eagle, the doctrine of quasi-estoppel prohibits 
IDWR from asserting that the appeal period began on July 3, 2008, 
where IDWR previously asserted in both the Order on 
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Reconsideration and in the letter accompanying the Corrected 
Certificate of Service that the period began on the date of service, 
July 16, 2008. Quasi-estoppel is properly invoked against a person 
asserting a claim inconsistent with a position previously taken by 
him with knowledge of the facts and his rights, to the detriment of 
the person seeking application of the doctrine. KTVB, Inc. v. Boise 
City, 94 Idaho 279,282,486 P.2d 992,995 (1971). The doctrine 
of quasi-estoppel applies when it would be unconscionable to 
allow a party to assert a right which is inconsistent with a prior 
position. Mitchell v. Zilog, Inc., 125 Idaho 709, 715, 874 P.2d 520, 
526 (1994). 
Estoppel is not appropriate where jurisdiction is at issue. 
This Court recently explained in State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 
[248-49], 244 P.3d 1244, 1248-49 (2010): 
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to 
determine cases over a general type or class of dispute." 
Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 145, 158 P.3d 305~ 308 
(2007). The source of this power comes from Article V, 
Section 20, of the Idaho Constitution, which provides that 
district courts "shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, 
both at law and in equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as 
may be conferred by law." Idaho Const., art. V, § 20. This 
issue is so fundamental to the propriety of a court's actions, 
that subject mauer jurisdiction can never be waived or 
consented to, and a court has a sua sponte duty to ensure 
that it has subject matter jurisdiction over a case. See Idaho 
R. Civ. P. 12(g)(4). 
(Emphases added). 
The failure to file a timely petition for judicial review is 
jurisdictional and causes automatic dismissal of the petition. 
l.R.C.P. 84(n). Idaho Code§ 67-5273(2) confines the courts' 
jurisdiction to those petitions filed within the prescribed time 
period. IDWR does not have the authority to expand the courts' 
jurisdiction by waiving or consenting to subject matter jurisdiction, 
and even ifiDWR was estopped from claiming the appeal period 
began on July 3, 2008, this Court has a sua sponte duty to 
determine whether the appeal was filed within the time prescribed 
in I.C. § 67-5273(2). 
City of Eagle, 150 Idaho at 454, 247 PJd at 1042 (emphasis original). 
In Madsen v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 116 Idaho 758, 779 P.2d 433 (1989), 
the Idaho Court of Appeals held that a plaintifrs failure to file a notice of claim in accordance 
with the provisions of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, which was a mandatory condition precedent to 
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maintaining an action, meant that the district court Jacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 
action. 
Our Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the 
language ofi.C. § 6-908-that no claim or action shall be 
"allowcd"-to mean that compliance with the notice requirement 
of the Tort Claims Act is a mandatory condition precedent to 
bringing an action under the Act. See McQuillen v. City of 
Ammon, 113 Idaho 719,747 P.2d 741 (1987); Overman v. Klein, 
I 03 Idaho 795, 654 P.2d 888 (I 982); Smith v. City of Preston, 99 
Idaho 618,586 P.2d 1062 (1978); Independent School Dist. of 
Boise v. Callister, 97 Idaho 59, 539 P.2d 987 (1975); Newlan v. 
State. 96 Idaho 711, 535 P.2d 1348. appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 
993,96 S.Ct. 419,46 L.Ed.2d 367 (1975). 
Consistent with the Supreme Court's pronouncements, the 
district court concluded that Madsen's suit against the Department 
shou1d be dismissed because the action was not preceded by the 
filing of a notice of claim. The court's decision was coiTect as a 
matter oflaw. Because the action could not be maintained without 
compliance with the Tort Claims Act, the court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction and properly dismissed the action as to the 
Department. Furthermore, since the court lacked jurisdiction over 
the subject matter, the court coiTectly refused to grant Madsen's 
request either for default judgment or for summary judgment. 
Madsen, 116ldaho at 761,779 P.2d at 436 (footnote omitted). 
Plaintiffs' failure to timely present a notice of claim to the City means that this Court 
does not have subject matter jurisdiction over such claims and quasi estoppel cannot be applied 
to conier such jurisdiction. 
(2) Quasi estoppel may not be applied against a city without 
exigent circumstances. 
Even if this Court were to decide that it has jurisdiction, Plaintiffs are unable to meet the 
strict requirements for the application of quasi estoppel against a city. 
In Harrell [v. The City of Lewiston, 95 Idaho 243,506 P.2d 470 
(1973)], we held that "[i]n the exercise of its police power, which 
includes the enactment and enforcement of zoning regulations, a 
municipality acts in a governmental capacity." ld. at 248, 506 P.2d 
at 475. We further stated that "[a]lthough a municipality may be 
estopped in limited circumstances, the enactment of zoning 
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regulations is a governmental function which is not usually subject 
to estoppel." ld. at 247, 506 P.2d at 474. We determined in 
Harrell that no exigent reasons existed in that case for the 
application of estoppel without deciding what extraordinary 
circumstances may merit the application of the doctrine of estoppel 
in future cases. As in Harrell, we again determine that no exigent 
circumstances exist in this case to apply estoppel against the City 
in the exercise of its police power. 
Sprenger, Grubb &Associates, Inc. v. City of Hailey, 127ldaho 576,583,903 P.2d 741,748 
(1995). In Sprenger, Grubb, the plaintiffs argued that estoppel should apply to prevent the city 
from rezoning a parcel of land that was subject to a prior development agreement. The Court 
found that there were no exigent circumstances present that would prohibit the rezone. See also 
Terrazas v. Blaine County ex. rel. Bd. ofComm 'rs, 147 Idaho 193, 200~01, 207 P.3d 169, 176-77 
(2009) (refusing to apply quasi estoppel to preclude the Board of Commissioners from taking a 
position on a land use application inconsistent with the opinions of Planning and Zoning staff 
members). 
In the instant case, Plaintiffs failed to direct this Court to the proper standard for the 
application of quasi estoppel against the City. Further, they have not presented any facts that 
would satisfy the "exigent circumstances" test. Here, the City's actions in adopting a resolution 
that called for a refund of Community Housing fees paid under one of its ordinances was an 
exercise of its authority and a govemmental action. There is nothing extraordinary or exigent 
about the City deciding to refund such fees paid while also relying on the failure of Plaintiffs to 
submit a notice of claim conceming their conveyance of real property to the City. 
(3) Plaintiffs have failed to establish the elements of quasi estoppel. 
Finally, Plaintiffs are unable to prove the elements of quasi estoppel even if the more 
stringent standard is ignored. As Plaintiffs recognize, quasi estoppel applies when it would be 
unconscionable to permit a party to maintain a position that is inconsistent with one in which he 
CrrY'S REPLY BRIEl; IN SUPPORT 01<' MOTION I~OR SUMMARY JUDGMJ.:N'J' 
IIS68SZ_!S !JOC. 4431-4 
Page 10 of27 
fZjOll/028 
321 
05/04/·2011 WED 16t48 l"AX 208 1300 Givens Pursley 
acquiesced or of which he accepted a benefit. Plaintiffs' Response Brief at 3, citing Mitchell v. 
Zilog, Inc., 125 Idaho 709, 715, 874 P.2d 520, 526 (1994) and Willig v. State, Dep 't of Health & 
Welfare, 127 Idaho 259, 261, &99 P.2d 969, 971 (1995). As the Idaho Supreme Court explained 
in Mitchell: 
Quasi estoppel has its basis in acceptance of benefits; it precludes a 
party from asserting to another's disadvantage a right inconsistent 
with a position previously taken by him or her. The doctrine 
applies where it wouid be unconscionable to allow a person to 
maintain a position inconsistent with one in which he acquiesced 
or of which he accepted a benefit. The act of the pazty against 
whom the estoppel is sought must have gained some advantage to 
himself or produced some disadvantage to another; or the person 
invoking the estoppel must have been induced to change his 
position. 
Mitchell, 125 Idaho at 715,874 P.2d at 526. 
Here, the City has not, at any time, taken a position that is inconsistent with the assertion 
that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by their failure to timely file a notice of claim. Nothing in 
Resolution 08-ll is inconsistent with the City's position in this action. By Resolution 08-ll, the 
City resolved to refund Community Housing fees that were paid under Ordinance 820. The 
undisputed facts in the record show that Plaintiffs' application was not subject to Ordinance 820, 
and that Plaintiffs' conveyance ofthe nine lots was not made pursuant to Ordinance 820. As a 
result, Resolution 08-11 did not apply to Plaintiffs and there is no inconsistency whatsoever in 
the City's position. 
The City consistently has taken this position. For example, in the City's response to 
Plaintiffs' demand letter at 2 (Exhibit Z to Groenevelt Affidavit), the City's lawyer explained: 
"The Greystone Village Lots were not subject to Ordinance No. 8l9 or No. 820, nor were they 
subject to the imposition of the moratorium on development imposed in September 2006. The 
Greystone Village lots were donated to the City." It may be that the Plaintiffs take a different 
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position about whether the conveyance was voluntary. But their view of things is not relevant to 
this point. For purposes of quasi estoppel, the question is whether the City changed its position 
in a way that caused the Plaintiffs to change their position to their detriment. This did not occur. 
The City said on the record from the outset that the contribution was voluntary (e.g .• Finding 16 
of the SUB and PUD approvals (Exhibit P and Exhibit Q to Groenevell Affidavit)) and it has 
never changed that position. The adoption of Resolution 09-11 is not inconsistent with the City's 
position that the conveyance was voluntary and not a payment of a community housing fee. 
Further, Plaintiffs cannot meet the second element that is necessary for the application of 
quasi estoppel. Plaintiffs have not been disadvantaged or induced to change their position as a 
result of any action by the City. While the Plaintiffs are certain1y disadvantaged as a result of 
their state law claims being barred, that is not the product of any act on the part of the City. 
Instead, that result is a function of state law and Plaintiffs' own failure to timely submit their 
claim. Similarly, the City has not taken any action to gain an advantage or benefit-it has 
simply availed itself of provisions of the Idaho Code. 
As a final note, the City is compelled to observe that the elements of quasi estoppel 
appear to be met by Plaintiffs' conduct with respect to the application-thus providing a defense 
to the City.3 This issue, however, is more fact-dependent than other defenses raised by the City 
3 The undisputed facts show that (whatever may have been in their minds) Plaintiffs never objected to the 
contribution of property in conne<:tion with their application and development agreement, and that they accepted the 
benefits that flowed from that contribution, including the publicity and good will that accompanied il The City was 
induced to change its position by the contribution of the property insofar as it committed assets to the construction 
and sale of those properties for the good of the community. Now, Plaintiffs are taking an inconsistent position with 
their earlier active participation in the process by claiming that the City acted illegally by accepting the parcels. 
This is very similar to the situation addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court in KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 
279,486 P .2d 992 (1971 ). In that case, the plaintiffs claimed that a franchise award was illegal and invalid as a 
result of improprieties in the competitive bidding process. The coutt ruled that plaintiffs, who were unsuccessful 
bidders, were barred from challenging the award by quasi estoppel based upon their participation in the process 
without objection. !d. at 281-82, 486 P.2d at 994-95. Of course, this seems to be just another way to approach the 
same exhaustion and voluntariness issues that are discussed more fully below. 
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and should be left for resolution at trial in the event that Plaintiffs survive this motion for 
summary judgment. 
In any event, it is plain from the record that quasi estoppel cannot be applied to excuse 
the Plaintiffs from their failure to timely submit a notice of claim to the City, and that such 
failure requires dismissal of Plaintiffs' state law claims. 
B. Plaintiffs' state-taw claims are barred by the four-year statute of 
limitations. 
(1) The claims are time-barred under McCuskey eta/. 
Plaintiffs concede that "it may be arguable that is [sic] was apparent by April2006 that 
the City intended to exact nine lots worth over a million dollars from Greystone" thus satisfying 
the key criterion of McCuskey v. Canyon County Comm 'rs ("McCuskey If'), 128 Idaho 213,912 
P .2d 100 (1996). Plaintiffs' Response Brief at 7. But they contend that a second requirement in 
McCuskey was not met. "First, the party seeking damages for inverse condemnation must 
experience a loss of use and enjoyment of property .... Greystone did not, and could not have~ 
lost the use and enjoyment of those lots at any time before July 31, 2006, when it conveyed title 
to those lots to the City." Plaintiffs' Response Brief at 6-7. 
The problem with Plaintiffs' argument about this second criterion is that there is no such 
requirement. TI1cy say that it comes from McCu.~key, but, in fact, they have made it up out of 
whole cloth. Obviously, a takings claim must be based on an allegation that the government's 
action will lead to a deprivation ofthe use and enjoyment of property. But there is no 
requirement that such deprivation physicaHy occur before the cause of action accrues. If that 
were the case, there would have been no cause of action in Mountain Central Bd. of Realtors, 
Inc. v. City of McCall, Case No. CV 2006-490-C (Idaho, Fourth Judicial Dist., Feb. 19, 2008). 
Plaintiffs' fictitious requirement is also impossible to reconcile with cases such as Harris v. 
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State, ex rei. Kempthorne, 147 Idaho 40 l, 405, 210 P.3d 86, 90 (2009), which held that the cause 
of action accrued when the obligation to pay occurred, not when the money was conveyed.4 
Next, Plaintiffs contend that no cause of action accrued because they might have decided 
not to develop the project. That is true of all developers, and it is irrelevant. The cause of action 
accrues when the developer is squarely faced with an exaction or other improper restriction on 
his or her property. If the fact that a developer, hypothetically, might change his or her mind and 
decide not to pursue the project meant that he or she had no cause of action, then one could never 
challenge a downzoning. Obviously, this is not the law. E.g., Sprenger, Grubb. Likewise, 
Plaintiffs' contention that "Greystone could not have pursued a claim for inverse condemnation 
prior to conveying the lots to the City" (Plaintiffs' Response Brief at 8-9) is simply and entirely 
incoiTect. They could and should have pursued the claim when "substantial interference with 
[their] property interest became apparent." Wadsworth v. Idaho Department ofTransportation, 
128 Idaho 439, 443, 915 P .2d 1, S (1996). 
(2) The "project completion rule" in C & G is a departure from 
the standard rule and applies only to direct physical takings 
through government construction projects. 
Plaintiffs cite C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140,75 P.3d 194 
(2003), as an alternative argument. C & G departs from the standard rule applied in inverse 
condemnation cases (articulated in McCuskey and Tibbs). It created a "project completion mle" 
applicable in direct physical takings through construction. C & G was a classic physical taking. 
The government built a road through the middle of a farmer's propetiy and provided no 
compensation (contending that the govemment held an easement). 
4 Plaintiffs' oontention that the City had no rights or interests in the nine lots prior to their conveyance 
(Plaintiffs' brief at 7) is wrong. The City had contract rights in the Jots pursuant to the Development Agreement. 
Those rights may have been conditional, but they were legal rights nonetheless. But even this is not required for a 
cause of action to accrue. 
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The C & G Court explained the simple policy reason for adopting the project completion 
rule: "[T]he property owner was justified in waiting until the project was completed before 
bringing suit for damages because until completion, there was no reliable method to determine 
the extent of the damages." C & G, 139 Idaho at 143-44, 75 P.3d at 197-98. Obviously, that 
policy rule has no applicability here. Plaintiffs certainly knew what their alleged "damages" 
were when they signed the Development Agreement on July 16, 2006. 
In any event, the Court was very clear about the narrow application of the project 
construction rule to physical takings by construction projects. "This anaLysis should not be taken 
as a reversal of McCuskey where this Court refused to apply Farber's project completion rule to 
detennine when an inverse condemnation claim accrues .... Also, today's holding should not 
be read to disrupt the rule of Tibbs and its progeny, which continues to apply to claims of inverse 
condemnation not involving a construction project." C & G, 139 Idaho at 144, 75 P.3d at 198. 
The point was reiterated and emphasized in the concun-encc: 
I write separately only for the purpose of pointing out that 
invasive, uncompensated takings which entail the construction of 
public improvements on private property have distinct 
characteristics which set them apart from both non-invasive and 
so-called "regulatory" takings. There are sound practical and 
policy reasons for recognizing these distinctions. This case 
presents a classic example of these differences and serves to 
readily explain why the principles set forth in McCuskey v. Canyon 
County Commissioners, 128 Idaho 213, 912 P.2d 100 (1996) and 
Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 603 P.2d 1001 (1979) 
are inapposite. 
Third, it is important to note that cases which involve an 
actual physical invasion like that which occurred here can readily 
be distinguished from non-invasive takings like that involved in 
Tibbs, and regulatory takings like that involved in McCuskey. . .. 
Similarly, in cases like McCuskey, where the "taking" consists of 
the adoption or enforcement of govemmentat regulations wbich 
preclude the plaintiff from using his land for any economically 
viable purpose, it makes sense to hold that the claim accrues when 
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the plaintiff ''[B ]ecame aware of the full extent of the 
government's interference .. .'' 128 Idaho at 218, 912 P.2d 100. 
C & G, 139 Idaho at 147~48, 75 P.3d at 201-02. 
Obviously, the case at bar is not a governmental construction project across Plaintiffs' 
property. Indeed, it is not a physical taking of any sort. Plaintiffs allege they were coerced into 
this transaction in order to obtain governmental approvals. That is known as an exaction. 
Exactions are analyzed by the courts as regulatory, not physical, takings. 5 The fact that the 
aJieged exaction (at the election of the Plaintiffs) happened to involve a piece of real property is 
irrelevant and does not tum this into a physical taking. 
In sum, Plaintiffs' citation to C & G is inapposite. 
C. Plaintiffs have acknowledged that the 5-year statute of limitations 
does not apply. 
Plaintiffs state that they are not pursuing this defense. Plaintiffs' Response Brief at 
10-11. 
5 There are two, and only two, types of takings cases: physical and regulatory. Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Comm 'n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992). A physical taking occurs when the govemment physically enters 
upon and occupies a person's property, as inC & G. Exactions, however, are a form of regulatory taking, even if 
the end result is the government's physical possession of the thing exacted. The Supreme Court drew a clear 
distinction between physical takings and exaction-based regulatory takings: "In each case, the Court began with the 
premise that, had the government simply appropriated the easement in question, this would have been a per se 
physical taking. The question was whether the government could, without paying the compensation that would 
otherwise be required upon effecting such a taking, demand the easement as a condition for granting a development 
permit the government was entitled to deny .... Not/an and Dolan both involved dedications of property so 
onerous that, outside tl1e exactions context, they would be deemed per se physical takings." Lingle v. Chevron USA, 
Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546-47 (2005) (citingNollan v. Califiwnia Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (19&7) 
and Dolan v. City ofTigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994)). The Idaho Supreme Court is in accord. In 2004, the Court 
ruled against a takings claim brought in response to a statute immunizing seed fanners from damages cause by 
burning grass. Moon v. N01·th Idaho Farmers Ass 'n, 140 Idaho 536, 96 P.3d 637 (2004). "The taking asserted by 
plaintiffs is not a physical taking because the plaintiffs' land is not appropriated and because the smoke complained 
of does not result in a loss of access or of any complete use of the property." Moon, 140 Idaho at 542,96 P.3d at 
643. The Court went on to hold that there was no regulatory taking, either. In other words, if the City had simply 
entered upon Plaintiffs' property and built community housing, that would have been a physical taking. Obtaining 
the same thing via an exaction could still be a taking, but it is analyzed as a regulatory taking. 
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D. Plaintiffs' state law claims fail the exhaustion and voluntary action 
tests established under KMSTand other Idaho case law. 
Plaintiffs question the applicability of the dual requirements in KMST, LLC v. County of 
Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 583, 67 P.3d 56, 62 (2003): exhaustion and a non~voluntary contribution. 
We discuss these in turn below. 
(1) Plaintiffs failed to exhaust. 
Plaintiffs contend that this case falls under two exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. 
As explained in footnote 14 of the City's Opening Brief, those exceptions are not applicable here 
because this is an as applied challenge. In White v. Bannock County Comm 'rs, 139 Idaho 396, 
401-02, 80 P.3d 332,337-38 (2003), the Court expressly declined to apply the exceptions to the 
exhaustion requirement. White was an as applied constitutional challenge. The same is true of 
Service Employees lnt 'l Union, Local 6 v. Idaho Dep 't of Health & Welfare, 106 Idaho 756, 683 
P.2d 404 (1984) and Palmer v. Bd of County Comm 'rs of Blaine County, 117 Idaho 562, 790 
P.2d 343 (1990). In American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. !DWR, 143 Idaho 862, 872, 154 
P.3d 433, 443 (2007), the Court began by recognizing the two standard exceptions to the 
exhaustion requirement. "There are two exceptions to the rule that an as applied analysis is 
appropriate only if all administrative remedies have been exhausted: when the interests of justice 
so require and when an agency has acted outside of its authority." American Falls, 143 Idaho at 
872, 154 PJd at 443. The Court went on to explain that trying to figure out whether an agency 
acted outside its authority is essentially a circular argument (except in those rare cases where the 
agency had no authority over the subject matter at all). Accordingly, it concluded that it makes 
sense to apply this simple rule of thumb: "Thus, the exception for when an agency exceeds its 
authority does not apply unless the CM (Conjunctive Management] Rules are facially 
unconstitutional." American Falls, 143 Idaho at 872, 154 P.3d at 443. 
CITY'S REPLY BRIKI~ IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
II S68S2 _I S.J)()C, ~431-4 
Page 17 of27 
l,l!Ol8/028 
328 
'05/04/2011 WED 16:55 FAX 208 1300 Givens Pursley llJ019/028 
While the holdings in these cases could be clearer, their teaching is unambiguous. 
"[E]xhaustion is not required when the issue is a facial constitutional challenge to the agency." 
Michael S. Gilmore & Dale D. Goble, The Idaho Administrative Procedure Acr: A Primer for 
the Practitioner, 30 Idaho L. Rev. 273,347 (1993). 
Plaintiffs seek the benefit of this exception by claiming that their chailenge is a facial 
challenge. Not so. Mountain Central Bd of Realtors. Inc. v. City of McCall, Case No. CV 2006-
490-C (Idaho, Fourth Judicial Dist., Feb. 19, 2008) was a facial challenge. But this case is not. 
The action challenged here was a particular, one-of-a-kind "deal" worked out between Plaintiffs 
and the City providing for the conveyance of nine lots expressly notwithstanding the 
nonapplicability of Ordinance No. 819 (which, if applicable, would have required such a 
conveyance) and Ordinance No. 820 (which did not require fees to be paid until later). Whether 
the City "forced" Plaintiffs to enter into this deal with the City is an as applied challenge, not a 
facial challenge. 
Next, Plaintiffs cite Euclid Avenue Trust v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 193 P.3d 853 
(2008), which held that a judicial review and a civil action may not be combined in a single 
proceeding. What that has to do with anything we do not know. It certainly has nothing to do 
with Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Nor would it have been a barrier to a 
timely judicial review. Takings claims {inverse condemnation) are routinely raised in judicial 
reviews. After all, the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act specifically identifies "violation of 
constitutional or statutory provisions" as a basis for review. Idaho Code § 67-5279. 
Then, Plaintiffs mischaracterize the City's exhaustion argument as a "protest" 
requirement under BI-IA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise ("BHA If'), 141 Idaho 168, 108 P .3d 
315 (2004). The City addressed this point in its Opening Brief at 24·25. Unlike the defendant in 
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BHA II, the City is not alleging that the transaction was a tax and is not invoking the distinct 
common-law protest requirement for tax disputes. Plaintiffs simply ignore the City's 
explanation of why BHA II is inapplicable here. 
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that exhaustion does not apply to them because "Greystone 
had no l'eason to question the City's policies and ordinances." Plaintiffs' Response Brief at 13. 
Failure to investigate the basis of one's cause of action is no excuse in the context of the 180-day 
rule under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise (''BHA If'), 141 
Idaho 168, 174, 108 P.3d 315, 321 (2004) (rejecting argument that plaintiff did not know of 
claim until court decision)) nor under the statute of limitations (McCuskey v. Canyon County 
Comm'rs ("McCuskey If'), 128 Idaho 213,217,912 P.2d 100, 104 (1996) (rejecting argument 
that plaintiff did not know it had a cause of action until court decision.)) Plaintiffs cite no 
authority for why this should be a defense to the exhaustion requirement, and there is none. (The 
presumption statutes cited by Plaintiffs are rules of construction and have nothing to do with 
exhaustion.) 
(2) Plaintiffs' actions were voluntary. 
Plaintiffs seek to create a disputed issue of fact as to whether their contribution of the 
nine lots was voluntary. In the lay sense of the word "voluntary," the City acknowledges that 
there is disputed fact But KMST is not premised on that kind of a gift. In KMST, the donation 
of an easement was not voluntary in the lay sense of the word. It was not a contribution that the 
plaintiff was excited to make. The contribution was made because the plaintiff perceived that the 
government would insist on it anyway and that it was not worth fighting over. Even if all of the 
facts stated in each of Plaintiffs' affidavits are taken as true, they have offered nothing to take 
them out of the KMST scenario. 
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Even if, in the developers' minds, they hated making this contribution and felt compelled 
to do so, the fact is they chose to make it. The record states that it was voluntary. "While the 
applicant is not required to provide a Community Housing Plan, the applicant has agreed to deed 
the nine single family residential lots that constitute Phase 3 of the project to the City of McCall 
to provide Community Housing." Finding 16 ofthe SUB and PUD approvals (Exhibit P and 
Exhibit Q to Groenevelt Affidavit). They did not dispute this at the time. Thus, the action was 
objectively voluntary in the sense of KMST. This is not changed by what the developers were 
thinking or who approached whom first. 
Plaintiffs' citation to C & G is inapposite. That case simply held that the lack of clear 
donative intent defeated the government's quasi estoppel defense. That is a different meaning of 
voluntary and a different defense than the KMST defense made by the City. 
II. PLAINTIFFS' FEDERAL LAW CLAIMS ARE BARRED. 
A. Plaintiffs failed to plead their federal claims under§ 1983. 
In its Opening Brief at 25-28, the City explained why the dictum in First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 314-15 (1987) 
and BHA II, 141 Idaho at 176 n.2, 108 P.3d at 323 n.2 does not control and the repeated, 
definitive, express rulings in Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F .2d 704, 705 (9th 
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1081 (1993), Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 
13 82 (91h Cir 1998), and Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill, 353 F .3d 651, 
655 (91h Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1041 (2004) do control. We will not rehash that here. 
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B. Plaintiffs' federal claims are blocked by the two special "ripeness" 
tests in Williamson County. 
In its Opening Brief at 28-33, the City discussed at length the two ripeness tests under 
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 
(1985). 
(1) Plaintiffs fail test 1: The "final decision" requirement. 
Plaintiffs' sole defense to the first test is that this is a physical taking, not a regulatory 
taking. It is true that this test does not apply to physical takings. 6 But. for reasons discussed 
above in section l.B(2) at page 14 (and in particular fn. 5 at p. 16), this is not a physical taking 
case. 
(2) Plaintiffs fail test 2: The requirement to employ state inverse 
condemnation procedures. 
Williamson County requires that Plaintiffs bring the state law inverse condemnation 
action first (and lose it) before they file the federal takings cJaim. This is a cumbersome 
requirement, but it is settled law. Plaintiffs acknowledge this. Plaintiffs' Response Brief at 19. 
Obviously, that has not yet happened. 
Plaintiffs contend, however, that this rule applies only to federal takings claims brought 
in federal court. This is not so. Williamson County certainly does not draw that distinction, and 
6 Various lower courts have recognized an exception to the first Williamson County requirement. The 
requirement that there be a tina! government decision is automatically satisfied by a physical taking because the 
taking occurs at the moment there has been a physical invasion. Vacation Village, Inc. v. Clark County, Nevada, 497 
F .3d 902, 912 (9th Cir. 2007). This is a fairly 11arrow exception, however, it does not apply in the context of 
regulatory takings, including exaction cases. In any event, the exception does not eliminate the second prong of the 
Williams County test requiring utilization of state inverse condemnation proceedings. "Even in physical taking 
cases, compensation must first be sought from the state if adequate procedures are available." Sinaloa Lake Owners 
Ass 'n v. City of Simi Vall~, 882 F.2d 139&, 1402 (9111 Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by Armendariz v. 
Penman, 75 F.3d 1311 (9 Cir. 1996). "The second Williamson County requirement remains the same. In a 
physical takings case, as in a regulatory takings case, the property owner must have sought compensation for the 
alleged taking through available state procedures." Daniel v. Counly of Santa Barbara, 288 F.3d 375, 382 (91b Cir. 
2002). In Vacation Village, inc. v. Clark County, Nevada, 497 F.3d 902,912-13 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit 
found the first prong was inapplicable in the context of a physical taking, but nevertheless applied the second prong. 
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nothing in the logic of the case would suggest that outcome. Moreover, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has expressly recognized and adopted Williamson County. Williamson County has been 
cited and followed by the Idaho Supreme Court~ which has embraced the general principles of 
ripeness and exhaustion atticulated in that case. KMS1: LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 
581, 67 P.3d 56,60 (2003) (inverse condemnation action against ACHD not ripe because 
plaintiff failed to pursue challenge to Ada County's adoption of ACHD's recommendation for 
dedication of street); City of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 845-46, 136 P.3d 310, 
316-17 (2006) (applying the Palazzolo exception to the ripeness requirement in Williamson 
County-plaintiffs not required to seek variance where none would have been granted~ relying 
heavily on federal law governing takings, ripeness, and exhaustion, strongly suggesting that 
Idaho has no separate jurisprudence of these constitutional issues); Merrilf v. State, 113 Idaho 
142, 153,742 P.2d 397,408 (1986) (denying takings claim). 
(3} Plaintiffs may not escape Williamson County by recasting its 
takings c1aim as a due process claim. 
Plaintiffs seek to evade Williamson County by contending that it does not apply to their 
due process claims. This is a ruse. No matter how much Plaintiffs talk about due process, this 
case is not about due process. They are not asking for more process. They are asking for money. 
This is a takings claim plain and simple. Plaintiffs had as much process as anyone could hope 
for. If they are entitled to any money, it is because of a taking, not because they did not get 
enough process. 
C. Plaintiffs' federal claims are subject to a two-year statute of 
limitations in any event. 
Even if Plaintiffs are correct that they may bring their federal claims independent of 42 
U.S. C. § 1983, those federal claims are still subject to the same two-year statute of limitations 
applicable in the context of§ 1983. The two cases cited by the City in its Opening Brief at 34 
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are definitive and controlling. In Bieneman v. City ofChicago, 864 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1988), the 
plaintiff made exactly the same argument that Plaintiffs are making here. 
Bieneman attempts to avoid that outcome by insisting that the 
takings claim rests on the Constitution rather than§ 1983 .... We 
know from First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County 
of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2386 n.9, 96 
L.Ed.2d 250 (1987), that takings suits may be filed directly under 
the Constitution. It follows, Bieneman contends, that we should 
use as the limitations period the most analogous period drawn from 
state law-which, he submits, is the 20-year time al1owed to bring 
adverse possession actions, a period applied to inverse 
condemnation suits against governmental units. 
Bieneman, 864 F.2d at 468. This argument got nowhere. 
The court explained that the holding in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985) 
(that, as a matter of federal law, the state's personal injury statute oflimitation applies) arose in a 
§ 19&3 case but is not dependent on§ 1983: 
These decisions-whether to have a single period, and 
which period to use-do not depend on § 19&8. . . . The Court 
had to devise its own rule, and it made a practical choice for 
compelling reasons: 
These considerations apply with equal force to claims 
invoking the Constitution directly. . . . When the defendant is a 
state actor, § 1983 and direct litigation may be interchangeable, the 
choice between them adventitious. 
Bieneman, 864 F.2d at 469. (Section 1988, referenced in Bieneman, contains procedural 
provisions of the same Civil Rights Act that contains§ 1983.) 
Plaintiffs here forthrightly admit that they avoided pleading § 1983 so as to avoid the 
two-year statute of limitations. "Here, Greystone does not have that problem because it chose to 
proceed on its federal takings claim directly under the U.S. Constitution." Plaintiffs' Response 
Brief at 22-23. This is precisely the sort of strategic gamesmanship the court sought to avoid in 
Bieneman; 
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There is no reason to have a different period of limitations, and a 
strong reason not to: any difference would give the plaintiff an 
incentive to pick whichever jurisdiction provided the longer 
period, recreating the uncertainty that the Supreme Court sought to 
eliminate. We conclude, therefore, that there should be a single 
period of limitations for all suits in which the Constitution supplies 
the remedy. 
Bieneman, 864 F.2d at 469. 
lj!I025/028 
On this precise point, the Ninth Circuit said: "We agree, and follow the position adopted 
by the Seventh Circuit [in Bieneman], as well as the Second and Sixth Circuits. See Chin v. 
Bowen, 833 F.2d 21,23-24 (2d Cir.l987); McSurely v. Hutchison, 823 F.2d 1002. 1004-1005 
(6th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934, 108 S. Ct. 1107, 99 L.Ed.2d 269 (1988). 
Accordingly, we hold that the personal injury statute of limitations properly applies to Bivens 
claims." Van Strum v. La'rtm, 940 F.2d 406,410 (9th Cir. 1991). The City is aware of no contrary 
authority from any jurisdiction. 
Plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish these cases falls flat. Plaintiffs blithely brush aside these 
cases saying, "Bieneman and Van Strum are inapplicable because Greystone has not pled or 
sought inverse condemnation under section 1983." Plaintiffs' Response Brief at 22. This makes 
no difference. The whole point of these cases is to prevent parties from circumventing the 
single, fixed statute of limitations by creative pleading. As the court said in Bieneman, "So 
pleading this case as a claim directly under the Takings Clause leaves Bieneman exactly where 
pleading it under§ 1983 would have left him." Bieneman, 864 F.2d at 470. Likewise, plaintiffs 
in Van Strum plead it both ways, and the court said it made no difference. "Like § 1983 actions, 
the purposes of Bivens actions are best served through a uniform, easily applicable limitations 
period that is unlikely to discriminate against interests protected by the Constitution. Moreover, 
the rationale for applying the statute of limitations for personal injury applies with even greater 
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force to Bivens actions, which come solely from the provisions of the Constitution protecting 
personal rights." Van Strum, 940 F.2d at 409-10. 
The conclusion is inescapable. Plaintiffs' federal claims are subject to a two-year statute 
of limitations. 
As noted in the City's Opening Brief at 34-35, it may be that the two-year statute of 
limitations has not yet begun to run (if the claim is unripe under Williamson County). But if 
Plaintiffs can escape Williamson County, they run smack into the brick wall of the two-year 
statute of limitations. There is no way around this. 
III. EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES PREVENT PLAINTIFFS FROM OBTAINING TIJE REMEDIES 
THEY SEEK. 
There is nothing in the record to suggest that either Plaintiffs or the City acted in bad 
faith. Given the decision in Mountain Central Bd. of Realtors v. City of McCall, it is 
indisputable that Ordinances 819 and 820 were unconstitutional. But the City enacted them in 
good faith based on advice by its consultants. Nor is there any suggestion in the record that the 
City acted in bad faith in entering into a Development Agreement with Plaintiffs. The fact that 
the City's ordinances were subsequently invalidated should not deprive the City of otherwise 
legitimate equitable defenses. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs continue to press claims that are barred by multiple, insurmountable obstacles. 
Even if they think they have an argument to overcome one or another of them, it should be 
apparent that they cannot overcome them alL Plaintiffs should have dropped this litigation 
before further expenses were incurred by the City in defending it. The City respectfully urges 
the Court to bring the bleeding to an end by granting the City's motion for summary judgment. 
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DATED this 4th day of May 201 1. 
Respectfully submitted, 





Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant 
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CITY OF McCALL, 
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CITY OF McCALL. 
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RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE 
VILLAGE, LLC, 
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COMES NOW the Defendant and Counterclaimant City of McCall (the "City")~ by and 
through its attorneys of record, and hereby submits its memornndum in opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Vacate Hearing and/or Allow Supplemental Responses. lbe referenced hearing is on 
the City's J\,<Jotionfor Summary Judgment. which is scheduled for May 11, 2011. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(t) states: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion 
that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may ... order a 
contim.umcc to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be 
taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is 
just, 
LR.C.P. 56(f) (emphasis added.) This rule requires the opposing party to (l) explain its inability 
to provide opposing a1l1davits at present; (2) state what facts are sought; and. (3) show how these 
facts are reasonably expected to create a tri11ble issue. See Jenkins v. Doise Cascade Corp., 141 
Idaho 233, 239, 108 P.3d 380, 386 (2005) (for court to grant a motion for additional discovery, 
the party must make clear how the information sought would preclude summary judgment); 
Sterns Airport Equip. Co. v. FAJC Corp., 107 F.3d 518, 534-535 (51h Cir. 1999) (in short, the 
opposing party must demonstrate why it needs additional discovery and how the discovery will 
1 ikely create a genuine issue of material fact) This Court has discretion in deciding whether to 
grant such a request. 
Where the discovery sought appears irrelevant to the issues to be adjudicated, relief under 
Rule 56(t) is not available. See Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 
3d § 2741, page 438, note 27; United States of America v. 215 Cartons, More or Leis, of An 
Article at Drug, 871 F.2d 409, 420 (3rd Cir. 1989) (holding that the evidence the nonmoving 
CTF'\''S MEMORANI>{JM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO V AC.HE HEARING Page 2 of7 
I 1~1/tl:.). 44U·.3 
340 
1 o: !-'age r of 11 2011-05-04 1600:59 MDT 18665753182 From: Lisa Hughes 
sought to elicit on further discovery was immaterial as a matter of Jaw); Powers v. McGuigan, 
769 F.2d 72, 73 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that where discovery sought would not meet the issue 
that the moving party contends contains no genuine issue of fact. it is not an abuse of discretion 
to dedde the motion for summary judgment without granting discovery). 
ARGUMENT 
In the present case, us justification for their request to vocate the summary judgment 
hearing, Plaintiffs assert only that "discovery is ongoing in this matter and Greystone has issued 
discovery "Tittcn discovery requests [sic], which remain outstanding." Motion to Vacate 
Hearing and/or Allow Supplemental Responses, p. l. Nowhere in the motion or in their 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment do the Plaintiffs 
describe the facts that they expect discovery to reveal or how such facts would bear upon the 
issues raised by the Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs do not explain why they arc 
unable to present opposing affidavits. In fact, Plaintiffs have filed opposing affidavits and a brief 
that addresses each of the issues raised by the City. In the absence of a properly supported 
motion under Rule 56( f), including a dcscri.ption of the specific issues that supposedly require 
postponing the hearing on the A1otion for Summary Judgment. this Court should deny the motion 
to vacate the hearing. 
While Plaintiffs' failure to address the Jenkins elements would be a suft1dent basis upon 
which to deny their Motion lo Vacafe, even if we speculate on what Plaintiffs expt.-ct further 
discovery to reveal, it is very difficult to reach the conclusion that there is any good reason to 
postpone: the hearing on the Motion fi)r Summary Judgment, 
The City's defenses that are based on Plaintiffs' failure to timely file a claim with the 
City and the running of the applicable statutes of limitat]ons r~ly only upon undisputed facts in 
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the record. Indeed, in their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendam's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the Plaintiffs have not identified any disputed facts that bear on such issues. Instead, 
they claim that quasi estoppel (based on the City's action of refunding Community Housing fees 
paid under Ordinance 820) somehow revived. their ability to submit a claim to the City, and that 
the statute of limitations did not begin to run until they actually conveyed the lots to the City. 
These issues are based upon undisputed facts and are ripe for decision by the Court. Thereis no 
reason to force the parties to incur further expense to conduct discovery that would not affect 
these issues. 
Similarly, the issues raised by the City's Motion for Summary Judgment that concem 
.Plaintiffs' federal claims--§ 1983. the statute oflimitations, and the application of Williamson 
County--all present strictly legal questions for the Court to determine bl:lsed upon facts in the 
ret:ord that have not been controverted by Plaintiffs. As to the equitable issues raised by the 
City, Plaintiffs argue that the City is not entitled to defend on equitable grounds because of the 
doctrine of unclean hands, but Plaintiffs do not claim that there are any disputed tacts that 
preclude a decision on those issues. 
In fact, Plaintiffs contend that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude 
summary judgment only on a single issue-whether the convey(}I]cc of the lots to the City was 
volw1tary. PlaintiiTs have tiled aftidavits that they claim show that Oreystonc had to include the 
contribution of those lots in order to obtain the approvals for its development. Plairuiffs · 
Memorandum in Opposition ro Defendant's Motion for Stimmary Judgment at 15. While the 
City does not believe that any of the affidavits provided by Plaintiffs create an issue of n1atc::rial 
fact, the relevant question for purposes of the Motion to Vacate is whether Plaintiffs have 
demonstrated a need for additional discovery on this issue, which they plainly have not 
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Nowhere do Plaintiffs explain what additional discovery they need to conduct or how it would be 
expected to reveal additional facts relevant to the issue of the voluntary nature of the agreement 
to contribute the lots to the City. The undisputed facts in the record show that Plaintiffs entered 
into the Development Agreement and never objected to the provision concerning the contribution 
of lots for community h.ousing at any time during the administrative process. Plaintiiis have not 
disputed those facts and further discovery is not warranted. 
In addition to moving to vacate the smmnary judgment hearing, Plaintiffs also seek leave 
to file supplemental responses prior to the hearing but after their deadline to tile affidavits has 
passed under l.R.C.P. Rule 56(c). In support of this request, Plaintiffs point out that the City is 
required under the rules to respond to pending V.Titten discovery requests from Plaintiffs by May 
5, 2011. 1 As with their Motion to Vacate, Plaintiffs have failed to support this request with any 
description of the evidence they expect to be able to present, what issues it might relate to, and 
how it would bear on the Motion for Summary Judgment. In the absence of any such 
information, it is impossible for the City to determine whether to object to the request to file 
supplemental responses. The City does not believe that any of the information that will be 
produced in connection with its discovery responses will in any way change the undisputed facts 
set forth in the recmds concerning the Plaintiffs' application. 
1 On April28, 2011, counsel for the City ddivered to PlaintitTs' cow1sel copies of the non-privileged 
docum~:nb, including emails, in the possession of the City that relate to the Oreystone project and the issues in this 
action. 
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DATED this 4th day of May, 2011. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorneys for Dejimdant and Counterclaimant 
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CERTmCATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 4th day of May, 2011, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
was served by the following means: 
Jed Manwaring 
Victor Villegas 
Evans Keane LLP 
1405 West Maio 
P.O. Box 959 
Boise, ID 83701-0959 
jmanwaring@evanskeane.com 
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RICHAltD HEHR and OREYSTQNE 
VlLLAGE, LLQ. 
Counter-defendant. 
Case No; CV 20 10-276C 
MOTION FOI\ LEAVE TO 
SUPPLEMENT REPLY BIUEF AND 
TO SHORTEN TIME 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO SUPPLEMENT REPLY BRIEF AND TO SHORTEN TIME Pagel of I 
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To: Page3of5 2011-05-05 13 06:09 MDT 18665753182 From: Lisa Hughes 
COMES NOW the Defe.ndantJCounterplaintiff, the City of McCall ( ... City") by and 
through its attorneys of recor'4 and respectfully moves this Court for Leave to supplement the 
City's Reply Brief in Support ofMotiqnforSummaryJudgment, by adding the highlighted 
paragraphsetforthbelowto the discussion ofquasi estoppel thatappe.ars.on page 11, The 
relevant pQrtion ofthe brief is reproduced below in indented form with the new material 
highlighted in yellow and underline: 
flere, the City has not, at any time, taken a position th:;lt i~:> inconsistent 
with the assertion that Plaintiffs' clai1Jls are barred by their failure to timely file a 
notice of claim. Nothing in Resolution 08-ll is inconsistent with the City)s 
position in. this action. By Resolution 08-ll ~ the City resolved to refund 
Community Housing fees t:llat were paid under Ordinance 82(). The undisputed 
facts in the record show that Plail)tiffs'. application. was oot subject to Ordinance 
820, and that Plaintiffs' conveyance of the nine lots was not made purS'Il(lnt to 
Ordinance 820. As a result, Resolution 08-ll didnot apply to Plaintiffs and there 
is no inconsistency whatsoever in the City'sposition. 
Ittfact1 ()r$&1lia.rite•§5~i·•.~ili@hw4§'.adoiat!S\•the.-salile.~a~/}h3i••R~§titUtioh 
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To: Page 4 of 5 2011-05-05 13:06:09 MDT 18665753182 From: Lisa Hughes 
The City consistently has takenthis position. . .. 
GPOd cause <;:x:ist~ for the granting of(he mqtion for leave because the provision of 
Ordinance 85 6 that specifically excludes contributions made pursuant to development 
agreements was simply overlooked during counsels' preparation ofthe Reply Brief, yet appears 
in the sun.unary judgment record and seems 1{) be particularly significant with respect to the issue 
of whether the City took an inconsi~ent position that would ~upport the application of quasi 
estoppel. 
The City further moves this Court for an order shortening time to allow the instant 
motion, and the City's .Motion to Enlarge Page Limit fi;r Reply Brief, to be heard at the same 
time as the City's Motion. for Summary Judgment, on May 11, 2011, at 3:30p.m. 
ORAL ARGUMENT lS REQUESTED. 
DATED this 51h day of May. 2011. 
GIVENS .PURSLEY, LLP 
Attorneys for D:efendant/Co\.Ultcrclaimant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of May, 2011. a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
was served by the following means: 
Jed Manwaring 
Victor Villegas 
Evans Keane LLP 
1405 West Main 
P.O. Box 959 
Boise., ID 83701..0959 
jmanwaring@evanskeane.com 
vvillegas@evanskeane.com 
0 U.S. Mailt postage prepaid 
0 Express Mail 
0 -· Hand Delivery 
~ Facsimile 
0 Email 
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CITY OF Mc(:ALL, 
Defendant. 
CITY OF McCALL, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE 
V lLLAGE, LLC, 
Counter·defendant. 
Case No: CV 2010-276C 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 
SUPPLEMENT SUMMARY 
JUDGMEN1' RECORD AND TO 
SHORTEN TIME 
MOTION FOR I .. EA VE TO SliPPT .EMENT SUMMARY JUDGMENT RECORD 
AND TO SHORTEN TIME Page 1 of4 
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To: Page 3 of 9 2011-05-11 09:50:12 MDT 18665753182 From: Lisa Hughes 
COMES NOW the Defendant/Counterplaintiff, the City of McCall ('"City") by and 
through its attorneys of record, and respectfully moves this Court for leave to supplement the 
record in this matter for purposes of the pending A1otionfor Summary Judgment with the 
document that is attached hereto as Exhibit 1, which is the Greystone Village application for 
Planned Unit Development Final Plan and Final Plat, dated March 20, 2006, from Briggs 
Engineering(" Application .. ). 
Good cause exists for the granting of the motion for leave because the Application was 
supposed to be included in Exhibit H to the. Affidavit of.Michelle Groenevelt, whi-ch was filed 
along with the City's Motion j&r Summary Judgment on April 7, 20 II, but was inadvertently 
omitted. As stated in paragraph 10 of the Affidavit of Michelle Groenevelt; "A1tached hereto as 
I:::xhibit II is a true and correct copy of the Application for Final Plan (PUD) and Final Plat 
(PUD) dated 3-20-2006." However, Exhibit H only included the fonn application that consists 
of a checklist and <,:ertification from the applicant's representative. 
Tht: Appli~;ution is rdercnct:d in the: Timdine that is Exhibit A to the City's Openirig 
Bri~fin Support of}Jotionfor Summary Judgment ru:; follows: 
J-20-2006 Applk:ation for Final. Plan {PUO) and 
Final Plat (SUB) 
fLtrther details." (p. 3, unr\umbel"6d) Note that referenced 
De11~lnpment AgrAer'l'lenl w.as h;,td not been AlCE!Cuted <'II this 
tim;t; appar-enUy this was a reference to a draft agreement 
'The deed-re.atrided lots fe>r Phase Ill w~l be deeded to tfhe·h-ib-it H---~ 
City of McCall, please rev~ew development agreement fo 
--~-~-~---------------~h-----------------------------------· ---~---
As reflected in the Timeline, Exhibit H was intended and assumed to include the 
Application in addition to the checklist. In preparing for oral argument, the City's counsel 
discovered that Exhibit H only included the checklist and not the Application. Second .Affidavit 
of Martin C. Hendrickson, ~ 2. 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO SUPPLEMENT SUMMARY JUDGMENT RECORD 
AND TO SHORTEN TJ MF. Page 2 of4 
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To: Page 4 of 9 2011-05-11 09:50:12 MDT 18665753182 From: Lisa Hughes 
The Plaintiffs will not be prejudiced by the inclusion of the Application in the summary 
judgment record. As noted, the Application was referenced and quoted in the Timeline. Further, 
Plaintiffs• counsel received a copy of the document along with the City•s document production 
on April28. 2011. !d .• ~1, 3 and 4. More importantly, the Application is Plaintiffs' own 
document, h.a.v:ing been provided to the City by Sabrina Whitehead of Briggs Engineering "[o]n 
behalf of my client Steve Benad and Greystone Village ... :· 
The City further moves this Court for an order shortening time to allow the instant 
motion to be hearq at the same time as the City's Motionfor SummaryJt4dgment, on May 11, 
2011, at 3:30p.m. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
DATED this ll 1h day ofMay, 2011. 
GIVENS PURSLEY.LLP 
MOTTON FOR LEAVE TO SUPPLEMENT SUMMARY .JUDGMENT RECORD 
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To: Page 5 of 9 2011-05-11 09:50:12 MDT 18665753182 From: Lisa Hughes 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify tbat on the 11th day (lf May, 2011, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served by the following means: 
Jed Manwaring 
Victor Villegas 
Evans Keane LLP 
1405 Wes1 Main 
P.O, Rox 959 
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BRIGGS ENGINEERING, Inc. 1800 West OVerland Road. 
Bola, Idaho ~705- 3142 
Volea (208) 344-9700 
ENGaiEERB/PI.AM&i./SURVI!VORS 
Fax (208) 345-2950. 
E-mail ~neenng,oom 
March 20, 2006 
Hormrable Mayor and McCall City Council 
216 East Patk Street 
McCall. l®ho 83638 
RE: Pbuuled Unit Development Ftnal .Ptan!naal Plat 
On behalf or my client Steve Benad and Greystone Village. please a<:cept thi$ application. 
.tOr Planned Umt Development Final Plan and Final Plat. The subject property is in 
Government Lot l ~ Sec:tion 9. Government Lot 3, Section 4, Township 18 No~ Range 
3 East, B.M. City ofMcCal1. Valley County, Idaho. 
~ II 
1. The applicant shall realign Mill Poin1 Drive to connect directly to Roosevelt 
Avenue at H.emloclc Street. The realigned street sha1l be renamed Roosevelt 
Avenue and shall be constructed to City standard. 
MlU Potnt Drive WllS renamed Roo••welt. .Ave, aqd laas direc:t 
connection •• RAO*Welt Ave. at Hemtocl<. Street. Please review Plu•se 
l tlllal plat for Gre;y~;tone VIIIII!C• for ebn.a~;es. 
2. The applic;ant shall constru:et sidewalla to City standard on both sides of 
Roosevelt Avenue from Hemlo~:rkStreet to McCall Avenue. 
All sidewalks wm l>o eonstrtteted to City of McCall's standant ou. both 
sides of Roosevelt An. from Hemlo<Ck Street to McCall Ave. 
3. Any parking on Roo$<::voltAvonue shall be designed to City standard aml si~d 
to prohibit ov~;~uight pl'll"kiu.g. 
AU parrkiug uu Ruoscvelt Ave. sbaU be desl&aed. to City stan (lards and 
sl&ns will be posted to prollibit overnight p:arldag. 
4. The shared driveway between units l S through 18 and unit.s 19 through 22 shall 
be 60 feet in width llltd designed tQ City standard as a private street. 
ThJs sbared driveway betweea ults 15 .. rough 18 and units t9 
tllrou8lJ. 21, are aot part of the c11rrent applications for phases 1, 2 
aad3. 
5. The applicant shaH grant an easement between lhe end ofthis shared driveway 
and the property to the east to provide vehicular and pedestrian access to this 
property. 
Aa easement has bee~~ granted l>etweea tbe eod of the s.bared 
clrtnways and tlae property to tile east. wblcla provides veltlcv.lar ••d 
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6. The~ appli<".ant shall oon~ct a bicycle path to City specifications from McCall 
Avenue to Davis Street. 
A bicycle patll to the City'• •peclfkattons from MeCaU Ave. to Davl1 
Street are uot eurreJttly part of Pl:&ue 1, l, or 3, this wW be addressed 
ln. a later pbaa. for Greystone VWage. 
7. The n:pplicent shall dedi<:atc a ten-foot wide pedestriWl eaaement for the portion of 
the bicycle path from Roosevelt Avoouc to Davis S~. 
A. ten-foot pede$trlaa ea.sement of the blqele patb from :Roosevelt 
A. ve. to Davia Street bJ not e.._rreotl)r part or P1la$e 1, ~' or 3; thla will 
be add.rased in a later phase fur Grey:stoae VUlage. 
8. The applicant shall construct a connection to the bicycle path described above 
ftom the shared driveway adjacent to unit 26. This oonneotion and the bicycle 
path from the connection to Davis Street sllall be constructed to accommodate 
emergency vehicles. A vehicle barrier acceptable to tbe City shall be installed Q.l 
Davis Street to keep tratTw offofthe path. 
Au e~Bergeaey access win be coa•tracted to accommodate emergency 
vellieks front unit 1«$ to Davis Street, however, tbJs Is aot cun-endy 
part of Phase 1,. 2, or 3; this wiU be addreS$~ tn a later ph~ for 
GreysCone ViUage. 
9. Tb.e applicant sball provide pedestri1111. scale lighting along the bicycle patll ftom 
Roosevelt Avenue to Davis Street. 
Ped.es:trlaB seale lighting along tbe bleycle path from Roosevelt Ave. to 
Davia Street will be constructed, however, tills Is not earrently part of 
Phase 1,. l, ur 3; this wUl be acldressf!d iu a later ph•e for Greyst<tae 
VIllage. 
10. The applicant sl:)allprovidA: $tre« lighting at the following intersec.tiqns.; 
a. Rooeevolt Ave~nue and H.emlOf;k Street 
b. lluoservfllt Avenuo and McCan Avenue 
Tile appUeaut will prc~vlde street lighting for the above referenced dli'eet 
Ioeatiou1 please vi~ Plauaed Uaii Dcvelopmeut flat for Uglatlug 
locations. 
11. All street and pcde$trian lighti11S plans shall be submittoo with the tina! plat 
app!iuttion. 
Street and pedestrian llpting piau have been designattcd pea- tile 
Planaed Unit Deve!opn~ent plat, please review plaDS. 
12. Any pedmeter fencing $hall oonfonn with the following: 
Perimeter fencing QK\ans fencing wbich, in the opinion of the 
Commission. substantially encloses the property in question. Perimeter 
fencing enclosing residential developments i:s discouraged, except fencing 
enclosing property with no moro than two residential units. Perimeter 
fencing. which aurround~ or substantially swroun~ a residential 
subdivision shall be primarily oonstructed of natural materials, such as log 
poles or split rail&. Perimeter fencing for residential developments shall 
have periodic openings to allow for tho movement of larger wild animals, 
such as deer and elk, and shall be const:l"ucted so that the height of the top 
rail is oo more than forty two (42) inches alJove grade and the minimum 
To: Page 8 of 9 2011-05-11 09:50:12 MDT 18665753182 From: Lisa Hughes 
gap between tho bottom rail and grade is fifteen (lS) inches. Perimeter 
fcndng proposed for a residential development is subject to the approval 
of the Commission eit~ es a. part of the proposed aubdiviaion or 
requested via a conditional uso pcnnit. 
Perimeter feudal& wUI be constractcd to the ophllOil of the 
Commlssloa a ad will be subject te the approval or the CommissJ" 
dtb~ as a part of tile prupuHCI subdlvlslou or u a reqlleated via a 
coaditlonal we pmuU. 
13. All shared driveways shall meet the following conditions: 
a. Shared driveways shall be constructed to the dimensions of fire apparatus 
access roads per IFC 503.2.1. 
b. Shared driveways in excess of 1:50 feet shall .have an approved turnaround 
fOT fire apparatus per IFC .S03,2.s. Appendix D. 
c. Additional fire hydrants ehall be required at tbe end of shal:ed driveways 
periFC 508.501. 
d. Hydrant spacing sru..u be per Table ClOS.l of Appendix Cof JFC. 
e. The applicant shall prepate !L plan detailing hyd:rant IClcations to be 
submitted with the final plat application. 
All shared driveways wiD be comtraeted to meet aJltlte above 
requirements, plea~e review Plaaaed Uait DeYelopmeut plat for l~ations 
for fire llydraats. 
14. The applicant shall prepare construction dmwi~ for the proposed landscaping 
plan :for City approval, to incl~de: 
a. Landlwa.pins alonsbClth sides ofRoosevelt Avenue. 
b. Ltw4sca.piug along the bicycle path. 
c. Lalld:scaping and fumiabinga (benches. trash receptacles acceptable to the 
City) fbr thco open space adjacent to units 23 through 26. 
Please review attached lauds;c:a:pe plaus, pw approvcct coustru.etioll 
drawlags for the above required lndacape requ.iremeuts. 
1!1. Maintenance ofhmdscaping and fUrnishings in all public rights-Qf-way :shall be 
the responsibility of the applicant until establishment ofphmtings~ when they wi11 
become the respomibility of the City of McCall. At the applicant's request • the 
City Arborist ahall detel:mine whether the landscaping bas become established 
and, if established. a,.;cept responsibility from the appli.cant 
Maiatenaaee of landscaping ad t'Uroisbmas Ja all publie rights-of-ways 
!\lball be tbe rest"osii>Ulty of the applieat. 
All conditions for Greystone Village phases l, 2, and 3. will either be cons.tn1ded or will 
be bonded. per City of McCall's bonding requirements. prior to having the final plats 
signed. The deed-restricted lots for Phase III will be deeded to the City of McCall~ please 
review development agreement further details. 
COM00031 sJ56 
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If )'QU should have an:; que&tions. ple-aso feel tree to contact ~ at 268-344-9700 or 
!'llbrinaw@brigp-<m&iw;giniJ?Onl. 
Sabrina Whitehead 
Land Use Plamtet 
Briggs Engineering 
COM000319/ 57 
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Christopher H. Meyer, lSB # 4461 
Manin C. Hentlrickson, lSB #5.876 
GIVENS P'URSLhYLLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Office: 208-38.8-1200 
Fa>~.: 208-388-1300 
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mch@givenspursley .. com 
Atlorneys for Defen®nt and Countercl.aimant City ~f McCall 
lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
RICHARD HEHR and OREYSTONE 
VILLAGE. LLC, 
Case No: CV 2010-276C 
Plaintiffs, 
SECOND AFFIDAVlT OF MARTIN C. 
IIENDltlCI<SON 
v. 
CfTY OF McC:ALT,, 
CITY Of McCALL, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
RJCHARD l:ffiHR and GREYS TONE 
VIL.LAGE, LLC, 
Counter-defendant. 
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STATEOFlDAUO } 
)ss. 
County of Ada ·) 
I, MARTIN C. HENDRICKSON, being first duly sworn, deposes and says,: 
I. I am one of the attorneys for the Defen.dant/Counterclaimant City <>f McCall in 
this matter. I make this affidavit based upon my personal knowledge. 
2. Exhibit H to the Affidavit of Michdle Groenevelt was intended to include the 
application dated March 20, 2006, frurn Briggs Engineering that is .Exhibit I to tb.t:: City's MOlton 
for Leave to Supplement Summary Judgment Record and to Shorten Time. Instead, Exhi.bit H 
inadvertently only included the checklist that accompanied the application. The omission of the 
application ftom Exhibit H was noticed tbr the first time in the evening of May 10~ 2011, a'3. the 
City's counsel prepared for oral argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of a letter d.llted April 28, 
2011, from me to Plaintiffs' counsel in this action tl:lat accompanied the production ofthe City's 
documents in this matter. which were hand delivered on that date. Also included in Exhibit A is 
a table of the produced documents that also accompanied the letter. 
4. As r~tlected in the table of produced documents, the City's producti.on of 
doc\lmenls included the March :20. 2006 application for .Planned l }nit Development final Plan 
and Final PLat from Driggs Engin~.ring, numbered us COM000316~319. 
I declare under penalty of peljw:y that the fore&oing is true and correct. 
DATED this 11th day ofMay, 2011. 
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foregoing was served by tQ~ fo1lowing means: 
Jed Manwaring. 
Victor ViUega$ 
Evans Kelllle LLP 
1405 West Main 
P.O. Box959 
Boise, ID 83701-0959 
jmanwarin.g@evanskeane.com 
vvillegas@evanskeane.com 
So.C.OI\D AFFIDAVHOF MARTIN C. HENDRiCKSON 
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3 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 






RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE 
VILLAGE, LLC, 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 
Case No. CV-2010-276C 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
10 vs. 




15 For Plaintiffs: VictorS. Villegas of Evans Keane, LLP 
16 For Defendant: Christopher H. Meyer of Givens Pursley, LLP 
17 
18 This matter came on for hearing before the Court on the Defendant's Motion for 
19 Summary Judgment on May 11, 2011. The Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the hearing 
20 and allow supplemental responses. The Court declined to grant the Plaintiffs' motion. 
21 The Court heard oral argument on this matter and took the matter under advisement. 
22 PROCEEDINGS 
23 
The Plaintiffs filed a complaint and then a First Amended Complaint on July 16, 
24 
2010, seeking declaratory relief regarding an ordinance requiring the developers to fund 
25 
low income housing, inverse condemnation, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, 
26 
equitable restitution and attorney's fees. The Defendants filed an Answer to the First 
,; 
















Amended Complaint denying those allegations and also filed a Counterclaim on August 
31, 2010. A status conference was held and the Court set the case for trial on August 
21, 2011 with a cutoff date for motions, requiring them to be heard on or before July 6, 
2011. 
The City of McCall (hereinafter referred to as "City"), filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment on April 5, 2011. The Court granted a motion to enlarge the brief submitted 
by the City. The motion was accompanied by affidavits and a brief. The Plaintiff 
submitted a memorandum in opposition to the City's motion along with affidavits and 
the City then submitted a response to a reply brief on May 4, 2011. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The Plaintiffs filed applications for a subdivision and planned unit development 
on January 12, 2005. At that time, the City had no community housing requirements. 
Subsequent to the application by the Plaintiff for their planned unit development and 
subdivision, the City enacted Ordinance Nos. 819 and 820 on February 23, 2006 and 







to contribute community housing units upon submitting a subdivision request and 
further required developers to pay a community housing fee at the time building permits 
were issued. 
The Plaintiffs' subdivision was grandfathered in and was not subject to 
Ordinance No. 819 because the application for the subdivision had been filed before 
23 
the enactment of that ordinance. However, because the Plaintiffs had not actually 
24 obtained a building permit until after Ordinance No. 820 was enacted, that ordinance 
25 was applicable to the Plaintiffs at the time they requested building permits. Ordinance 
26 No. 820 dealt specifically with the fee for low income housing for building permits. 



























Despite the fact that the Plaintiffs' subdivision was grandfathered, the Plaintiffs 
did contribute nine lots within the subdivision, which is the Greystone Subdivision, to the 
City. The City agreed that the value of the lots would serve as a credit in the event any 
future community housing fees were to be assessed. The parties entered into a 
development agreement signed by the Plaintiffs on May 3, 2006. On February 19, 
2008, Judge Neville, in a Memorandum Decision, invalidated Ordinance Nos. 819 and 
820, ruling that they were an invalid tax. Consequently. the Ordinances were repealed 
on April 24, 2008. As of that date, the City had accepted the lots from the Plaintiff and 
Greystone and had in fact constructed community housing and conveyed properties to 
qualified low income families and individuals. 






Did the Plaintiffs, by missing the 180 notice requirement under the Idaho 
Tort Claims Act, preclude them from seeking the remedies through their 
First Amended Complaint? 
Have the Plaintiffs missed the applicable four year statute of limitations? 
Are the Plaintiffs' state law claims subject to the requirement set out in 
KMST, LLC v. Ada County? 
The Plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief is moot. 
Are there equitable defenses to these claims? 
DISCUSSION 
A. The 180 Day Notice Requirement Under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. 
The Idaho Tort Claims Act requires Plaintiff to provide the City notice within 180 
days when a claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered. Coupled with 
Idaho Code§ 50-219, the City asserts that all claims for damages against the City must 
be filed as prescribed by Chapter 9, Title 6, Idaho Code. Thus, the City's position is 
that all damage claims against the City are subject to a 180 day rule and they cite 










Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568 (1990) to support this position. 
The Plaintiffs assert that when the City of McCall passed Resolution No. 08-11 
on April 24, 2008, they revived Greystone's cfaims involving Ordinance No. 820 and 
extended the period to obtain a refund of community housing fees under Ordinance No. 
820, until December 31, 2009. Plaintiffs go on to assert that they provided the City a 
request form by the City for refunds on November 12, 2009 and that that form complied 
with the contents required for a Notice of Claim under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. 
Essentially then, the Plaintiffs assert that they have filed a timely tort claim and that the 


















asserted by the City. 
Quasi estoppel as cited in City of Eagle v. Dept. of Water Resources, 150 Idaho 
449 (2011 ), does not operate to grant subject matter jurisdiction as contended by the 
Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs have not cited any authority to the Court that allows estoppel to 
override or modify the requirement of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. Further, the Court will 
find that from the undisputed facts, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to a quasi estoppel 
action because the City did not change its position specifically as to these Plaintiffs, nor 
were the Plaintiffs induced by the City's action to change their position. The City did not 
change its position previously taken to the detriment of the Plaintiff. As set forth in 
Madsen v. Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare, 116 Idaho 758 (Ct. App. 1989), failure to 
file a notice of claim in accordance with the provisions of the Idaho Tort Claims Act is a 
mandatory condition precedent to maintaining an action, thus the district court in that 
case lacked subject matter jurisdiction of the action. 
In addition Quasi estoppel against a municipality requires exigent circumstances. 
See Harrell v. The City of Lewiston, 95 Idaho 243 (1973) and Sprenger, Grubb & 









Associates, Inc., v. City of Hailey, 127 Idaho 576 (1995). 
The Plaintiffs in this case have not established that there were exigent 
circumstances in this case. The City's action in adopting a resolution that called for the 
refund of community housing fees paid by subsequent ordinance was an exercise of 
the City's authority and a governmental action. There is nothing extraordinary or 
exigent about the City deciding to refund such fees paid to the City by developers. 
Finally, from the record, the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they have been 
disadvantaged or induced to change their position as a result of any action by the City. 
9 



















The Plaintiffs' failure to present a notice of claim to the City, based upon the 
enacted Ordinance Nos. 819 and 820, was not timely, thus, this Court does not have 
subject matter jurisdiction over such claims and quasi estoppel cannot be applied to 
confer jurisdiction. 
B. Statute of Limitations 
The City asserts that the Plaintiffs' claims are barred based upon Idaho's 
residual four-year statute of limitations found in Idaho Code § 5-224. The limitations 
period for inverse condemnation claims is contained in Idaho Code § 5-224 which is the 
statute of limitations for all actions not specifically provided for in any other statute. 
McCuskey v. Canyon County Comm'rs, 128 Idaho 213 (1996). 
The original Complaint in this case was filed July 15, 2010. The Plaintiffs 
premise the timeliness of their lawsuit based upon the warranty deed conveying the 
nine lots, on July 31, 2006. 
The City maintains that the triggering event for the running of the statute of 



























limitations occurred on May 3, 2006, the date the Plaintiffs entered into the 
Development Agreement. 
The Court will find as a matter of law that the Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the 
statute of limitations. The Court will find that the date of the signing of the Development 
Agreement is "the date that the plaintiff became fully aware of the interference with his 
or her property." 
The Development Agreement clearly sets forth that the agreement expressly and 
unequivocally mandated the conveyance of the nine lots when it contained the 
language "Greystone Village shall deed to the City of McCall nine affordable housing 
lots located along McCall Avenue and shown on the plat for Greystone Village as 
Phase Ill." 
As set forth in the series of decisions in McCuskey v. Canyon County Comm'rs: 
In determining when the cause or an action for inverse condemnation 
accrues we note that while a taking is typically initiated when government 
acts to condemn property, the doctrine of inverse condemnation is 
predicated on the proposition that a taking may occur without such formal 
proceedings. In such an informal taking, this Court has decided that 
damages for inverse condemnation should be assessed at the time the 
taking occurs. The time of taking occurs, and hence the cause of action 
accrues, as of the time that the full extent of the plaintiff's loss of use and 
enjoyment of the property becomes apparent. 
It was abundantly apparent to the Plaintiffs that they were, by the Development 
Agreement, transferring these lots to the City. See also, Wadsworth v. Idaho Dept. of 
Transportation, 128 Idaho 439 (1996); Tibbs v. The City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667 
(1979); Harris v. State, ex rei. Kempthome, 147 Idaho 401 (2009). 
It was clear that the Plaintiffs had an actionable claim even before the signing of 
the Development Agreement based upon the record before the Court. Therefore, the 
Court will find that in reference to the inverse condemnation claims, the statute of 









limitations bars the Plaintiffs' claims in that regard. 
The Court will find that the Plaintiffs' reliance on C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway 
District No. 4, 139 Idaho 140 (2003 ), is inapplicable to this case. C & G involved a 
physical taking, where the government built a road through the owner's property and 
provided no compensation. That case stands for the proposition that a project 
completion rule extends statute of limitations. The basis for that ruling was that there 
was no reliable method to determine the extent of damages. In this case, the Plaintiffs 


















on July 16, 2006. The project completion rule as set out in C & G, is a very narrow 
application and in no way affected the McCuskey decision. There has been no 
showing made by the Plaintiffs that this was a physical taking and thus the Plaintiffs' 
claims that the project rule extended the statute of limitations is not applicable in this 
case. 
C. The Five Year Statute of Limitations 
The Plaintiffs have conceded that the five year statute of limitations for contracts 
is not applicable in this case. This case does not involve a contract; rather, it involves a 
taking or other violation of law. 
D. The Exhaustion and Voluntary Action Tests Under KMST 
The City asserts that the Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their remedies as set 
out in the case of KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577 (2003), and therefore, 
these claims fail. 
In the KMST case, the developer brought claims against the Ada County 
Highway District, one in connection with the Ada County Highway District road 
26 dedication requirement and another in connection with Ada County's Highway District 




























The Plaintiffs, through the documents that the Court has reviewed, deeded these 
lots and did not protest or in any way put the City on notice that they intended to 
challenge these ordinances. The Plaintiffs signed a Development Agreement providing 
that the transfer of these lots to the City would serve as credits against any fees 
charged in the future under Ordinance No. 820. The Court agrees that by failing to 
object, the Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. 
There are limited exceptions to the exhaustion requirement; specifically, when an 
agency acted outside its authority. In this case, the Plaintiffs are asserting that this is 
an as-applied challenge. The Court concurs that the decision in White v. Bannock 
County Comm'rs, 139 Idaho 396 (2003) is applicable here. The City would have been 
able to assess the situation and decide whether or not to proceed if the Plaintiffs had 
notified the City that the Development Agreement providing for community housing was 
unlawful. The Plaintiffs entered into the Development Agreement and the City complied 
with the terms of that Development Agreement. The exhaustion requirement is a 
requirement in place designed to avoid litigation such as the litigation that is before the 
Court. 
From the totality of the record before the Court, the dedication of these lots was 
a voluntary action on the part of the Plaintiffs. No ordinances were in effect at the time 
of the Development Agreement that compelled the Plaintiffs to convey these lots. 
Certainly the Plaintiffs, from the record, submitted the idea of the conveyance of these 
lots for community housing to the City. Ordinance No. 819 did not apply to the Plaintiffs 
because it had not been enacted until after they had filed for their SUB application. 
As pointed out in the application, there is specific language "while the applicant is 
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not required to provide a Community Housing Plan, the applicant has agreed to deed 
2 








McCall to provide Community Housing." As pointed out in KMST, voluntary actions do 
not give rise to takings. For these reasons, the Court will find as a matter of law that the 
Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as required. 
The Plaintiffs have set forth federal law claims and the City maintains that those 
federal law claims are barred for the following reasons: {1) The Plaintiffs failed to plead 
their federal claims under U.S.C § 1983; (2) The Plaintiffs' federal claims are blocked by 






Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); and (3) The Plaintiffs' federal 
claims are subject to a two year statute of limitations. 
The Court will find that the precedent set forth in Williamson County and as 
adopted in KMST, is applicable to the facts of this case. Williamson County dealt with 
15 the failure to seek a variance and the court ruled that the case was not ripe for that 
16 reason. In this case, the Plaintiffs failed to contest the Development Agreement. In this 
17 










timely and meaningful way in order to set up their claim that the exaction was 
involuntary. In this case, the Plaintiffs proposed, executed and carried out a 
development agreement. Thus, the Court will find there is no final decision as spelled 
out in Williamson County. Williamson County went on to hold that where a regulatory 
taking is alleged against the state or local government agency, the property owner must 
first seek compensation through the procedures the state has provided for doing so 
before litigating the federal claim. In this case, the Plaintiffs failed to seek judicial 
review of the decision by the City. From the Court's review of Williamson County, this is 
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a strict requirement for a federal takings claim. The Plaintiffs, thus, have failed to 
2 
complete this two step procedure and therefore their federal claims are barred. The 
3 Court further finds that the same application of Williamson County applies to the due 
4 process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment; and therefore, those claims are 
5 barred based upon the record before the Court. 
6 The Plaintiffs assert that there is an exception to the ripeness doctrine and that 
7 
occurs when the interests of justice so require and when an agency has acted outside 
8 
of its authority. The Idaho courts have ruled that in American Falls Reservoir Oist. No. 
9 
2 v. IDWR, 143 Idaho 862 (2007), that the exception for when an agency exceeds its 
10 
authority does not apply unless the rules are facially unconstitutional. The Plaintiffs in 
11 
12 
this case are claiming that their challenge is a facial challenge. The Court cannot find 
13 that this is a facial challenge. This action is an as applied challenge, not a facial 
14 I challenge. This was an action worked out between the Plaintiffs and the City providing 
15 for the conveyance of nine lots expressly; notwithstanding the non applicability of 
16 Ordinance No. 819. 
17 The Plaintiffs go on to assert that exhaustion does not apply in this case 
18 
because the Plaintiffs have no reason to question the City's policy and ordinances. The 
19 
Court can find no authority for the position that the Plaintiffs had no reason to question 
20 
the City's policy and ordinances as a defense to the exhaustion requirement. The 
21 
22 
Court will conclude then that the federal claims are subject to the two year statute of 
23 
limitations and therefore their federal claims are untimely. 
24 Based upon the Court's ruling the Court need not address the equitable 
25 defenses asserted by the City. 
26 




























The Court will find for the reasons set forth above that the Plaintiffs' claims are 
barred and the Court will grant the City's Motion for Summary Judgment. The City's 
counsel will prepare an appropriate judgment with a Rule 54(b) certification set forth. 
DATED this~ day of June 2011. 
MICHAEL McLAUGHLIN 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 




CITY OF McCALL, 
Oefendant/Counterclaimant. 
Cnsc No. CV 2010-276C 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
AND OBJECTION TO PROPOSED 
JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, Richard Hehr and Greystone Village, LLC (''Plaintiffs''), by 
and through their attorneys of record, Evans Keane LLP, move this Honorable Court to reconsider 
the Court's Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dated June 16. 
20 I I. Further, Plaintiffs object to the City of McCall's proposed Judgm~nt delivered under cover 
letter dated June 28, 2011. 
This motion and objection arc made and based upon the records. files and pleadings in the 
above-entitled matter. together with the Supporting Memorandum and Affidavit of Counsel tiled 
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herewith. Oral argument is not requested~ Plaintiffs will rely on their motion and supporting 
memorandum and affidavit. 
DATED this 29th day of June. 20 11 , 
EVANS KEANE LLP 
By K&i~~ 
Victor Villegas e Finn 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of June, 2011; a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was served by ftrst~class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax 
transmission to; by overnight delivery to: or by personally delivering to OJ' leaving with a person in 
charge of the office as indicated below: 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Martin C. Hendrickson 
Givens Pursley LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise~ ID 83701 .. 2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
Attorneys for Dr...1rmdant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 




CITY OF McCALL, 
Defcndant/Countcrclaimant. 
Case No. CV 2010-276C 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Plaintiffs/Countcrdefendants, Richard Hehr and Greystone Village. LLC ("Plaintiffs"), by 
and through their counsel of record. Evans Keane LLP. submit this Memorandum in support of their 
Motion to Reconsider the Court's Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment dated June t 6, 2011. 
I. lt'iTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs move this Court to reconsider its June 16, 2011, Memorandum Decision Rc: 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (the .. Memorandum Decision"), and to preserve the 
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375 
2011-06-29 16:55 Evans Keane LLP 208 345 3514 >> 2083827184 p 5/10 
issues addressed herein for appeal. In its Memorandum Decision, the Court entered summary 
judgment in tbvor of the City of McCall findingt among other things, that Plaintiffs voluntarily 
deeded nine lots and that summary judgment disposes of all issues in this case. For the reasons set 
forth below, Plaintiffs seek reconsideration from this Court with regard to its Memorandum 
Decision. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The Memorandum Decision does not Dispose of all of the Claims Asserted by 
Plaintit'fs. 
The Court's Memorandum Decision indicates that summary judgment is granted in full to the 
City and directs the City's counsel to prepare a judgment and Rule 54(b) Certificate. The City, 
however, did not address all of the claims in Plaintiffs· Complaint, it only addressed Plaintiffs' claim 
for inverse condemnation relative to conveyance of the nine lots. In addition to making a claim for 
the taking of Plaintiffs' property in the form of the nine lots conveyed to the City, the City also 
required Plaintiffs to construct roadway improvements and make utilities available to each of these 
nine lots. (See First Amended Complaint, n 19, 24.) Even after conveying the nine lots to the City, 
the City still required Plaintiffs to shoulder the costs ofbuildi11g the road and providing utilities to 
these nine lots. (Sec Affidavit of Victor Villegas in Support of Motion for Reconsideration 
("Villegas Affidavit''.), 'tj3, Ex. B.) 
Plaintiffs asked this Court to declare that these constmction requirements, in addition to the 
taking of Plaintiffs' nine lots, constitute an illegal tax against Plaintiffs. Se~. e.g. BHA rnvestments 
v. Cjty of Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 172, 108 P.3d 315, 319 (2004} (holding that where the government 
has no authority to charge a fee. the fee constitutes an i !legal tax subject to the takings clause ofboth 
the Idaho and federal constitution). It is an adjudicated fact that the City had no legal authority to 
require Plaintiffs to pay anything toward community housing, including the building of a roadway 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION· 2 
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and utilities to the nine lots conveyed to the City. The City did not address these claims in its 
Motion tbr Summary Judgment and the Court did not rule on these claims in its Memorandum 
Decision. Therefore, the Memorandum Decision did not fully dispose of all of Plaintiffs' claims and 
issues in this matter. 
B. The Record Establishes That There arc Genuine Issues of Material Fact with 
Regard to the Question of Whether Plaintiffs' Voh.lntnrily Donated the Nine 
Lots at Issue to the City of McCall. 
Plaintiffs may seek reconsidcratiOt'l of this Court's ruling under Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11 (a)(2)(B). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure ll(a)(2)(B) provides a district court with 
authority to reconsider interlocutory orders so long as final judgment has not been enter~d. This 
motion is timely and properly before the Court under Rule ll(a)(2)(B) as a motion for 
reconsideration because not all issues and claims asserted by Plaintiffs have been disposed ofin this 
matter. 
With regard to the question of whether Plaintiffs voluntarily contributed the lots at issue to 
the City, the Court states that "[c]ertainly the Plaintiffs, from the record, submitted the idea of the 
conveyance of these lots for community housing. . . . As pointed out in the application, there is 
specific language "while the applicant is not required to provide a Community Housing Plan, the 
applicant has agreed to deed the nine single family residential Jots that constitute Phase 3 of the 
project to the City of McCall to provide community housing. ••• (See Memorandum Decision, p. 8M 
9.) There is no evidence in the record that the Plaintiffs themselves submitted the idea of conveying 
the lots at issue for community housing. 
Importantly, the language quoted in the Memorandum Decision cannot be found in Plaintiffs' 
application for a subdivision and planned unit development. Rather, the language quoted in the 
Memorandum Decision is Finding of Fact No. 16 found in the April27 ~ 2006, McCall City Council 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPOR.T OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDER.ATION. 3 
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Planning and Zoning Commission Findings and Conclusion Regarding Application for Final Plat 
Approval. (See Affidavit of Michelle Groenvclt, Ex. Q.) This is a self~serving statement made by 
the City's Planning and Zoning Commission; it cannot be attributed to Plaintiffs. This factual 
scenario is distinguishable from KMST v. Ada County, 138 Idaho 557,67 P.3d 56(2003) whet'ethe 
applicant suggested, in its application, that it dedicate a roadway. Since the language quoted in the 
Memorandum Decision was the City's statement, not the Plaintiffs', that language cannot be relied 
upon as evidence that Plaintiffs voluntarily conveyed the nine lots at issue to the City. 
Furthennore, the record establishes, at the very least. that Plaintiffs satisfied the minimal 
standard at summary judgment to create genuine issues of material fact as to the issue of 
voluntariness. See I.R.C.P. S6. Plaintiffs submitted affidavits: from a former member of the City 
Council stating that community housing, in her opinion and experience, was not "voluntary", even 
before enactment of the relevant ordinances (See Affidavit of Bonnie Bertram); from Plaintiffs' 
engineer who stated community housing was not addressed in the application and community 
housing was a necessary component of the project (See Aftidavit of Dean W. Briggs); from 
P1aintiffs! accountant who stated that he did not seek a deduction on Plaintiffs' taxes because the lots 
were not a charitable contribution, but were conveyed to pay fees required by the City and thus 
could not qualify for a tax deductible donation (See Affidavit of Jeffery Beebe); and from Plaintiff 
Richard Hebr, who testified that he did not convey the lots as a cont-ribution to the City, but that they 
were conveyed in lieu of paying fees to the city for community housing (See Affidavit of Richard 
Hehr). Those affidavits clearly refute the City's position on the question of whether the lots were 
conveyed voluntarily. Nonetheless, these affidavits are not referenced in the Memorandum 
Decision. nor is there any cxpla11ation for how or why these affidavits fail to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact on the issue ofvoluntariness. The evidence contained in these affidavits is relevant to 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MO'riON FOR RECONSIDERA 'riON • 4 
378 
2011-06-29 16:56 Evans Keane LLP 208 345 3514 >> 2083827184 p 8/10 
and raise a genuine issue of materia! fact as to the issue of voluntariness. Viewed in a light most 
favorable to Plaintiffs and the non-moving party, these facts should be heard by a jury, not disposed 
of on summary judgment. 
The fact that Plaintiffs made no such offer to pay community housing fees or convey lots for 
community housing in their app1ication is further illustrated by the very portions of the record relied 
upon by the City to attempt to establish that Plaintiffs' actions where voluntary in this matter. For 
example. the minutes maintained by the City's Planning and Zoning Commission demonstrate that 
Plaintiffs did not suggest or offer to pay for community housing in their application. In a May 3, 
2005 meeting, the Planning and Zoning Chairman further questioned Plaintiffs' representative about 
community housing and a discussion regarding a different development by Plaintiffs, and how 
community housing applied to the application for this project. (See Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. B (p. 
7 of26).) Had Plaintiffs offered to voluntarily contribute to conununity housing in their applicatio" 
by conveying tbe nine lots at issue, there would have been no need or purpose for this question from 
the PI ann ing and Zoning Chairman. Further, an April 7. 2006 letter from an attorne;y, who was then 
representing PlaintiffGrcystone, questions whether Plaintiffs have ••satisfied the city's requirements 
for providing affordable housing." (See Gt•ocnevclt Affidavit, Ex. L) (emphasis added). This also 
illustrates the fact that Plaintiffs' conveyance of the nine lots was not voluntary, but rather was 
required by the City to satisfy its affordable housing policies. 
In addition to the parts of the record cited above and these affidavits, the City itself followed 
a written, required policy regarding community housing. In an October 19, 2006, Memorandum 
from Steven Hasson to McCall City Staff. Mr. Hasson instructs City personnel how to address 
community housing mitigation witb applicants. (See Villegas Affidavit, ,l 2, Ex. A.) This 
memorandum clearly states that applicants have an option to move forward with their projects 
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during the City's moratorium on the condition that the applicant ••offer a fonn ofaffotdable housing 
mitigation that is in keeping with the spirit and intent of the housing policy and ordinances that has 
[sic) been adopted by the City." {See rd.) This memorandum attempts to call any such offer by an 
applicant as "voluntary," but goes on to state that if the applicant proposes "a means of 
compensation as mitigation that is clearly insufficient. we should just return the penn it to them with 
a comment that in our judgment the form of consideratio~ does not resolve the affc::ct the 
construction ofthe residence will have on the City's affordable housing needs." (See Id.) In other 
words. the City continued to require that applicants mitigate for affordable housing and their 
building pem1its would be retumed to them if their proposed mitigation was deemed insuft1cient by 
City Staff. 
This memorandum was not produced by the City in response to Plaintiffs' discovery 
requests, but was obtained by Plaintiffs' counsel in separate litigation and is now submitted as 
evidence of the City's policy requiring community housing mitigation of all developers. (See I d.) 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure ll(aX2)(b) allows for the inclusion of this "new" evidence as part of 
this motion. 1 Seg Coeur d' 81em: Mining Co. v. First Nat. f?ank ofNorth Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 822-
23800 P.2d 1026 (1990). 
Based on the record in total, including testimony contained in the affidavits submitted by 
Plaintiffs on summary judgment. there was no intent on Plaintiffs' part that conveyance of the nine 
lots was voluntary. The statement attributed to Plaintiffs with regard to the conveyance of the nine 
lots was actually made by the City. Addhionally, the October 19, 2006. memorandum to McCall 
City Staff further illustrates the City•s approach in extracting the illegal community housing fees 
1 On Plaintiffs' Motion 10 Vu<:atc Heari1tg, the Court ornlly llssured Plnintift:._• counsel that th<: Court would consider 
new evidence submitted by Plaintiffs ifit pertained lO the voluntnrincss issue rniscd by the: City's Motion for 
Summary Jt.1dsmcnt. 
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from applicants such as Plaintiffs. The record, taken as a whole, supports Plaintiffs contentiOi1 that 
they did not convey the lots at issue voluntarily, but rather were forced to convey the lots by the 
City. In light of this. Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court reconsider and an'\end its 
Memorandum Decision witb regard to the issue ofvoluntariness. 
III. CONCLUSION 
l•or the above reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court reconsider and/or amend 
its Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dated June 16,201 L 
DATED this 29111 day of June, 2011. 
EVANS KEANE LLP 
By_ }Q,;, ~ 
Victor Vill~s, fte Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFTCA TE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29111 day of June, 20llt a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax 
transmission to~ by overnisht delivery to~ or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in 
charge of tbe office as indicated below: 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Martin C. Hendrickson 
Givens Pursley LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, lD 83701·2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
Attorneys .for Defendant 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X) Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
Victor vmesas 
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CITY OF McCALL~ 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV 2010-276C 
AFFJDA VIT OF VICTOR VILLEGAS 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
VICTOR VILLEGAS, being duly sworn upon oath deposes and says as follows: 
l. I am a partner in the law tim1 of EvANS KEANE LLP, and represent Plaintiffs Richard 
Hchr and Grcystone Village, LLC ( .. Plaintiffs .. ) in the above--entitled matter. and have personal 
knowledge of the facts set forth ln this affidavit. 
2. I represented the Mountain Central Board of Realtors® in a previous case brought 
against the City of McCall, Case No. CV-2006-490-C. During discovery in that case, I received an 
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electronic file of an October 19, 2006, memorandum from Steven Hasson to all City of McCall Staff. 
A true and correct copy of the memorandum that is in my possession is attached as Exhibit A. 
Portions of the copy of this memorandum in my possession are unreadable because the electronic 
file is corrupted. 
3. Attached as Exhibit B to this affidavit is a true and correct copy of an e-mail thread 
produced in discovery by Defendant City of McCall, Bates Numbered COM002962-002963. dated 
July 26, 2007. 
,.••'-;,';Rii,i~IQC'RlBED and SWORN to before me this 29th day of June, 2011 . 
.... ,~ ........ ~~ .... ~ 
.- ~""' _;/ ~ 
/"/ ~o'tAR)' '\ ~ ~ ·~ 
; : ....... :: ----~-~'4-~""'""'"<-~~~....;....;:;;.;;...;~-------
\. \ /llua\..\c,. i Nol>ublic forldaho 
· .. .st ~I Res1aing in Boise, Idaho 
. ··~"' 11! ot \~:,_,.:- My Commission Expires: 03/08/20 12 ...... "'"--' 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I 1-IEREBY CERTIFY that on tbis 29th day of June. 201 I, a true and com::ct copy of the 
foregoing document was served by first-class mail. postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax 
transmission to; by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in 
charge of the office as indicated below; 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Martin C. Hendrickson 
Givens Pursley LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, TO 83701-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
Attorneys for Defendant 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ J Hand Delivery 
AFFIOA VlT OF VICTOR VILLEGAS IN SUPPORT Of.' MOTION FOR RECONSlO~RA TION -2 
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CITY OF MCCALL 
;:r :: g ·=! ! I § f 
October 19. 2DCI5 
l o: MCCI!ID Olly Sfaff /~ 
From~ $4e\ttn Ha:sson, A~CP ~If 
17 
; :s .: : :es u :: ===:: ; ,: 
"~nr.;:!);,.~ 4dvi~mgo ap,pll~l'!ts :.bnut lil)r<JMary atr'on;fable ttou&tog m,~rs,tatloo p&ym$n( 
Oe.ar ::~l.lotff' He~ •~ ;a torma~ that Jo'OU lif1C3Uid ftll!' up.on fr.'lf' a~stng 11<34untftry lldf~Druable il~q~ 
rn~at!Qo ptoposflr.;., 
A.<fvlse Uwt appliCant tNt •hey h:.ilvll! mo ~ol'l to m~e fClt"l\rard t.-n tJlelr buikfing .penn~! aj)p#ica6tln 
dl.l'nng ~ .mo~onum - prcM'ded' 'ltiOy <r1f~ s form Gf aff«dabre h®:;.lng ~n thm 14 in 
1<eepit19 'Wilh ltlf: Slpl'lf al"'d fnlsnt of lie "housing POlicY antf or~~s that hat~- beet\ adop~ by 
1he Citv. 
*\l!Ul'IE' iNs is a 'Valu~ry eftt:lt1 Ol• r.h.etl part- iilpp!sc:Qnt~:o Me fteEJ fo propotft wt'ta\ 1tley ~ 
r&ln ~r;g 'W\tt. :lt\.e ~plrif and in1011t of thl:! CJt,,.~ afl'orda~ h01Jai14g progum. sr lite :woofiCilnt 
3$ks tor assisliiifl'Cie In fee d~~aon we should pro~ them a ecJi1Y ol !~ 'tee .. cruetur~ 
wllhOOI o1teftng CQ~mmen-t ~ 1&\ay mus1 folrow !'hi$ p3)'mllii'Jt ~n 
If lh~y ;.as~ tu Ni.!IY upon ~~ cornpertsatlM ft:li"'Tt'Uliil w.o r>l'1c.u • .ri0 aocommods~e th«n W'ftll.out m~~I11Q' 
<:(ltnJll&r~ts t.o the lil'ff'ect fi'Jat u.,.y ,.,~ U\e .1ghr a 'llll'Or!Q cMlc9. 1f ~ p~ to JN:IY fCC~• tnoy 
~ho~.~rd bo stven ~ couy of I11P. \vtiJ,.,rJto&r-N&e form ~Y wlll be .ast<l!!d to s,igh 
tf tntli'IPPI~nllillqulr~ as co wt1a1 •<I:'-·• 1'\J".~ ........ ,.,, ~".,...,.., .. Jql '.•;• -r~:""''"::r~~::i·r. rjl •::•t"J ~ ·M-
oQid llle foes an.Q &I~ a waiVer. •· • f~·· • ;""'• ..... ·••·• .... ~ ~ :r"t " ""'".II·•. ,.J••*·~ hJII' r.'I:•·J"'H.~,.;~ 
otrwen have er~tod sc · . :'.,.. ,_.,.., .--r,. n;~"' :,., ""'.t'fil'• ''P'""~:~e~:~';.l •'<#:! =,.~(~ ~r:111111~'111) 
dt1fert1nt iftti"Y et~aose ~,.,-= •: ...... ,1t~ w:• .. ..,. ""'"'•""~l' 
\r 0'1&~ p:o~:ms~ a ;nean'5; of c:om~nsatltlh as m~rm tt1at as dtil'ly' ltl~l we $t\CUlti just 
retum the petmif to '!..llDrn ~n a COrTtMDnt t.1\tiC In our Judgment tne fortt~ ot ;oo~~ dqes Mt 
feGOl"~e ll"te .._'1: 'lhe OOMtrocUon ol lie Tt~Gidenc» WI'M haY& an 1M cctYs aff«dabCm Jloueinp 
~s. ~ ort:financ::e fOI!> swerure stlould be ~em\l; guide YQU ~ t.tse to determll'l& if tnl'l 
offo~ ~mr:'Snttllioo Js .11d~ete 
St.# ~t:l n·14'1Jc(l no effort 1t> WI ~ llow too t."'ll'e' tht tlifM of instlfrldent OOil'lpeooatiQt"'. S1a1T 
ean and s.h(luld as~ iJI"'f .<lp~lc-...-rtJon why !My be!ieV& t!\e oH'erod ~ml)snsatkm Is adL--c;Wl~. 
Jf U1oy o1ff:l .a form -uf com..:aos:tdioo or m~.aMI\ that tli .;~rii)naf (sU¢h G:$ 'I :.t Duffalo} ~etl !hB 
ttetermiMtion ~ wtre\her that is. StJfrn::ieftll'!litfQ.a~n ro res oM, tilt: Glty$ affordabi., rousi.ny 
1'1eo~ crca1ed 01 itlm~ec tt\1 tfle eor,~ of d'le rfiSll:fei"IQI) s~ 00 tofWGr®l:f » Rogor 
Mclt.er for nis ~~ment. 11 you feel CJI'IoQOmforillbl'e- returni~ ttte preorml! b«:atJse ~r is likilry 
ln~u.lfftc:iem ;, its rneans. of ~~n- thflll feel "'"to r~r<l tMt. u:s ~ for t'll$ TO\tlew. 
Tots~~ appl\cclot ~ tne «far~ m~on wilr twt ro~ &nd a dee!~ rna<ltJ. 1f'ley w.lll'le 
lntorm.,a or the ~iQn 
A.d.,.r.~ en~ ~Dpli<mnl that :sny 3t:ilff de~Grl'l"~rtatlun 1$ ~poet~l:!!:,l~ to » higher a\llnority. 
We Sl'lour<l !ry i'll1d be ·~- nQt~lfal 4~ ~O~~i#ble ana .nal ern:CtJI':l3gQ> « di~CUrii'$Je lhl!' nri,tgMn 
cffer..,li. 
::: d i 
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From: Roger Millar (malito:rmnlar@co.missoula.mt.us) 
Sent: Thursday, July 261 2007 12:08 PM 
To: MIChelle GI"'enevelt 
Cc: Amanda.catrlngton@Oi2M.c:om; carol Coyle; Undley KTrkpatrlck; steven Hesson; William F. Nichols 
Subject: Re: Greystont!: VIllage questions 
MicheUe, 
On issue #1, G.-.ystone Village subdivided property and then ga11e platted lots to the City. Part of subdivision is 
providing infrastructure to the lots being created. The engmeenng plans reflect this. It was theirs to do when they 
planned on selfing the lots and stllf theil'& to do with the donation. 
On isstJe #2, Greystone Village's donation was good for up to the appraised value on community housing fees 
only. They still have to pay water and sewer end they stiP hav9 to compete for EDU. 
Roger 
Roger M. Millar, PE, AICP 
DirectQr 
Missoula City·County Office of Planning & Grants 
435 Ryman Street 
Missoula, MT 59802-4292 
Phone: (408) 258-4657 
Fax: (406) 258-4903 
>>>"Michelle Groeoovelr cmgroeMvelt@meeall.id.us:. 712612007 12.:021'M >» 
Roget, 
Steve, Rlek and I met wlth one of the owners, Richard Hehr, from 
Greystone Vhlage th~ moming to discuss a number of Issues related to 
the project Stave Benacf fs no longer Involved In the project so 
Rlchatd was trying to fill In the information gaps blc he has a new 
partner. The question came up whore in writing did It say the 
applicant ls responsible for road Improvements on McCall Avenue. I 
soat'Ched the file and did not find anything in the fin<.tings or the 
development agreement. Do you know of any written documentadon of this 
requirement? My thought is the Greystonc Village I, H and lit were 
oonsk:lered one prOjeot and therefore required to make all infrastructure 
improvements. The construction drawingsll'lnal plat show these 
improvements. 
Also, the development agreement states, "The appraised market value of 
the lots shall provide Greystone Village with an offset again:M 
community housing fee$ for the Greystone Villag& projects. 'l'he 
applicant will also receive the associated benefits of the community 
housing c:ontributions in the building permit alloc:cttioo process." 
Old this negotiation between you and Steve: mean th8t Gteystone Village 
is exempt from community housing fees (up to the appraised market value 
$1.3 milliOn) and the unlts do not compete for building permits/EDUs or 
mhtml;filc:I/C:\Documents and Settings\michciie\Loeal Scttings\T~mp\MSNL\PVC1263... 12115/2009 
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Michelle M. 13roenevelt 
Community Planner 
City of McCan 
216 East Park Street 
McCall, Idaho 83638 
PhOne: (208)634--4256 
Fax:(208)634-3038 
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